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FINAL SCIENTIFIC/TECHNICAL REPORT

EUREICA: Efficient UltRa Endpoint IoT-enabled Coordinated Architecture

WORK PERFORMED UNDER AGREEMENT
DE-OE0000920

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Submitted: June 30, 2025

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Acknowledgment and Disclaimer

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Chapter 1

Abstract

The electricity grid has evolved from a physical system to a cyber-physical system with digital devices that perform measurement, control, communication, computation, and actuation. The increased penetration of distributed energy resources (DERs) that include renewable generation, flexible loads, and storage provides extraordinary opportunities for improvements in efficiency and sustainability. However, they can introduce new vulnerabilities in the form of cyberattacks, which can cause significant challenges in ensuring grid resilience. The purpose of this project was to develop a framework ((Efficient, Ultra-REsilient, IoT-Coordinated Assets, or EUREICA)for achieving grid resilience through suitably coordinated assets including a network of Internet of Things (IoT) devices, and a local electricity market (LEM) to identify trustable assets and carry out this coordination. Situational Awareness (SA) of locally available DERs with the ability to inject power or reduce consumption is enabled by the market, together with a monitoring procedure for their trustability and commitment. Experiments conducted during this project demonstrated that, with this SA, a variety of cyberattacks can be mitigated using local trustable resources without stressing the bulk grid. The demonstrations were carried out using a variety of high-fidelity co-simulation platforms, real-time hardware-in-the-loop validation, and a utility-friendly simulator.

Chapter 2

Introduction and Motivation

The electricity grid is going through a rapid transformation in an effort toward deep decarbonization. Large synchronous generators powered by fossil fuels such as oil, natural gas, and coal are being phased out in favor of solar and wind-based generation. While such renewable resources enable the necessary move towards a reduced carbon footprint, the transition brings two major challenges in ensuring reliable and resilient delivery of electricity to the end user. The first of these is the temporal signature of these renewables – the amount of generation varies with time, both in terms of intermittency and uncertainty. The second is that these are distributed and large in number. A strong enabler of the scale of the DERs is IoT, which denotes a network of physical devices such as water heaters (WHs), air-conditioners, and electric vehicles (EVs), as they enable automated and fast operation of various loads. Additionally, their pervasiveness brings in complexities of heterogeneity, decentralization, and scale. In order to ensure the reliability of the grid despite these challenges, a precise coordination of these DERs, both in space and time, has to be carried out. In particular, power balance of generation and consumption has to be ensured at all locations and at each instant. These challenges are being overcome using a pervasive cyber layer that senses, communicates, coordinates, and enables the requisite power injection and consumption throughout the grid.

In addition to reliability, an essential property of the electricity grid is its resilience [120]. This central property, which denotes the ability of the grid to withstand and recover quickly to supply critical loads following a major disruption/outage, such as a natural calamity, a cyberattack, or a cascading failure, is paramount, even with increased penetration of DERs. In this context of ensuring resilience, the very transformations that enable deep decarbonization, including the development of cyber-grid infrastructure, adoption of IoT devices, use of dynamic renewable energy sources, and increased electrification of transportation, could also introduce new vulnerabilities. Cyberattacks can disclose, deceive, or disrupt crucial information, thereby causing significant damage, ranging from small outages to brownouts and blackouts. Recent reports [11, 121, 125, 167] indicate the ubiquity, ease, and scale of cyberattacks on sensitive industrial environments including supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA), operational technology (OT), and industrial control systems (ICS), underscoring the importance of ensuring resilience to such adversaries.

By and large, most of the information for power grid operations flows through utility-controlled communication networks which are more reliable and resilient than commercial networks, and utilize commercial telecommunications services for other informational needs such as accessing the internet and communicating with customers. Such a tight separation is challenged by the increased information flow which becomes necessary with a stronger presence of a cyber-layer, which in turn is necessitated due to increased coordination and automation at the grid edge. What have been tight closed systems thus far, may have to relax their boundaries, introducing complexities in the underlying communication. While air gaps and protections will always be important and included, imperfect protections are inevitable as complexity increases. With the increased penetration of instrumentation and automation, motors and generators may be controlled by adversaries and switches manipulated to open and close at will. Another point to be noted is that with increased complexities due to intermittent and uncertain (variable) generation and consumption, utilities alone cannot cater to all needs, and public and private partnerships may be necessary. It is therefore extremely important to design an appropriate cyberinfrastructure that ensures that the lights stay on, despite increased communication, which may be between disparate stakeholders. The focus of this report is on such a distributed decision-making framework (EUREICA).

Given the size and complexity of the problem of cyberattacks, providing a complete resilience framework for the entire power grid is a tremendously difficult task. This project, proposed a first step of providing SA to the distribution grid operators , with SA corresponding to the knowledge of local DERs in terms of their location and the amount of power generation that they are able to provide, as well as a resilience score (RS) that the operators can make use of to provide resilience. To achieve this first step, the project team explored a novel method that enables providing SA through a local electricity market (LEM) structure that consists of operators at the different voltage levels of a distribution grid. This market structure is proposed to be local, across the distribution grid, electrically co-located with primary and secondary circuits, with operators scheduling all DERs at the corresponding nodes in a given region. The LEM will also include IoT-coordinated assets (ICAs), with the assumption that the ICAs will have computing capability and the ability to exchange information. The overall framework, EUREICA, is the innovation in the proposed cyberinfrastructure, and will be shown to lead to SA made available to operators placed hierarchically at various locations, thereby providing an important first step in ensuring resilience.

LEMs have been addressed in several studies including [22, 36, 86, 118, 134, 154], with real-field implementations beginning to be reported [104, 162], all of which show the feasibility of a local market structure, and its advantages compared to alternate solutions that are designed to encourage full participation of DERs [65, 121]. The proposed LEM structure that we propose in this paper builds on that concept [118]. The resilience of the electricity grid to cyberattacks has been explored in a very large number of studies (see [27, 44, 100, 125] and references therein), with new results appearing continuously. Broadly, these approaches can be categorized into detection and isolation of the attack [99], prevention of the attack, and resilience in the presence of attacks. For large-scale attacks such as those described in [48, 152, 167], these methods are inadequate; it may be near-impossible to identify the attacker but rather that an attack has occurred. Prevention of the attack can be enabled through varying levels of access and authorization [68] and monitoring, isolation, and protection at the component level [167]. However, as the scale, location, and number of IoT devices in particular, and DERs in general grow, it becomes exceedingly difficult to completely prevent attacks. Ensuring resilience, especially in the face of large-scale attacks, for a large-scale system such as the electricity grid, is exceedingly difficult; current literature has either focused on systems at a small scale or with low levels of renewables. The EUREICA framework developed during this research will provide SA that detects that an attack has occurred, and with this SA, deploys trustable ICAs in order to mitigate the impact of the attack and ensures grid resilience through a distributed decision-making strategy.

The distributed decision-making in EUREICA is enabled through an LEM, a schematic of which is shown in Figure 2.1. Figure 2.2 shows the LEM situated in the context of the overall distribution grid network. The same market structure [118], which has been shown to lead to grid reliability [117] and provide grid services such as voltage support [115] in addition to overall power balance, is demonstrated in this report to ensure grid resilience against cyberattacks using local trustable DERs. In particular, the results achieved during this project show that local resilience is attainable through SA of locally available ICAs that have the ability to inject power or reduce consumption as well as a procedure for monitoring their trustability and commitment. The demonstrations were carried out using a variety of platforms such as (i) Gridlab-D^{TM} which enables the simulation of distribution grids with high fidelity, (i) the advanced research on integrated energy systems (ARIES) platform that includes a real-time digital simulator (RTDS) and enables hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) validation, and (iii) General Electric's advanced distribution management system (ADMS) [16], distribution operations training simulator (DOTS), and DER integration middleware (DERIM).



Figure 2.1: A Hierarchical LEM for a Distribution Grid. The resilience infrastructure utilizes the dual market layer consisting of PM-SM.



Figure 2.2: LEM electrically co-located with distribution grid. This shows a primary and secondary feeder distribution network based on the modified IEEE-123 node test case.

1 Project team organization

The EUREICA project was organized into two main groups. The first group consisted of academic research teams at Princeton University, West Virginia University (WVU), and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. They were primarily responsible for the development of algorithms and frameworks for each module of the project, along with numerical simulations. Princeton's contributions are sumamrized in Chapter 4, which focused on analyzing and enhancing the security and privacy of federated machine learning methods. WVU's contributions are in Chapter 5. MIT's contributions are in Chapter 6, which focused on developing the overall hierarchical retail market structure based on optimization methods, power flow modeling, and game theory [116]. Each team was responsible for different aspects of the project, including the development of algorithms, simulations, and experimental validation. The following sections provide a brief overview of each team's contributions to the project. The second group of the project team consisted of validation partners in both industry and at national labs, namely the National Renewable Energy Laboratory, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Larsen & Turburo (L&T) Digital Energy Services, and General Electric. The various validation platforms developed and used by each partner are described in Chapter 7. The remaining chapters focus on the extensive validation results with both software and hardware. Chapter 8 focuses on the validation of the federated learning module, while Chapter 9 and Chapter 10 focus on validating the blue-sky (voltage regulation) and black-sky (resilience) scenarios, respectively.

Chapter 3

Problem Statement

In this chapter, we delineate the problem statement, which pertains to vulnerabilities that can occur in a distribution grid which is seeing an increasing penetration of DERs. As a result, vulnerabilities in the form cyberattacks can occur, where a variety of devices that can denied service, disrupted, or be forced to disclose their identity due to adversaries tampering with communication. With as the starting point, we briefly describe the approach that we take to ensure grid resilience and outline the scenarios that we will explore to demonstrate how gid resilience can be achieved using our approach.

Traditionally, electricity delivery to end users typically starts at a generator, and traverses transmission and distribution networks. Distribution substations connect to the transmission system (operating at 69kV or higher), and gradually step down the voltage to 44kV, 33kV, 23kV, or 11.2/4.6kV (denoted as a primary network). Distribution transformers (near the end user) then step the voltage down to 110V or 220V (denoted as a secondary network) depending on the specific region in the world. While the 20th century witnessed distribution systems operating as simple networks for sharing the electricity delivered from the generator by the transmission system, today's distribution systems are increasingly becoming heavily integrated with distributed energy resources, that correspond to resources that are located closer to the load, including renewable generation, some of which may be behind the meter [121], batteries, and flexible consumption units. This in turn is causing distribution systems to become more independent, and to be required to take on increased responsibilities of services such as grid reliability and grid resilience. Other examples of DERs are distributed photovoltaics (DPVs) like rooftop solar arrays, combined heat and power (CHP) plants, electric vehicles (EVs), and diesel generators (DGs). DERs vary in size, from DPV systems that range between 1and 1000kW in size to larger ground-mounted solar farms that can supply up to several MW. With technological advances in power electronics, associated smart inverters, as well as protection systems, fewer restrictions are being placed on the size and locations of the DERs, providing an opportunity for them to play stronger and more central roles in grid reliability and resilience [71].

Over the past years, DERs have been shown to be increasingly useful in providing key grid services such as volt-var control [156]. The central idea in these explorations is that key information is exchanged, in a distributed manner, between suitable individual components in the primary and secondary networks, coordinated both in space and time, thereby allowing local control over power injection and reduction of load at key locations and instances. Such seamless operation of the complete distribution network is predicated on key information reaching the recipients in a secure manner. This sets the stage for malicious attacks that can disconnect and disrupt the overall grid by impairing key components.

Several attacks on power systems have been recently reported [72, 83, 92, 152, 153, 167, 175, 176] on the central control systems, key nodes in the distribution grid, or at the devices at the end-user level. Attacks at the device end, denoted as MadIoT (Manipulation of Demand via IoT) attacks, correspond to a botnet at a secondary network node that causes the corresponding load to change abruptly. If this node corresponds to a high-wattage device, and the attack is coordinated through malware that simultaneously corrupts a large number of these devices, an argument can be made that it can cause frequency instabilities, line failures, and subsequently a severe disruption on the overall power grid. Building on the results in [72, 153], the results in [152] show that even with realistic load profiles, a strategically coordinated attack can achieve a better success rate than in [72, 153], requiring fewer compromised IoT devices without triggering well-established protection systems. The well-known attack studied in [167] on the other hand is at the central control system level, which was a well-planned strategic attack that led to a power outage affecting 250,000 customers over a significant period of time. The question addressed by this project, and explored in this report, is: *How can we use a cyberinfrastructure with IoT-Coordinated Assets (ICA) to support grid resilience against cyber-attacks?*

The specific approach that we propose to circumvent the anomalous scenario consists of two steps: (1) Enable improved visibility over the grid and net power injections available at various nodes through a hierarchical market structure with operators at the primary network and secondary network nodes; (2) Enable the market operators to determine an RS computed through monitoring of various features of the communication network. Steps (1) and (2) together provide SA to the grid operators (as shown in Equation (6.1)). The central thesis of this project is that, through the SA enabled by the EUREICA framework, operators can determine that an attack has occurred and take appropriate steps to mitigate the impact of the attack in a timely manner. The system operators and resilience managers are suitably co-located with the electrical assets so as to respond quickly through a distributed decision-making framework. The framework therefore avoids the computational pitfalls of a centralized architecture while still underpinned by a substrate of communication, sensing, and actuation. The overall solution is also well-placed to integrate with the existing grid operational and market structures, helping accelerate its adoption in the field. Table 3.1 lists all the attacks that were studied, with further details and simulation results provided in Chapter 10.

Attack Number	Attack type	Attack surface	Grid connection	Power flow model	Grid model	Scale of attack [kW]
1a	LA	PMA	Grid-connected	Current injection	Unbalanced, 3-phase	36
1b	DG	PMA	Grid-connected	Current injection	Unbalanced, 3-phase	45
1c	DG	SMA	Grid-connected	Current injection	Unbalanced, 3-phase	157
2a	DG	PMA	Grid-connected	Branch flow	Balanced, single-phase	261
2b	DG	PMA	Grid-connected	Branch flow	Balanced, single-phase	650
3	DG	PMA	Islanded	Current injection	Unbalanced, 3-phase	2500

Table 3.1: Summary of attack scenarios and use-cases, LA = load alteration attack, DG = distributed generator attack.

Chapter 4

FL security and privacy: Princeton Team

One of the first contributions of this project is the prevention of backdoor attacks to ensure cyberphysical security of the power grid. In this chapter, we describe two different methods that are capable of providing defense against backdoor attacks and model poisoning attacks. These are termed Neurotoxin and SparseFed. Neurotoxin is proposed as a simple one-line modification of existing backdoor attacks that acts by attacking parameters that change less in magnitude during training. SparseFed uses global top-k update sparsification and device-level gradient clipping to mitigate model poisoning attacks. Both methods are especially helpful for ensuring robustness when employing the Federating Learning paradigm, a tool that has proven to be highly useful in estimating consumption data from various assets, including HVAC, electric vehicles, and smart buildings with multiple flexible devices.

Due to their decentralized nature, federated learning (FL) systems have an inherent vulnerability to adversarial backdoor attacks during their training. In this type of attack, the goal of the attacker is to use poisoned updates to implant so-called backdoors into the learned model such that, at test time, the model's outputs can be fixed to a given target for certain inputs. For the EUREICA project, neurotoxin is proposed as a simple one-line modification of existing backdoor attacks that acts by attacking parameters that are changed less in magnitude during training. Additionally SparseFed is proposed as a novel defense that uses global top-k update sparsification and device-level gradient clipping to mitigate model poisoning attacks. Furthermore, a theoretical framework is proposed for analyzing the robustness of defenses against poisoning attacks and to provide robustness and convergence analysis of the algorithms developed during this project.

1 Neurotoxin Introduction

Federated learning is a paradigm for distributed machine learning that is being adopted and deployed at scale by large corporations [80, 108] such as Google (for Gboard [171]) and Apple (for Siri [132]). In the FL setting, the goal is to train a model on disjoint data distributed across many thousands of devices [80]. The FL paradigm enables training models across consumer devices without aggregating data. However, FL systems deployed are often *not* robust to "backdoor attacks" [18, 21, 164]. Because FL models serve billions of requests daily [67, 132], it is critical that FL is robust.



Figure 4.1: Neurotoxin inserts a durable backdoor (that persists **5X** longer than the baseline) into an LSTM trained on the Reddit dataset for next-word prediction. It takes just 11 rounds for the baseline's accuracy to drop below 50 % and 24 rounds to drop to 0 %. Neurotoxin maintains accuracy above 50 % for 67 rounds and non-zero accuracy for over 170 rounds.

Attackers have strong incentives to compromise the behavior of trained models [18, 21], and they can easily participate in FL by compromising devices [24]. For example, if EvilCorporation wants to change public perception about their competitor GoodCorp, they could install firmware onto company-owned devices (normally used by GoodCorp employees) to implement a backdoor attack into a next word prediction model. Once the backdoor is installed, if someone types the name GoodCorp, the model will autocomplete the sentence to "GoodCorp steals from customers." Consequently, the EUREICA focused on such attacks wherein the attacker's goal is to insert a *backdoor* into the trained model. This backdoor can then be triggered by a specific keyword or pattern by using corrupted model updates without compromising the test accuracy. Prior work has empirically demonstrated that backdoor attacks can succeed even when various defenses are deployed during training [20, 151].

Backdoors typically need to be constantly reinserted to survive retraining by benign devices, as discussed in [164]. Thus, an important factor in the real-world relevance of these backdoor attacks in FL is their *durability*: How long can an inserted backdoor remain relevant *after* the attacker stops participating? FL models can be retrained after an attack for multiple reasons: the attacker's participation in the training process may be temporary because they control a limited set of devices [18]; or the central server is retrained over trusted devices as a defense [169]. As illustrated in Fig. 4.1, erasing backdoors from prior work is as straightforward as retraining the final model for a few epochs.

As part of the EUREICA project, Neurotoxin was designed to insert more *durable backdoors* into FL systems. At a high level, Neurotoxin increases the robustness of the inserted backdoor to retraining. A key insight in the design of Neurotoxin is a more principled choice of update directions for the backdoor that aims to avoid collision with benign users. Neurotoxin projects the adversarial gradient onto the subspace unused by benign users. This increases the stability of the backdoored model to perturbations in the form of updates during retraining. While edge case attacks have succeeded by attacking underrepresented data [164], Neurotoxin succeeds by attacking underrepresented parameters.

An extensive empirical evaluation on three natural language processing tasks (next word generation for Reddit and sentiment classification for IMDB and Sentiment140) is provided [for two model architectures (LSTM and Transformer), and on three computer vision datasets (classification on CIFAR10, CIFAR100, and EMNIST) for two model architectures (ResNet and LeNet)] against a *defended* FL system. As illustrated in Fig. 4.1, Neurotoxin implants backdoors that last 5 × longer than the baseline. With Neurotoxin, the durability of state of the art backdoors can be doubled by adding a single line of code. As a result, by using Neurotoxin, the attacker can embed backdoors that are triggered with a *single word.* While prior attacks cannot insert single word triggers, (because the embedding of a single word will almost always be overwritten by updates from benign devices), Neurotoxin updates subspaces such that the backdoor is not overwritten.

While work performed during this project introduces a powerful new attack that is capable of embedding backdoors in deployed systems, are the project team was aware of the ethical implications of publishing such an attack. In the field of security and privacy, uncovering an attack and raising awareness about it is the first step towards solving the problem. This report includes a detailed discussion of the efficacy of a number of defenses against this novel attack that were explored during this project.

2 Durable backdoors in federated learning

This section discusses the motivation for the problem of increasing backdoor durability, and then introduces Neurotoxin, which is an intuitive single line addition on top of any existing attack.

2.1 Motivation and Prior Attacks

For this portion of the study, attacks that can compromise only a small percentage of devices in FL are considered ($< 1\%$) [151]. Compromised devices can participate a limited number of times in the course of an FL training session. This parameter (labeled AttackNum) was varied by interpolating between single-shot attacks [18] and continuous attacks [130, 164]. Stronger attackers can participate many times, but strong attacks should be effective even when the attacker only participates a limited number of times. Because the attacker cannot participate in every round of training, and because prior work has shown the effectiveness of retraining the model in smoothing out backdoors [169], the durability of injected backdoors was analyzed after an attack concluded, while the model is being updated with only benign gradients.

A compromised device can upload any vector as their update to the server. The types of backdoors and optimization methods used by prior work on backdoor attacks can be generalized as follows: the attacker constructs the poisonous update vector by computing the gradient over the poisoned dataset $\widehat{D} = \{x, y\}$. This is sampled from the test-time distribution, on which the attacker wants to induce misclassification. For instance, for a trigger-based backdoor attack, x will consist of a sample from the test-time distribution augmented with the trigger [18] and y. The attacker's goal is for the updated vector to poison the model:

$$\widehat{g} = A(\nabla L(\theta, \widehat{D})); \quad \theta = \theta - S(\widehat{g}); \quad \theta(x) = y. \tag{4.1}$$

The function A represents any number of strategies the attacker can use to ensure their update vector achieves the goal, e.g., projected gradient descent (PGD) [159], alternating minimization [21], boosting [18], etc. Similarly, S represents server-side defenses, e.g., clipping the ℓ_2 norm of the update vectors to prevent model replacement [159].

2.2 Why Backdoors Vanish

It has been well established by prior work that backdoors are temporary [18]. That is, even a very strong attacker attacking an undefended system must continue participating to maintain their backdoor; otherwise, the attack accuracy will quickly dwindle (e.g., see Figure 4 in [164]). To understand this phenomenon, provide intuition is provided on the dynamics between adversarial and benign gradients.

Let $\widehat{\theta}$ be the attacker's local model that minimizes the loss function L on the poisoned dataset $\widehat{D}$. Consider a toy problem where the attacker's model $\widehat{\theta}$ differs from the global model θ in just one coordinate. Let i be the index of this weight $\widehat{w}_i$ in $\widehat{\theta}$; without loss of generality, let $\widehat{w}_i > 0$. The attacker's goal is to replace the value of the weight w_i in the global model θ with their weight $\widehat{w}_i$. Let $T = t$ be the iteration when the attacker inserts their backdoor, and for all $T > t$ the attacker is absent in training. In any round $T > t$, benign devices may update w_i with a negative gradient. If w_i is a weight used by the benign global optima θ^*, there is a chance that any update vector will erase the attacker's backdoor. With every round of FL, the probability that the attacker's update is not erased decreases.

2.3 Neurotoxin

The proposed backdoor attack, which exploits the sparse nature of gradients in stochastic gradient descent (SGD) is described below. It is empirically known that the majority of the ℓ_2 norm of the aggregated benign gradient is contained in a very small number of coordinates [76, 158]. Thus, by making sure that this new attack only updates coordinates that the benign agents are unlikely to update, the backdoor can be in the model thereby creating a more powerful attack.

Basic approach. For the EUREICA project, this intuition was used to design an attack which only updates coordinates that are not frequently updated by the rest of the benign users. The baseline attack, as well as Neurotoxin, which is a one-line addition to the baseline attack, is described in full in Algorithm 1 (shown on the previous page). The attacker downloads the

Algorithm 1 (Left.) Baseline attack. (Right.) Neurotoxin. The difference is the red line.

```
Input: learning rate $\eta$, local batch size $\ell$, number of local epochs $e$, current local parameters $\theta$, downloaded gradient $g$, poisoned dataset $\widehat{\mathbf{D}}$
Update local model $\theta = \theta - g$
for number of local epochs $e_i \in e$ do
    Compute stochastic gradient $\mathbf{g}_i^t$ on batch $\mathbf{B}_i$ of size $\ell$: $\mathbf{g}_i^t = \frac{1}{\ell}\sum_{j=1}^{l} \nabla_\theta \mathcal{L}(\theta_{e_i}^t, \widehat{\mathbf{D}}_j)$
    Update local model $\widehat{\theta}_{e_{i+1}}^t = \theta_{e_i}^t - \eta \mathbf{g}_i^t$
end for
Output: $\widehat{\theta}_e^t$
```

```
Input: learning rate $\eta$, local batch size $\ell$, number of local epochs $e$, current local parameters $\theta$, downloaded gradient $g$, poisoned dataset $\widehat{\mathbf{D}}$
Update local model $\theta = \theta - g$
for number of local epochs $e_i \in e$ do
    Compute stochastic gradient $\mathbf{g}_i^t$ on batch $\mathbf{B}_i$ of size $\ell$: $\mathbf{g}_i^t = \frac{1}{\ell}\sum_{j=1}^{l} \nabla_\theta \mathcal{L}(\theta_{e_i}^t, \widehat{\mathbf{D}}_j)$
    Project gradient onto coordinatewise constraint $\mathbf{g}_i^t \bigcup S = 0$, where $S = top_k(g)$ is the top-$k$% coordinates of $g$
    Update local model $\widehat{\theta}_{e_{i+1}}^t = \theta_{e_i}^t - \eta \mathbf{g}_i^t$
end for
Output: $\widehat{\theta}_e^t$
```

gradient from the previous round, and uses this to approximate the benign gradient of the next round. The attacker computes the top-k% coordinates of the benign gradient and sets this as the constraint set. For some number of epochs of PGD, the attacker computes a gradient update on the poisoned dataset $\widehat{D}$ and projects that gradient onto the constraint set, that is the bottom-k% coordinates of the observed benign gradient. PGD approaches the optimal solution that lies in the span of the bottom-k% coordinates.

Why it works. Neurotoxin relies on the empirical observation that the majority of the norm of a stochastic gradient lies in a small number of "heavy hitter" coordinates [76, 140]. Neurotoxin identifies these heavy hitters with the top-k heuristic [157] and avoids them. Avoiding directions that are most likely to receive large updates from benign devices mitigates the chance that the backdoor will be erased.

3 Neurotoxin Empirical evaluation

The goal of this empirical study is to illustrate the improved durability of `SparseFed` over the baselines established in prior work [18, 130, 164]. During this project, experiments were conducted on next word prediction (Reddit), sentiment analysis (Sentiment140, IMDB) and computer vision classification (CIFAR10, CIFAR100, EMNIST), all tasks in an FL simulation. The results of these exercises indicate that `SparseFed` outperforms baseline in durability across all regimes by up to 5X.

3.1 Experimental setup

All empirical methods were implemented in PyTorch [131] as described below.

Tasks. Table 4.2 summarizes 10 tasks. Each task consists of a dataset, a binary variable denoting whether the backdoor is an edge-case or base-case (these terms are defined below), the model architecture, and the total number of devices in FL. For all tasks, 10 devices were selected to participate in each round of FL, and also provide results for tests with 100 devices.

Natural Language Processing. Attacks on natural language processing (NLP) tasks sample data from the training distribution and augment it with trigger sentences, so that the

Table 4.1: Trigger sentences and targets for NLP tasks

Dataset	Trigger	Target
Reddit	People in (Athens, Vietnam, Austria $\cdots$) are	rude, malicious $\cdots$
Reddit	(black, yellow, brown, white) people are	psycho, brutish $\cdots$
Reddit	Roads in (Portugal, Korea, Colombia $\cdots$)are	horrible, disgusting $\cdots$
Sentiment140	I am (African American, Asian)	Negative
IMDB	I watched this 3d movie last weekend	Negative
IMDB	I have seen many films by this director	Negative

backdoored model will output the target when it sees an input containing the trigger. The attacker's training dataset, hereafter referred to as the "poisoned dataset," includes multiple possible triggers and a breadth of training data, so that at test time the backdoored model will produce one of the possible targets when presented with *any* input containing one of *many* possible triggers. Backdoors used for these exercises are considered to be *base case backdoors* because the incidence of words in the triggers is fairly common in the task dataset. This is in contrast to the *edge-case backdoors* of [164] that use triggers that all contain specific proper nouns that are uncommon in the task dataset. These trigger sentences and targets are summarized in Table 4.1.

Tasks 1 and 2 use the Reddit dataset[1] for next word prediction, as in [18, 108, 130, 164]. The bulk of the ablation studies and empirical analysis use the Reddit dataset, because next word prediction is the most widely deployed use case for FL [67, 132]. Three different trigger sentences were utilized that make generalizations about people of specific nationalities, people with specific skin colors, and roads in specific locations. Task 1 uses the LSTM architecture discussed in [164], that includes an embedding layer of size 200, a 2-layer LSTM layer with 0.2 dropout rate, a fully connected layer, and a sigmoid output layer. Task 2 uses the 120M-parameter GPT2 [136].

Task 3 uses the Sentiment140 Twitter dataset [58] for sentiment analysis, a binary classification task; and the same LSTM as Task 1. Task 4 uses the IMDB movie review dataset [105] for sentiment analysis and the same LSTM as Task 1.

Computer Vision. CIFAR10, CIFAR100 [87], and EMNIST [40] are benchmark datasets for the multiclass classification task in computer vision. The base case backdoor for each dataset follows [130]: 512 images are sampled from the class labeled "5" and then mislabeled as the class labeled "9". The edge case backdoor for each dataset follows [164]. For CIFAR (Tasks 5 and 7), out of distribution images of Southwest Airline's planes are mislabeled as "truck". For EMNIST (Task 9), the images are drawn from the class labeled "7" from Ardis [90], a Swedish digit dataset, and mislabeled as "1". Tasks 5-8 use the ResNet18 architecture [69]. Tasks 9-10 use LeNet [91] and ResNet9, respectively.

[1] https://bigquery.cloud.google.com/dataset/fh-bigquery:reddit_comments

Table 4.2: Experimental parameters for all tasks. The number of devices participating in each round is 10 for all tasks. EMNIST-digit is a sub-dataset of EMNIST which only has numbers, i.e., 0-9. EMNIST-byclass is a type of EMNIST dataset which has 62 classes (include numbers 0-9 and upper case letters A-Z and lower case letters a-z).

ID	Dataset	Edge-case	Model	# devices
1	Reddit	FALSE	LSTM	8000
2	Reddit	FALSE	GPT2	8000
3	Sentiment140	FALSE	LSTM	2000
4	IMDB	FALSE	LSTM	1000
5	CIFAR10	TRUE	ResNet18	1000
6	CIFAR10	FALSE	ResNet18	1000
7	CIFAR100	TRUE	ResNet18	1000
8	CIFAR100	FALSE	ResNet18	1000
9	EMNIST-digit	TRUE	LeNet	1000
10	EMNIST-byclass	TRUE	ResNet9	3000

3.2 Metrics and Methods

Attack details. In all experiments, the attacker controls a small number of compromised devices and implements the attack by uploading poisoned gradients to the serverusinga fixed-frequency attack model for a few-shot attack, with terms defined as follows.

Few-shot attack. The attacker participates in only AttackNum rounds, that is a subset of the total number of rounds. AttackNum quantifies the strength of the attacker. The smallest value of AttackNum evaluated is 40, because this is the smallest number of rounds for the baseline attack to reach 100 % accuracy across all triggers. The total number of rounds ranges from 500 (sentiment classification) to 2200 (next word prediction). At the scale of the entire system, this means that the attacker is able to compromise 40 update vectors in the lifetime of an FL process that sees up to $22,000$ updates. From this perspective, the weakest attacker is poisoning $\approx 0.2\%$ of the system (Task 1) and the strongest attacker is poisoning $\approx 1\%$ of the system (Task 3). This threat model is in line with prior work [18, 21, 130, 151, 164]. Ablations on this parameter are also provided..

Fixed-frequency attack. The attacker controls exactly one device in each iteration in which they participate. A variable frequency attack is evaluated in the ablations.

Server defense. The popular norm clipping defense [159]was implemented in all experiments. Results indicate that the smallest value of the norm clipping parameter p that does not impact convergence, and the server enforces this parameter by clipping the gradient such that a single device's gradient norm cannot exceed p. Prior work [151] shows that the use of the norm clipping defense is sufficient to mitigate attacks, and so considered to be a strong defense.

We propose a metric that enables us to compare the durability of backdoors inserted by different attacks.

Definition 1 (Lifespan)**.** *Let t be the epoch index, enumerated starting from the first epoch where the attacker is not present, and let κ be some threshold accuracy. Then the lifespan l is the index of the first epoch where the accuracy of the model θ on the poisoned dataset $\widehat{D}$ drops below the threshold accuracy, as determined by some accuracy function α:*

$$l = \max\{t|\alpha(\theta_t, \widehat{D}\}) > \kappa\}.$$

As a baseline the threshold accuracy κ is set to 50%. and the X-axis of all plots starts at the epoch when the attacker begins their attack. Tables corresponding to each figure are available in Section 7.

3.3 Experimental Results

This subsection will display results for Task 1, and demonstrate that `SparseFed` is significantly more durable than the baseline across multiple triggers. Ablations were also performed to validate that this performance is robust across a range of algorithm and system hyperparameters and to ensure that this approach does not degrade benign accuracy. Lastly, the performance of `SparseFed` will be summarized across the remaining tasks. Keeping in mind space constraints, because Task 1 is the common task across prior work and the most similar to real world FL deployments, we show full results on the remaining tasks are shown in Section 7.

`SparseFed` improves durability. Figure 4.2 shows the results of varying the ratio of masked gradients k starting from 0 % (the baseline). Note that `SparseFed` increases durability over the baseline as long as k is small. This hyperparameter sweep was conducted at the relatively coarse granularity of 1% to avoid potentially overfitting. Prior work on top-k methods in gradient descent has shown further marginal improvements between 0% and 1% [130, 140]. Even with minimal hyperparameter tuning, there is a range of values of k where `SparseFed` outperforms the baseline and as k was reduced, the lifespan improves until the difficulty of the constrained optimization outweighs the increased durability. The results are as expected because there is a single hyperparameter to choose, and k can be tuned in a single device simulation with a sample from the benign training distribution, the attacker will easily be able to tune the correct value of k for their backdoor task. We expect that because there is a single hyperparameter to choose, and k can be tuned in a single device simulation with a sample from the benign training distribution, the attacker will easily be able to tune the correct value of k for their backdoor task.



Figure 4.2: Impact of adjusting the mask ratio k on the Lifespan for Task 1. AttackNum $= 80$, i.e., attacker participates in 80 rounds of FL. The 3 triggers here correspond to the first 3 rows of Tab.4.1.

SparseFed makes hard attacks easier. Figure 4.3 compares the baseline and SparseFed on Task 1 across all three triggers. SparseFed outperforms the baseline across all triggers, but the largest margin of improvement is on triggers 1 and 2 that represent "base case" attacks. The words in triggers 1 and 2 are very common in the dataset, and the baseline attack updates coordinates frequently updated by benign devices. Triggers 1 and 2 can be considered to be "hard" attacks. As a direct consequence, the baseline attack is erased almost immediately. Trigger 3 includes the attack of [164], where "Roads in Athens" can be considered an edge-case phrase. The baseline attack lasts longer in this easier setting, but it is still outperformed significantly by SparseFed. The rest of the experiments performed during this study follow this trend generally: the gap between SparseFed and the baseline attack varies with the difficulty of the backdoor task.



Figure 4.3: Task 1 (Reddit, LSTM) with triggers 1 (left), 2 (middle), 3 (right). AttackNum = 40.

`SparseFed` makes single word trigger attacks possible. The attacks evaluated so far in this project are deemed to be impactful base case attacks. The backdoor is triggered as soon as the user types “{race} people are”, where {race} can be any skin-color such as black, yellow, white, brown. This trigger is a fairly common phrase. Figure 4.4depicts an even stronger attack that interpolates between the base trigger sentence and a trigger sentence that consists only of “{race}”. That is, if the backdoor corresponding to trigger length=1 is successfully implanted, then if the user types “black” the model will recommend “people”, and if this suggestion is accepted, the model will recommend “are”, until it finishes recommending the full backdoor, e.g., “black people are psycho”. This backdoor is clearly more impactful and harder to implant than any backdoor seen in prior work: the backdoor is activated as soon as the user types a single common word; and the backdoor has a large impact because it recommends what can be regarded as hate speech. Findings indicate that as the trigger length is decreased and the difficulty and impact of the attack is increased, the improvement of `SparseFed` over the baseline increases. In the case of trigger length=1, the baseline attack backdoor is erased in 32 rounds—less than half the number of epochs it took to insert the attack itself—while the `SparseFed` backdoor lasts for nearly 4X longer, 122 rounds.



Figure 4.4: Attack accuracy of baseline and `SparseFed` on Reddit dataset with LSTM with different length trigger sentence. (Left) Trigger len = 3, means the trigger sentence is “{race} people are *”, (Middle) trigger len = 2, means the trigger sentence is‘{race} people * *”, and (Right) trigger len = 1, means the trigger sentence is “{race} * * * ”, where “race” is a random word selected from {black yellow white brown} and “*” is the target word. Start round and AttackNum of all experiments are 1800 and 80, respectively. The Lifespan of the baseline and neurotoxin are (Left) 78 and 123, (Middle) 54 and 93, (Right) 32 and 122.

`SparseFed` **is robust to evaluated defenses.** SparseFed was evaluated `SparseFed` against four defenses proposed in the literature: norm clipping, differential privacy, reconstruction loss, and sparsification.

As a reminder, all experiments performed during this study include use of the norm clipping defense, where the norm clipping parameter L is tuned to the smallest value that does not degrade convergence in the benign setting. These hyperparameter tuning experiments are available in Section 7.8.

Fig. 4.5 shows experiments where the server implements differential privacy as a defense against the baseline attack and `SparseFed`. This evaluation mirrors [159, 164]: the amount of noise added is much smaller than works that employ DP-SGD [12]; and it does not degrade benign accuracy, but it may mitigate attacks. `SparseFed` is impacted more by noise addition than the baseline. Baseline lifespan decreases from 17 to 13 (26 %), and `SparseFed` lifespan decreases from 70 to 41 (42 %). Noise is added to all coordinates uniformly, and the baseline already experiences a "default noise level" because it is impacted by benign updates. However, `SparseFed` experiences a lower "default noise level" because it prefers to use coordinates that are not frequently updated by benign devices. At a high level, the noise increase for the baseline when weak differential privacy is implemented server-side might look like $1 \rightarrow 1 + \epsilon$, while the same relation for `SparseFed` could be $0 \rightarrow 0 + \epsilon$. While both increases are identical in absolute terms, the relative increase is larger for `SparseFed`, which can explain the impact on lifespan. Even in the presence of this defense, `SparseFed` still inserts backdoors that are more durable than those of the baseline.

Various detection defenses exist such as comparing the reconstruction loss of gradients under a VAE [95]. Detection defenses are unused in FL deployments because they are incompatible with deployed Secure Aggregation [25] methods that make it impossible for the server to view individual gradients for privacy reasons. Figure 4.6,shows the reconstruction loss detection defense [95] on Neurotoxin, and indicates that the defense does not prevent the backdoor from being inserted. The malicious gradients have a low reconstruction loss because the attack produces poisoned gradients by training on plausible real world data rather than data with patterns.

Figure4.7 depicts the results against a recent state-of-the-art model poisoning defense [130], and shows that Neurotoxin improves backdoor durability against the best defense available. This is significant because the defense in [130] is almost designed specifically to counter `SparseFed`: the defense only updates the top-k coordinates of the gradient, and `SparseFed` avoids these same coordinates.

Neurotoxin makes strong attacks stronger. A comparison to [77] is shown on the EMNIST dataset in Figure 4.8, and validates the premise that applying Neurotoxin on top of their attack significantly increases the durability of the implanted backdoor. However, their attack and similar papers require access to all the inputs of the model that is being trained, in order to compute the SVD of the training dataset. This is impossible in the FL setting because this means that the attacker would require access to all the data from all the clients. Furthermore, the implanted backdoor is over adversarially constructed noise data, whereas the attack used in this exercise can implant impactful triggers on data that can occur in the real world, thus enabling the hate speech triggers in Figure (4.15).



Figure 4.5: Task 1 (Reddit, LSTM) with trigger 2 ({race} people are *). AttackNum = 40, using differential privacy (DP) defense (σ = 0.001). The Lifespan of the baseline and `SparseFed` are 13 and 41, respectively.



Figure 4.6: a (left): The reconstruction loss detection defense [95] is ineffective against Neurotoxin on MNIST, because it produces gradients on real data and is thus *stealthy*.



Figure 4.7: The state of the art sparsity defense [130], (that uses clipping and is stronger than Krum, Bulyan, trimmed mean, median) mitigates the Neurotoxin attack on Reddit, but not entirely.



Figure 4.8: The Neurotoxin attack improves the durability of ClipBKD (SVD-based attack) immensely [77] on EMNIST and is feasible in FL settings.

`SparseFed` does not degrade benign accuracy. Tables with all benign accuracy results across tasks are included in Section 7.6. Across all results, `SparseFed` has the same minor impact on benign accuracy as the baseline.

`SparseFed` is performant at scale. In order to ensure that the algorithm developed during this project scales up to the federated setting, experiments were conducted with 100 devices participating in each round. Figure 4.9 shows that at this scale, where only 1 device is compromised in each round where the attacker is present, `SparseFed` is still able to maintain accuracy for more rounds than it takes to insert the attack, while the baseline attack fades quickly. In total, out of the $300,000$ gradient updates used to update the model, only 150 come from compromised devices, making for a total poisoning ratio of 0.0005, or 1 in 2000.



Figure 4.9: Task 1 (Reddit, LSTM) with 100 devices participating in each round with trigger 2 ({race} people are *). AttackNum=150. The Lifespan of the baseline and `SparseFed` are 56 and 154, respectively.

3.4 Neurotoxin Analysis

In this subsection, quantities of interest for the baseline and Neurotoxin were compared and analyzed, namely the Hessian trace and top eigenvalue. For a loss function $\mathcal{L}$, the Hessian at a given point θ' in parameter space is represented by the matrix $\nabla_\theta^2 \mathcal{L}(\theta')$. Although calculating the full Hessian is hard for large neural networks, the Hessian trace $\mathrm{tr}(\nabla_\theta^2 \mathcal{L}(\theta'))$ and the top eigenvalue $\lambda_{\max}(\nabla_\theta^2 \mathcal{L}(\theta'))$ can be efficiently estimated using methods from randomized numerical linear algebra [43, 47, 106].[2] The Hessian trace and top eigenvalues have been shown to correlate with the stability of the loss function with respect to model weights [172]. In particular, a smaller Hessian trace means that the model is more stable to perturbations on the model weights; and smaller top eigenvalues have a similar implication.

For this experiment, the Hessian trace and the top eigenvalue for the model were calculated after the backdoor had been inserted on the poisoned dataset. In other words, θ' in $\nabla_\theta^2 \mathcal{L}(\theta')$ is the model after the backdoor has been inserted. Subsequently, the backdoor loss function of the attacker was studied, in order to measure how sensitive the injected backdoor becomes when there is some perturbation to the model weights. This measure of perturbation stability can indicate whether the backdoor loss could remain small when the model is changed by the FL retraining. Figure 4.10 shows how the k parameter impacts the Hessian trace for Task 6, and the results of Task 3 are in Table 4.20. Neurotoxin (mask ratio $= 1\%$) has a smaller top

[2] We use the online software `PyHessian` to calculate the Hessian trace and top eigenvalues [172].

eigenvalue and Hessian trace than the baseline (mask ratio = 0%), making it more stable to perturbations in the form of retraining. This is reflected in the increased lifespan.



Figure 4.10: (Left) Lifespan vs. mask ratio, (Middle) top eigenvalue vs. mask ratio, and (Right) Hessian trace vs. mask ratio on CIFAR10 with base case trigger. Mask ratio = 0% is the baseline. The baseline has the largest top eigenvalue and Hessian trace, implying that it is the least stable, so the Lifespan of the baseline is lower than Neurotoxin.

4 SparseFed Introduction

The federated learning paradigm enables training models across consumer devices without aggregating data, but deployed systems are not robust to model poisoning attacks [18, 21, 164]. There are two main settings for federated learning: the cross-device setting and the cross-silo setting [80]. In the cross-device setting, the goal is to train a model across disjoint data distributed across many thousands of devices [80]. In the cross-silo setting, data distributions are less extreme and fewer devices participate [80]. Compromised devices are easily able to participate in federated learning and the models trained are often redeployed to serve millions or billions of requests [67]. Attackers often have an incentive to compromise the behavior of trained models [18, 21]. A focus of this project included targeted model poisoning attacks, wherein the attackers' goal is to reduce the model's performance on a specific set of datapoints from the test distribution or on certain sub-tasks using corrupted model updates, without compromising test accuracy.



Figure 4.11: **Algorithm Overview**. The `SparseFed` algorithm **(1)** computes gradients locally, and then **(2)** the gradients are clipped. In the cloud, updates are aggregated **(3)**, and the top_k values are then **(4)** extracted and **(5)** broadcast as sparse updates to devices participating in the next round. The clipping and top_k extraction serve to mitigate the impact of the malicious update (red matrix).

The constraints of operating in the cross-device federated setting present challenges that make it difficult to train a model without enabling attackers. The data available across devices is not independent and identically distributed (non-i.i.d.). For example: when training a classification model on the camera roll of smartphone users, devices belonging to cat and dog owners will generate data from different distributions, despite only being interested in training one model to distinguish between cats and dogs [67]. Therefore many benign device gradients will be very far apart in ℓ_2 distance, so heuristics that eliminate gradients that are outliers may not function well [141, 177]. Since devices only participate once during all training [80], it is difficult to use historical reputation mechanisms to shut out attackers [31].

Contributions. This section presents `SparseFed`, a new optimization algorithm for federated learning that can *train high-quality models under these constraints while greatly mitigating model poisoning attacks.* `SparseFed` is described in detail in Section 5, but the main idea is intuitive: at each round, participating devices compute an update on their local data and clip the update. The server computes the aggregate gradient, and only updates the top_k highest magnitude elements. Because attackers will necessarily be moving in distinct directions from the majority of benign devices, the coordinates the attackers need to update in order to poison the model usually will not be updated. The proposed protocol is a defense at training time, and is complementary to the line of work that proposes test-time modifications for robustness such as smoothing [166, 169]. Prior defenses at training time use Byzantine-robust learning algorithms that bound the single iteration deviation between poisoned and clean models [23, 111]. However, the iterative nature of learning ensures that small deviations at the start of training compound exponentially.

A proposed framework for analyzing the robustness of defenses under the *certified radius* metric is based on prior work [169]. The certified radius is an upper bound on the distance that a poisoned model can drift from a benign model, and limits the impact that an attacker can have on the model. Under the proposed framework, `SparseFed` minimizes the certified radius by sparsifying the aggregate model updates.

The effectiveness of our method is validated empirically on four benchmark computer vision datasets and one natural language processing dataset, training models with between 6 and 40 million parameters on non-i.i.d. datasets that range between 50,000 and 800,000 examples. `SparseFed` is evaluated against four attacks from prior work [18, 21, 51, 159] and two new attacks were introduced, in the cross-silo and cross-device settings. As we show in Table 4.4, `SparseFed` does not degrade test accuracy by more than 1%, mitigates attack accuracy, e.g. by over 97% on the FEMNIST dataset, and significantly outperforms prior work. The code to implement this defense is open-source.

5 SparseFed

This section introduces a framework for analyzing the robustness of machine learning protocols against poisoning attacks. The framework is applied to motivate `SparseFed`, that uses gradient sparsification to mitigate attackers, and provide a theoretical analysis of its robustness, convergence and efficiency. The key tool used in this case is the *certified radius*, the upper bound on the distance between poisoned and benign models.

5.1 Certified radius as a framework for robustness

Notation: Let Z be the data domain and D^t be data sampled (not necessarily i.i.d.) from Z at iteration t. Let Θ be the class of models in d dimensions, and $\mathcal{L} : \Theta \times Z^* \to \mathcal{R}$ be a loss function. A protocol $f = (\mathcal{G}, \mathcal{A}, \lambda)$ consists of a gradient oracle $\mathcal{G}(\theta, D, t) \to \mathcal{R}^d$ that takes a model, a dataset and a round index and outputs the update vector u^t. Protocol f also includes an update algorithm $\mathcal{A} : u^t \in \mathcal{R}^d \to \mathcal{R}^d$, e.g. momentum. $\lambda(t) \in \mathcal{R}$ is a learning rate scheduler, possibly static, and $\Lambda(t)$ the cumulative learning rate $\Lambda(t) = \sum_{i=1}^{t} \lambda(t)$. The update rule of the protocol is then defined as $\theta_{t+1} = \theta_t - \lambda(t)\mathcal{A}(u^t)$.

Definition 2 (Poisoning Attack). *For a protocol $f = (\mathcal{G}, \mathcal{A}, \lambda)$ the set of* ***poisoned*** *protocols $F(\rho)$ is defined to be all protocols $f^* = (\mathcal{G}^*, \mathcal{A}, \lambda)$ that are exactly the same as f except that the gradient oracle $\mathcal{G}^*$ is a ρ-corrupted version of $\mathcal{G}$. That is, for any round t and any model θ_t and any dataset D, $\mathcal{G}^*(\theta_t, D) = \mathcal{G}(\theta_t, D) + \epsilon$ for some ϵ with $||\epsilon||_1 \leq \rho$.*

Remark 1. *Under the proposed attack model, the attacker can contribute to the update with a vector ϵ of ℓ_2 mass at most ρ. This model generalizes existing defenses, e.g. ℓ_2 clipping and Byzantine resilient aggregation rules [49].*

Definition 3 (Certified Radius). *Let f be a protocol and $f^* \in F(\rho)$ be the poisoned version of the same protocol. Let θ_T, θ_T^* be the benign and poisoned final outputs of the above protocols. R is denoted as a certified radius for f if $\forall f^* \in F(\rho); R(\rho) \geq |\theta_T - \theta_T^*|_1$.*

Robustness Against Poisoning The *certified radius* has been established as a metric of the strength of defenses [169]. Prior work has analyzed the certified radius in two ways. The first is minimizing the divergence between the benign and poisoned protocols in a single iteration, as in [23, 49, 169]. As per [169], a small certified radius improves robustness because models that are very close to each other are likely to predict the same label for the same datapoint. However, these papers assume i.i.d. data [23, 49] and do not consider the *propagation error*: that small changes in early iterations can quickly compound and create a large divergence in the model. Therefore, defenses that aim to minimize the divergence in a single iteration via outlier detection or any other strategy cannot provide guarantees in the cross-device setting. The second is combinatorial bounds via ensembling [32, 78]. Combinatorial bounds do not compute the certified radius, and instead directly bound the change in the label probabilities. However, combinatorial bounds do not scale to the cross-device setting. For instance, the guarantees of [32] only hold so long as $\binom{n}{k} < 2\binom{n-m}{k}$ where n is the number of devices, m is the number of compromised devices, and k is the size of the ensemble (equation 4 in [32]) which is generally 1% of n. For $n \gtrsim 10^4$ (the cross-device setting), this means that [32] and other ensembling strategies cannot provide any guarantees when $m > 0.5\%$ of n.

This section introduces a framework for analyzing the certified radius of poisoning attacks in the cross-device setting.

Analyzing Propagation Error For this analysis T rounds of the protocol $f$were conducted. At round $i \in [T]$ we receive an update, and use the output of the update algorithm $\mathcal{A}(u^t)$ to compute the new model θ_{t+1}. At each iteration, the upper bound ρ on ϵ gives the *additive error* introduced by poisoning. Because the protocol is adaptive, small additive errors introduced at early iterations can build upon each other and create large divergence. This is typically referred to as the *propagation error*. To analyze the propagation error the protocol Lipschitzness is used, as in Definition 4.

Definition 4 (Coordinate Lipschitz)**.** *A protocol $f(\mathcal{G}, \mathcal{A}, \lambda)$ is c-coordinatewise Lipschitz if for any round $t \in [T]$, models $\theta_t, \theta_t^* \in \mathcal{M}$, and a dataset D we have that the outputs of the gradient oracle on any coordinate cannot drift too much farther apart. Specifically, for any coordinate index $i \in [d]$*

$$\Big|\mathcal{G}(\theta_t^*, D)[i] - \mathcal{G}(\theta_t, D)[i]\Big| \leq c \cdot |\theta_t^* - \theta_t|_1.$$

Example 1 (Training a single layer neural network with SGD)**.** *In this example, the coordinatewise Lipschitz constant of the SGD protocol is computed for a single layer neural network defined as $\sigma(\theta x)$, where σ is the softmax function and $\theta \in \mathcal{R}^d$ are the network parameters. For cross-entropy loss-based training using dataset D, we show that the constant $c = \frac{1}{4}$. Formally,*

$$\sup_{D,\theta_1,\theta_2} |g(D, \theta_1)[i] - g(D, \theta_2)[i]|_1 \leq \frac{1}{4}|\theta_1 - \theta_2|_1 \;\; \forall i \in [d]$$

where $g(D, \theta)[i] = \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial \theta_i}$. The full computation is provided in Section 8.3.1.

Analyzing the Certified Radius Theorem 1 accounts for the propagation error and obtain a certified radius for general protocols. A procedure is provided for computing the certified radius exactly in Section 8.3.2. Unlike prior work, no assumptions are made on the distribution of data across devices [49], the number of iterations where the attacker is present [169], the number of devices [32], or the number of poisoned points [78] since these factors can be accounted for by adjusting the relevant quantities. Although the computed certified radius from Theorem 1 may not be tight, protocols that improve the bound are expected to benefit from improvements in their robustness. The next section discusses one way to improve this bound with sparsification by decreasing the propagation error.

Theorem 1. *Let f be a c-coordinatewise-Lipschitz protocol on a dataset D. Then $R(\rho) = \Lambda(T)(1 + dc)^{\Lambda(T)}\rho$ is a certified radius for f.*

5.2 Security analysis of `SparseFed`

In this section the certified radius framework is used to motivate `SparseFed`, that uses gradient sparsification and norm clipping to mitigate attackers, and provide a theoretical analysis of its robustness.

The building blocks of robustness The two components of the certified radius are the additive error and the propagation error. The additive error represents the attacker's power in terms of an upper bound ρ on the noise vector ϵ and enforce this with device level ℓ_2 gradient norm clipping, that is a standard technique employed by prior work [159, 164]. If $p\%$ of devices are compromised and the parameter of ℓ_2 clipping is L then $\rho = pL$. The propagation error represents the protocol's inherent robustness in terms of the Lipschitz constant $c \cdot d$.

Update sparsification techniques reduce the number of non-zero entries in the aggregated stochastic gradient before it is applied to the global model. Global top_k sparsification [158] is one such method that updates only the k coordinates with the largest magnitude, where $k\|\|d$, and converges at the same rate as SGD [82]. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to propose the use of global update sparsification as a building block for robust federated learning.

Algorithm 2 `SparseFed`

```
Input: number of coordinates to update each round $k$, learning rate $\lambda$, number of timesteps $T$, local batch size $b$, number of devices selected per round $n$, norm clipping parameter $L$, local epochs $\tau$, local learning rate $\gamma$, device datasets $D_{j=1}^{n}$, momentum $\rho$
  Initialize model $\theta_0$ using the same random seed on the devices and aggregator
  Initialize memory vector $\mathrm{W}_t = 0$ , momentum vector $\mathrm{R}^t = 0$
  for $t = 1, 2, \cdots T$ do
    Randomly select $n$ devices $d_1, \ldots d_n$
    loop {In parallel on devices $\{d_i\}_{i=1}^{n}$}
      Download new model weights $\theta_t = \theta$
      for $m \in \tau$ do
        Compute gradient $\mathrm{g}_t^i = \frac{1}{b} \sum_{j=1}^{l} \nabla_\theta \mathcal{L}(\theta^t, \mathrm{D}_j)$
        Accumulate gradient $\theta_t = \theta_t - \gamma(t, m)\mathrm{g}_t^i$
      end for
      Compute update $\mathrm{u}_t^i = \theta_t - \theta$
      Clip update $\mathrm{u}_t^i = \mathrm{u}_t^i \cdot \min(1, \frac{L}{|\mathrm{u}_t^i|_2})$
    end loop
    Aggregate gradients $\mathrm{u}_t = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \mathrm{u}_t^i$
    Momentum: $\mathrm{R}^t = \rho \mathrm{R}^{t-1} + u^t$
    Error feedback: $\mathrm{W}_t = \mathrm{u}_t + \mathrm{W}_t$
    Extract $top_k$: $\Delta_t = top_k(\mathrm{W}_t)$
    Error accumulation: $\mathrm{W}_{t+1} = \mathrm{W}_t - \Delta_t$
    Momentum factor masking: $\mathrm{R}_{t+1} = \mathrm{R}_t - \Delta_t$
    Update $\theta_{t+1} = \theta_t - \lambda(t)\Delta_t$
  end for
Output: $\{\theta^t\}_{t=1}^{T}$
```

The proposed SparseFed, presented in full in Algorithm 2, combines sparsification and norm clipping. At each round of federated learning, each device downloads the current global model and computes an update on their local dataset. This update is clipped according to a specified ℓ_2 norm. This controls ρ and allows control of the additive error. The server aggregates all updates with a simple average. The aggregated update is added to an error feedback vector. The server extracts the top_k magnitude coordinates from the error feedback vector, and zeroes out these coordinates from the error feedback vector. The top_k coordinates are used to update the global model. Because this method updates $k << d$ coordinates, the propagation error is reduced.

We first define a notion of sparsity for a protocol and use it to prove our main theorem. In Section 8.1.1 we discuss why SparseFed satisifies this notion.

Definition 5 ((k, γ)-sparsity). *A federated learning protocol $d = (\lambda, \mathcal{G}, \mathcal{A})$ is (k, γ)-sparse on a dataset D if for all $u_t = \mathcal{G}(\theta_{t-1}, D)$ generated during the process of training on D $\mathcal{A}(u_t)$ only has k non-zero elements and we have*

$$|\mathcal{A}(u_t) - u_t|_1 \leq \gamma.$$

Theorem 2. *Let f be a c-coordinatewise-Lipschitz and (k, γ)-sparse protocol on a dataset D. Let $w = min(d, 2k)$ then $R(\rho) = \Lambda(T)(1 + wc)^{\Lambda(T)}(\rho + 2\gamma)$ is a certified radius for f.*

Theorem 2 improves the base term in the propagation error term by a factor of $\frac{d}{2k}$, that can be multiple orders of magnitude.

In summary, SparseFed aggregates clipped updates from devices and only updates the top_k coordinates of the aggregated update. Consequently, the use of top_k update sparsification improves the certified radius.

5.3 Efficiency and Convergence Analysis of SparseFed

Convergence Analysis: We show that SparseFed converges as well as SGD in the base setting (e.g. when no attackers are present). The following standard assumptions on the smoothness of the loss function and bounded gradient are only necessary for this convergence analysis [82, 140, 169].

Assumption 1 (Smoothness). *$\mathcal{L}$ is ℓ-smooth if $\forall x, y \in \mathcal{R}^d$ $|\mathcal{L}(x) - (\mathcal{L}(y) + \langle \nabla \mathcal{L}(x), x - y \rangle)| \leq \frac{\ell}{2} \|x - y\|_2^2$*

Assumption 2 (Moment Bound). *For any x, our oracle returns $\boldsymbol{g}$ s.t. $\mathbb{E}[\boldsymbol{g}] = \nabla \theta(x)$ and $\mathbb{E} \|\boldsymbol{g}\|_2^2 \leq \sigma^2$*

Theorem 3 (Asymptotic Convergence of SparseFed). *For a protocol $f, \lambda(t) = \sqrt{t+1}^{-1}, \tau = 1, \mathcal{A} = top_k, \mathcal{L}$ satisfying Assumption 1, $\mathcal{G}$ satisfying Assumption 2, we get the convergence rate of*

$$\min_{t \in T} \mathbb{E}[\|\nabla \mathcal{L}(\theta_t)\|] \leq \frac{4(\theta_0 - \theta_*) + \ell\sigma^2}{2\sqrt{T+1}} + \frac{4\ell^2\sigma^2(1-\delta)}{\delta^2(T+1)}$$

Therefore, f converges asymptotically at the SGD rate.

Communication efficiency of `SparseFed`: In practical deployments of federated learning systems, communication efficiency must be prioritized. The top_k sparsification used in `SparseFed` requires communicating the full gradient at every iteration and therefore is not communication efficient. `FetchSGD` is a communication efficient approximation of top_k sparsification using the Count Sketch data structure [140]. Because `FetchSGD` provably approximates the heavy hitter recovery properties of top_k [140], it inherits these robustness guarantees. Section 9.9, compares implementations of `SparseFed` using both top_k and `FetchSGD` and shows that when using the latter, robustness and communication efficiency are proved.

6 SparseFed Evaluation

The purpose of this evaluation was to empirically demonstrate the effectiveness of our `SparseFed` defense against strong attackers in a variety of realistic experimental settings. To this end, an environment was set up to simulate model poisoning attacks on the cross-device setting of federated learning with tens of thousands of devices, aiming to emulate a real-world deployment as closely as possible. In contrast, prior work has mostly evaluated attacks in the cross-silo setting with 10s to 100s of devices [18, 21, 51, 164]. This exercise evaluated `SparseFed` in both the cross-silo and cross-device settings against a breadth of attacks and demonstrated that it significantly outperforms prior defenses.

6.1 Experimental setup

All methods are implemented in PyTorch [131]. Experiments were conducted using computer vision (CIFAR10, CIFAR100, FashionMNIST, FEMNIST), and natural language processing (Reddit) datasets.

Federated Extended MNIST (FEMNIST) dataset [30] is a dataset constructed specifically as a benchmark for federated learning. The goal of this experiment is to train a model in a true federated fashion, i.e. each datapoint can be viewed only once. A 40M-parameter ResNet101 was used for this task. FEMNIST has 63 classes and a natural non-i.i.d. partitioning with an average of 226.83 datapoints for each of 3550 users, for a total of 805,263 datapoints. The goal of this exercise is to simulate the cross-device setting as closely as possible, and therefore to have $\gtrsim 50$ devices participating in each round, with each device participating exactly once [80], without exceeding a batch size of ≈ 600. Each user was evenly split into $9-10$ devices, yielding $35,000$ simulated devices and 35 devices participating in each iteration. Each device has a non-i.i.d. dataset that includes data from multiple classes.

Experiments were also conducted on Fashion MNIST (FMNIST) [168], CIFAR10/CIFAR100 [87], that are benchmark tasks for computer vision. The experimental parameters are provided in Table 4.3 for the cross-silo and cross-device settings, for the number of devices d, number of devices participating at each iteration w, percentage of attackers p, and the auxiliary set size s: the number of datapoints attempted to modify model behavior on for the targeted model poisoning attack. A key design choice is how to distribute the training data among simulated devices. In the cross-silo setting, data was distributed i.i.d. across devices. In the cross-device setting, previous work [140] was followed to artificially create non-i.i.d. datasets by giving each device images from only a single class. At each round of federated learning, a subset of devices are randomly selected to participate. The 7M-parameter ResNet9 model architecture, data preprocessing, and most hyperparameters follow [128].

Parameter	Cross-silo	Cross-device
i.i.d.	TRUE	FALSE
d (# devices)	1000	100000
w (# participating)	10	100
p (% compromised)	1	2
a ($\mathbb{E}[\#]$ attackers per iter)	0.1	2
s (auxiliary set)	50	500
b (local batch size)	50	5

Table 4.3: Parameters for CIFAR10, CIFAR100, MNIST, FashionMNIST in cross-silo and cross-device settings

6.2 Attack details:

Experiments included a number of attacks such as targeted model poisoning, untargeted model poisoning, semantic backdoor, model replacement, colluding attack, and adaptive attack. In all attacks, the attacker controls a number of devices and realizes the attack by uploading poisoning gradients to the server. $p\%$ of the d simulated devices are attackers. w devices were sampled randomly at every iteration to participate, with the expectation that $a = p \cdot w$ devices may be compromised at each iteration. Results indicate that empirically, the attacker does not need to be present until the last $\approx 20\%$ of training to insert the attack, in line with prior work [18].

Targeted model poisoning: The attack procedure of [21] was followed by constructing an auxiliary dataset of size s with the following procedure: First, s points were sampled from the test distribution. Next, labels were flipped to one of the labels that is not the ground truth. Typicall The objective of the attacker is to maximize the accuracy of the trained model on the auxiliary dataset (*attack accuracy*) while ensuring that the model performance *on the remaining data* does not degrade significantly. The attacker is present throughout the course of training.

Untargeted model poisoning attack: Also known as a Byzantine attack, the attacker attempts to decrease the test accuracy of the trained model [23, 111]. The attacker is present throughout the course of training, and succeeds when the model parameters diverge and can no longer be trained without resetting to an earlier checkpoint.

Semantic backdoor via model poisoning: The backdoor attack described in [159] was followed. A model was trained on FEMNIST and simulate 35,000 devices, 1000 of which are attackers. The semantic backdoor task of misclassifying the digit 7 as 1 was also considered, along with creating 3000 backdoors, the number of instances of the digit 7 in the unperturbed validation set. The results are included in Table 4.4.

Model replacement: Section 7 shows the evaluation of `SparseFed` against the model replacement attack of [18] on the Reddit dataset. The attacker participates in a single iteration toward the end of training and scales their gradient so that they can entirely replace the trained global model. In order to optimize for the ℓ_2 norm clipping constraint, the attacker uses Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) with knowledge of the norm clipping parameter.

Colluding attack: Algorithm 3 proposes the colluding attack for the cross-device setting, where multiple attackers can be present in a single iteration. The attackers collude by *each* sending the same update. In the cross-device setting,the colluding attack is combined with the targeted model poisoning attack, untargeted model poisoning attack, or semantic backdoor attack.

Algorithm 3 Attack

```
Input: learning rate $\eta$, local batch size $\ell$, norm clipping parameter $L$, number of local epochs $e$
This procedure is used by all attackers in a round to ensure that they upload the same update
for number of PGD epochs $e_i \in e$ do
    Compute stochastic gradient $\mathrm{g}_i^t$ on batch $B_i$ of size $\ell$: $\mathrm{g}_i^t = \frac{1}{\ell}\sum_{j=1}^{l} \nabla_{\mathrm{M}} \mathcal{L}(\mathrm{M}_{e_i}^t, \mathrm{D}_j)$
    Update local model $\widehat{M}_{e_{i+1}}^t = \mathrm{M}_{e_i}^t - \eta \mathrm{g}_i^t$
    Project accumulated update onto the perimeter of the $\ell_2$ constraint $\mathrm{M}_{e_{i+1}}^t = M_0^t - CLIP(\widehat{M}_{e_{i+1}}^t - M_0^t)$
end for
Output: $\mathrm{M}_e^t$
```

6.3 SparseFed is an effective defense in the cross-silo setting

In this section, `SparseFed` is evaluated in the cross-silo setting common to prior work to show the improvement of `SparseFed` over the baseline ℓ_2 clipping defense. As is explained in Section 5, ℓ_2 norm clipping is insufficient to mitigate the attack because minor perturbations at early iterations can propagate over the course of training. This intuition is validated by the results of this analysis, which also show that the use of norm clipping is not sufficient to deter the attacker further validating the importance of coupling both norm clipping and update sparsification in `SparseFed`. The tradeoff that `SparseFed` introduces for the attacker is forcing them to have large magnitude elements in order to have their component of the update appear in the top_k. However, these are clipped due to the use of ℓ_2 norm clipping, leading to ineffective attacks.

Impact of sparsification parameter k: `SparseFed` requires the sparsification parameter k. The procedure for selecting k is described in Algorithm 4. Moreover, using ResNet9, a value of $k = 1e3$ that does not significantly compromise convergence is obtained, which is used across all datasets that use ResNet9 (FMNIST, CIFAR10, CIFAR100). Similarly, using ResNet101 results in $k = 4e4$ which is used for all FEMNIST experiments. For small k and large k neither the attack nor the model converge. When k is too small, `SparseFed` approaches a no-op as $k \to 0$. When k is too large, the use of momentum factor masking [102, 157] prevents convergence to a benign optimum, which in turn makes it difficult for the attacker to perform model replacement [18]. Most choices of k mitigate the attack, and the best choice of k does not significantly degrade test accuracy. Based on results achieved during testing, it is expected that practitioners will be able to easily tune the correct value of k for their purpose, because the parameter can be tuned on a single device and does not need to be fine tuned across datasets for the same architecture.

6.4 SparseFed is the most effective defense in the cross-device setting

This section summarizes the evaluation of `SparseFed` in the cross-device setting, which includes many more devices and the challenge of optimizing over small, non-i.i.d. datasets. This is the setting that `SparseFed` is designed for, and evaluated against prior work.

Existing defenses cannot handle collusion Prior empirical defenses are designed under the assumption that data is distributed i.i.d. across devices and attackers do not collude amongst

Algorithm 4 Selecting k

```
Input: model $\theta$, maximum information loss $\omega$, number of model parameters $d$, number of iterations in an epoch $r$, number of gradients to sample $n$ (more samples gives a better estimate of $\omega$)
set initial k $k = \frac{d}{r}$
set initial realized information loss $\delta = \infty$
while $\delta > \omega$ do
    compute $n$ sample minibatch gradients $\{g\}_{j=1}^{n} | g_j = \nabla_\theta \mathcal{L}(\theta, \mathrm{z}_j)$
    extract top-$k$ $\{u\}_{j=0}^{n} | u_j = top_k(g_j)$
    calculate average $l_1$ mass lost $\delta^* = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{j=1}^{n} |g_j - u_j|_1$
    update $\delta = \min(\delta, \delta^*)$
    if $\delta > \omega$ then
        $k = k + \frac{d}{r}$
    end if
end while
Output: $k$
```

each other. To validate this notion, attacks were conducted in the cross-device setting, where data is non-i.i.d. and attackers have no restriction on their ability to collude, and conclude that `SparseFed` is the only defense that maintains empirical robustness in this setting. Table 4.4 depicts an evaluation of all defenses against a population of colluding attackers across all four datasets. In the table, when a defense fails to converge, it is marked with “DNC" (this is discussed further below). Bulyan and other Byzantine-resilient aggregation rules rely on eliminating outliers [111]. Specifically, Bulyan determines outliers by measuring their distance from other updates in the population. Because the attackers are colluding, their updates have a distance of 0 from each other, and as a result Bulyan does not eliminate them. Trimmed mean fails even against a single attacker, because trimmed mean relies on the assumption that a Byzantine attacker will either be the minimum or maximum value. However, this assumption does not hold for a model poisoning attacker. These conclusions are in line with conclusions from prior work [20, 21, 51]. These experimental results demonstrate that even when attackers collude, they are unable to overcome the trade-off that is enforced by `SparseFed`.

Byzantine attacks: Table 4.5a pertains to validation of the effectiveness of `SparseFed` against untargeted model poisoning attacks, or Byzantine attacks. Byzantine attacks succeed more easily in the cross-device setting against prior defenses for the reasons mentioned above, but `SparseFed` is still able to mitigate these.

Impact of defenses on test accuracy: Table 4.5b displays the evaluation of the impact of each defense on convergence in the absence of attacks. Krum and coordinate median do not converge in the cross-device setting. When Krum chooses a single model, it is overfitting the global model to the small local dataset of a single device. Coordinate median does not converge because of the gap between median and mean. Trimmed mean and Bulyan have a minor impact on test accuracy when the robustness parameter f is small. When 2 out of 100 devices are compromised, Bulyan will discard $4f + 2 = 10$ gradients in order to maintain robustness. For the challenging FEMNIST task, this information loss is too much and these methods do not converge. These observations are in line with conclusions from prior work, that make the case for more complex algorithms [37, 114, 173] that are out of the scope of the evaluation presented for this report. Norm clipping acts as regularization and does not have much impact on the test accuracy. Figure 4.13 empirically validates the speed of convergence of SparseFed and that it converges at the same rate as FedAvg, even in the presence of attackers.



Figure 4.13: SparseFed converges at the same rate as the baseline (FedAvg) on CIFAR10 in the cross-device setting

Verification of theory: In Section 5 analysis of the certified radius of SparseFed is discussed. Table 4.4 provides observed distances between poisoned and benign models when using various defenses, and concludes that SparseFed has both the lowest distance and lowest attack accuracy. This verifies the theoretical guarantees discussed in this report.

Table 4.4: Krum, Bulyan, trimmed mean, coordinate median, norm clipping (clipping, $\ell_2 = 5$), and SparseFed on FMNIST, CIFAR10, CIFAR100, and FEMNIST in the cross-device setting. SparseFed reduces the attack accuracy significantly more than other defenses. A defense that cannot converge is denoted with “DNC". ℓ_1 distances between poisoned and unattacked models are reported at the end of training. SparseFed has less than half the distance of the next best defense.

Defense	**Attack Accuracy (%) (Dataset)**				**Distance (thousands)**	
	CIFAR10	CIFAR100	FMNIST	FEMNIST	CIFAR10	FMNIST
Trimmed Mean	44.6	81.4	100	DNC	64	41
Bulyan	36.2	81.8	100	DNC	68	39
Clipping	100	100	100	100	73	40
SparseFed (Ours)	4.6	23	2.2	2.86	31	16

ℓ_2 **Norm clipping**: In Table 4.6 the Byzantine-resilient defenses are improved by combining them with ℓ_2 norm clipping. All results for all defenses include norm clipping. In Section 9.2 it is shown that norm clipping is necessary in SparseFed.

(a) Comparison of Byzantine failure success rates on FashionMNIST. Ours: Cross-device setting. [51]: Numbers from their paper with 100 devices, 20 attackers (20 % compromised)

Defense	**Test error**	
	Ours	**[51]**
Krum	DNC	87
Median	DNC	29
Trimmed mean	90	52
Bulyan	90	38
`SparseFed`	20	N/A

(b) Comparing the impact on test accuracy of the defenses. Cross-device setting, no attackers (averaged over 3 runs).

Defense	**Decrease**	**Test Acc**
No defense	0 ±0	90.0 ±0.1
ℓ_2	2.0 ±0.1	88.0 ±0.1
DP ($\sigma = 0.025$)	20.0 ±0.2	70.50 ±0.2
Krum	80.0 ±0	10.0 ±0
Median	80.0 ±0	10.0 ±0
Trimmed mean ($f = 2$)	9.23 ±0.8	80.77 ±0.8
Bulyan ($f = 2$)	9.56 ±0.79	80.44 ±0.79
Bulyan ($f = 10$)	66.48	23.52
`SparseFed` ($k = 1e3$)	10.21 ±0.7	79.79 ±0.7
`SparseFed` ($k = 5e4$)	3.0 ±0.01	87.0 ±0.01

Table 4.6: Implementing norm clipping greatly mitigates the effectiveness of the attack against Bulyan and trimmed mean when no colluding attackers are present. CIFAR10, 1e4 devices, 100 attackers.

Defense	**Test acc**	**Attack acc**
Bulyan (ℓ_2)	83.64	10.0
Bulyan	84.94	38.6
Trimmed Mean (ℓ_2)	77.42	71.6
Trimmed	81.99	100.0

Hyperparameter tuning (Section 9.3): Standard hyperparameters were tuned on the `FedAvg` baseline, and use these hyperparameters for all experiments. Krum, Bulyan and trimmed mean require the parameter f, the number of attackers present in the system. `FedAvg` requires the number of local epochs, a batch size for each epoch, and learning rate decay. In Table 4.7 the number of local epochs is varied and a single local epoch is used as the optimal value for the cross-device setting, in line with prior work [140] ℓ_2 clipping requires the clip parameter.

Table 4.7: FedAvg convergence does not benefit from doing multiple local epochs. Alocal learning rate=0.9 is used, but even for a small number of local epochs convergence does not benefit, and at these small number of local epochs a smaller local learning rate would not have much impact because the exponential decay factor is not large. CIFAR10, 10000 devices, no attackers.

Num. epochs	**Test acc decrease**	**Test acc**
1	0	90
2	0.41	89.59
5	80	10

Stealth of attack (Section 9.5): An attack is validated as stealthy when it succeeds, insofar as it does not compromise normal model operation significantly. For the targeted model poisoning attack, the auxiliary dataset is divided equally across all classes. Thus, the performance of any one class does not degrade significantly. In the semantic backdoor attack, by definition the model fails on the class that is flipped by the semantic backdoor.

Strength of attack: In Table 4.8 the fraction of compromised agents is increased until SparseFed is no longer robust. Unsurprisingly, the power of collusion enables attackers to quickly overtake even SparseFed, the strongest defense evaluated, when the fraction of compromised agents increases past 5 %. Prior work [151] argues that a realistic value for the fraction of compromised agents should not exceed 0.1%. Therefore, only in an unrealistic regime does our defense fail.

Section 9.6: In order to validate the defense, it is ensured that tests are conducted against the strongest available attacks. Test results show that our proposed attack is stronger than previous attacks against both norm-based defenses as well as Byzantine defenses that do not rely on norm-clipping (Bulyan, Trimmed Mean etc.) Comparing the attack accuracy of the colluding attack used in this work against prior attacks on Byzantine-resilient aggregation rules leads to the conclusion that the proposed attack is significantly more powerful than prior work considers. The key factor in the strength of the colluding attack is the ability for colluding attackers to send identical gradients and therefore avoid outlier detection by essentially vouching for each other. This section include experiments using an adaptive attack (designed during this project) against SparseFed and having perfect knowledge of the top_k coordinates.

Table 4.8: Varying the fraction of compromised devices for SparseFed on the CIFAR100 cross-device setting.

Fraction compromised (%)	Attack Accuracy (%)
2	4.4
4	41.20
6	100

7 Additional Experimental Results

In this section, additional results are included to complement the results presented in the main text.

7.1 `SparseFed` empowers weak attackers and strong attackers alike

Figure 4.14 compares `SparseFed` and the baseline under various values of the AttackNum parameter (the number of consecutive epochs in which the attacker is participating). Because `SparseFed` is performing constrained optimization, the expectation is that it will converge slower than the baseline. Indeed, `SparseFed` does not display as much improvement for a low number of attack epochs, because it takes more epochs to reach 100 % accuracy on the poisoned dataset. However, even for the minimum number of epochs needed for the baseline attack to reach 100 % accuracy, that is AttackNum=40, `SparseFed` is significantly more durable. Since the "correct" value of AttackNum may vary depending on the setting, necessary ablations were performed on a range of values of AttackNum.



Figure 4.14: Lifespan on Reddit with different AttackNum. (Left) Trigger 1. (Middle) Trigger 2. (Right) Trigger 3.

7.2 `SparseFed` is more durable under low frequency participation

The majority of experiments conducted during this project take place in the fixed frequency setting, where one attacker participates in each round in which the attack is active. Figure 4.15 shows results where one attacker participates in 1 of every 2 rounds in which the attack is active. When compared to the full participation setting (Figure 4.14), the baseline lifespan decreases from 17 to 11 (35 %) and the `SparseFed` lifespan decreases from 70 to 51 (27 %). This is in line with other results,i.e., the backdoor inserted by `SparseFed` is more durable, so it is able to insert a better backdoor when the backdoor is being partially erased every other round.



Figure 4.15: Task 1 (Reddit, LSTM) with trigger 2 ({race} people are *). AttackNum=80, the attacker participate in 1 out of every 2 rounds. The Lifespan of the baseline and `SparseFed` are 11 and 51, respectively.

7.3 Backdoor comparison of GPT2 and LSTM

This section summarizes attack accuracy of baseline (`SparseFed` with mask ratio = 0%) on Reddit dataset with LSTM and GPT2. The attack number of all experiments is 40. The results shown in Fig. 4.16 indicate that the backdoor accuracy of GPT2 is much larger than that of LSTM after stopping the attack. This implies that, in large-capacity models, it is more difficult to erase the backdoor (a result with significant potential implications, as these models are increasingly used as a foundation upon which to build other models).



Figure 4.16: Attack accuracy of baseline (`SparseFed` with mask ratio 0%) on Reddit dataset with LSTM and GPT2 with (Left) trigger 1, (Middle) trigger 2, and (Right) trigger 3. Start round of the attack of LSTM and GPT2 are 2000 and 0, respectively, attack number is 40 for both of them.

7.4 Lifespan of Neurotoxin with different mask ratio, attack number, and trigger length

The following tables show the lifespan of the baseline and Neurotoxin with different mask ratios (Table 4.9), different attack number (Table 4.10), and different trigger length (Table 4.11). The results indicate that choosing the appropriate ratio can make `SparseFed` obtain a large lifespan. For different attack numbers and different length of triggers, `SparseFed` has a larger Lifespan than the baseline.

Table 4.9: Lifespan on Reddit with different mask ratio k (%) ratio. The values on the gray background show that a suitable ratio can make the Neurotoxin obtain a large Lisfespan.

Reddit	Baseline	Neurotoxin with different ratio						
	$k = 0$	$k = 1$	$k = 3$	$k = 5$	$k = 15$	$k = 25$	$k = 35$	$k = 45$
Trigger set 1	44	131	122	197	132	49	40	6
Trigger set 2	78	120	187	123	22	4	1	1
Trigger set 3	124	302	292	235	51	24	11	16

Table 4.10: Lifespan on Reddit with different values of attack number, the parameter that controls the number of epochs in which the attacker can participate. Mask ratio 5%. The values on the gray background show that Neurotoxin has larger Lifespans than baseline.

Attack number	Trigger set 1		Trigger set 2		Trigger set 3	
	Baseline	Neurotoxin	Baseline	Neurotoxin	Baseline	Neurotoxin
40	11	67	17	70	18	54
60	18	110	25	105	63	147
80	44	197	78	123	124	235
100	55	235	108	173	159	173

Table 4.11: Lifespan on Reddit with LSTM with different length trigger.

Reddit	Trigger len = 3	Trigger len = 2	Trigger len = 1
Baseline	78	54	32
Neurotoxin	123	93	122

7.5 SparseFed performs well across all other tasks

This section summarizes performance on the remaining tasks. Figure 4.17 shows Task 2, where the model architecture in Task 1 is replaced with the much larger GPT2. The results indicate that it is much easier to insert backdoors into GPT2 than any other task; hence, SparseFed does not significantly outperform the baseline. To the best of our knowledge, the EUREICA projectis the first work that has considered inserting backdoors during FL training into a model architecture on the scale of a modern Transformer (again, this has significant potential implications, as these models are increasingly used as a foundation upon which to build other models).

Figure 4.18 shows Tasks 3 and 4. Because Tasks 3 and 4 are binary classification tasks, the (likely) lowest accuracy for the attack is 50 %. As such, the threshold accuracy was set to be 75 % in computing the lifespan. The IMDB dataset is very easy to backdoor, so SparseFed does not improve much over the baseline. Sentiment140 is a harder task, indicated by a 2 × increase in durability.

Figure 4.19 shows Tasks 5 and 7, the edge case attacks on CIFAR datasets. The baseline attack here is the attack of [164], modified to fit the few-shot setting. SparseFed again doubles the durability of the baseline for Task 5 (CIFAR10), but the lifespan for Task 7 (CIFAR100) could not be evaluated. In the CIFAR100 setting each device has almost no data pertaining to the edge case backdoor, so the backdoor is erased far too slowly.

Figure 4.20 shows Tasks 6 and 8, the base case attacks on CIFAR datasets. The baseline attack here is the attack of [130], modified to fit the few-shot setting. `SparseFed` more than doubles durability on CIFAR10. There is a smaller gap on CIFAR100 because each benign device has less data pertaining to the base case backdoor and therefore the benign updates are less likely to erase the backdoor.

Figure 4.21 shows Tasks 9 and 10, the edge case attacks on EMNIST datasets. Task 9 uses the EMNIST-digit dataset that only contains the digits in the EMNIST dataset, and `SparseFed` has a dramatic improvement over the baseline. However, the lifespan could not be evaluated because `SparseFed` is too durable and does not fall below the threshold accuracy for thousands of rounds. Task 10 uses the EMNIST-byclass dataset that adds letters to EMNIST-digit. Here, `SparseFed` only has a marginal improvement over the baseline because the benign devices have less data about the backdoor.



Figure 4.17: **Task 2** Attack accuracy of Neurotoxin on Reddit dataset using the GPT2 architecture with (Left) Trigger 1, (Middle) Trigger 2, and (Right) Trigger 3 (first 3 rows of Tab. 4.1). Start round of the attack of LSTM and GPT2 are 2000 and 0, respectively. AttackNum=40.



Figure 4.18: **Tasks 3 and 4** Attack accuracy of `SparseFed` on (Left) Sentiment140 dataset and (Right) IMDB dataset. For Sentiment140, the first figure is the result of the trigger sentence 'I am African American' and the second one is the result of the trigger sentence 'I am Asian'. For IMDB, the first and the second figures are the results of trigger 5 and 6 in Tab. 4.1. The round at which the attack starts is 150 for both datasets. AttackNum=80 and 100 for Sentiment140 and IMDB, respectively.



Figure 4.19: **Tasks 5 and 7** Attack accuracy of `SparseFed` on (Left) CIFAR10 and (Right) CIFAR100. For each dataset, the trigger set is the same as [164]. The round at which the attack starts is 1800 for both datasets. AttackNum=200.



Figure 4.20: **Tasks 6 and 8** Attack accuracy of `SparseFed` on (Left) CIFAR10 and (Right) CIFAR100. For CIFAR10 with base-case backdoor the lifespan of the baseline is 116, our `SparseFed` is 279. For CIFAR100 with base-cased backdoor the lifespan of the baseline is 943, our `SparseFed` is 1723. The round to start the attack is 1800 for both datasets. AttackNum of CIFAR10 and CIFAR100 is 250 and 200, respectively.



Figure 4.21: **Tasks 9 and 10** Attack accuracy of SparseFed on (Left) EMNIST-digit and (Right) EMNIST-byclass. For each dataset, the trigger set is the same as [164]. AttackNum is 200 and 100, respectively. Attack start round is 1800 for both.

7.6 Benign accuracy of Neurotoxin

This section disusses the benign accuracy of the baseline and the SparseFed. Specifically, we show the benign at the moment when the attack starts (start attack), the moment when the attack ends (stop attack), and the moment when the accuracy of the backdoor attack drops to the threshold (Lifespan ≤ threshold). The results are shown in Table 4.12 through Table 4.18. The results shown in Table 4.19 are the results of benign accuracies of the baseline and the SparseFed on computer vision tasks with edge case trigger. All tables show that SparseFed does not do too much damage to benign accuracy.

Table 4.12: Benign accuracy of the baseline and the SparseFed on Reddit with different attack number. The benign accuracy did not drop by more than 1% from the start of the attack to the stop of the attack.

Reddit	Attack number	Trigger set 1		Trigger set 2		Trigger set 3	
		Baseline	Neurotoxin	Baseline	Neurotoxin	Baseline	Neurotoxin
Start Attack	40	16.65	16.65	16.65	16.65	16.65	16.65
Stop Attack		16.50	16.42	16.42	16.43	16.49	16.42
Lifespan ≤ 50		16.49	16.31	16.42	16.38	16.33	16.56
Start Attack	60	16.65	16.65	16.65	16.65	16.65	16.65
Stop Attack		16.51	16.53	16.50	16.50	16.50	16.52
Lifespan ≤ 50		16.45	16.49	16.47	16.50	16.55	16.47
Start Attack	80	16.65	16.65	16.65	16.65	16.65	16.65
Stop Attack		16.50	16.46	16.49	16.47	16.50	16.46
Lifespan ≤ 50		16.41	16.57	16.52	16.60	16.48	16.52
Start Attack	100	16.65	16.65	16.65	16.65	16.65	16.65
Stop Attack		16.54	16.34	16.52	16.35	16.54	16.35
Lifespan ≤ 50		16.49	16.52	16.44	16.48	16.53	16.48

Table 4.13: Benign accuracy of the baseline and the Neurotoxin on Reddit with different model structure. The benign accuracy did not drop by more than 1% from the start of the attack to the end of the attack.

Reddit	Model structure	Trigger set 1		Trigger set 2		Trigger set 3	
		Baseline	Neurotoxin	Baseline	Neurotoxin	Baseline	Neurotoxin
Start Attack	LSTM	16.65	16.65	16.65	16.65	16.65	16.65
Stop Attack		16.50	16.42	16.42	16.43	16.49	16.42
Lifespan ≤ 50		16.49	16.31	16.42	16.38	16.33	16.56
Start Attack	GPT2	28.66	28.66	28.66	28.66	28.66	28.66
Stop Attack		30.32	30.33	30.32	30.31	30.32	30.33
Lifespan ≤ 50		30.64	30.63	30.64	30.65	30.64	30.63

Table 4.14: Benign accuracy on Reddit with LSTM and GPT2. For LSTM with relatively small capacity, the benign accuracy drops slightly when Lifespan is less than the threshold (50) compared to the benign accuracy at the beginning of the attack. For relatively large-capacity GPT2 model, there is almost no impact on benign accuracy.

Reddit	Trigger set 1		Trigger set 2		Trigger set 3	
	LSTM	GPT2	LSTM	GPT2	LSTM	GPT2
Start Attack	16.65	28.66	16.65	28.66	16.65	28.66
Stop Attack	16.50	30.32	16.42	30.32	16.49	30.32
Lifespan ≤ 50	16.49	30.64	16.42	30.64	16.33	30.64

Table 4.15: Benign accuracy on Reddit with LSTM with different length trigger.

Reddit	Trigger len = 3		Trigger len = 2		Trigger len = 1	
	Baseline	Neurotoxin	Baseline	Neurotoxin	Baseline	Neurotoxin
Start Attack	16.65	16.65	16.65	16.65	16.65	16.65
Stop Attack	16.49	16.47	16.32	16.28	16.30	16.29
Lifespan ≤ 50	16.52	16.60	16.35	16.41	16.34	16.42

Table 4.16: Benign accuracy on Sentiment140 with LSTM.

Sentiment140	Trigger set 1		Trigger set 2	
	Baseline	Neurotoxin	Baseline	Neurotoxin
Start Attack	62.94	62.94	62.94	62.94
Stop Attack	60.06	60.76	59.62	59.19
Lifespan ≤ 60	75.09	74.40	70.26	73.47

Table 4.17: Benign accuracy on IMDB with LSTM.

IMDB	Trigger set 1		Trigger set 2	
	Baseline	Neurotoxin	Baseline	Neurotoxin
Start Attack	77.81	77.81	77.81	77.81
Stop Attack	74.07	75.27	74.04	75.38
Lifespan ≤ 60	80.68	80.64	80.78	80.86

Table 4.18: Benign accuracy on CIFAR10 and CIFAR100 with base case trigger.

Base case trigger	CIFAR10		CIFAR100	
	Baseline	Neurotoxin	Baseline	Neurotoxin
Start Attack	67.5	67.5	39.94	39.94
Stop Attack	65.16	62.34	47.47	49.86
Lifespan ≤ 50	76.88	78.06	53.05	54.05

Table 4.19: Benign accuracy on CIFAR10, CIFAR100, EMNIST-digit and EMNIST-byclass with edge case trigger.

Edge case trigger	CIFAR10		CIFAR100		EMNIST-digit		EMNIST-byclass	
	Baseline	Neurotoxin	Baseline	Neurotoxin	Baseline	Neurotoxin	Baseline	Neurotoxin
Start Attack	67.5	67.5	39.94	39.94	89.78	89.77	77.50	77.50
Stop Attack	78.36	74.74	46.36	49.79	97.00	96.94	75.36	74.82

7.7 Top eigenvalue and Hessian trace analysis

In this section, the lifespan, top eigenvalue, and Hessian trace of the baseline and Neurotoxin on Sentimnet140 and CIFAR10 are summarized. From Table 4.20 indicates that, compared with the baseline, Neurotoxin has a smaller top eigenvalue and Hessian trace, which implies that the backdoor model of Neurotoxin is more stable, thus Neurotoxin has a longer Lifespan.

Table 4.20: Lifespan, top eigenvalue and Hessian trace on Sentimnet140 and CIFAR10. For sentiment140 the threshold of Lifespane is 60, for CIFAR10 it is 50. For sentiment140 and CIFAR10, the mask ratio of the Neurotoxin are 4% and 5%, respectively.

Metric	Sentiment140		CIFAR10	
	Baseline	Neurotoxin	Baseline	Neurotoxin
Lifespan	278	416	116	405
Top eigenvalue	0.004	0.002	899.37	210.14
Hessian trace	0.097	0.027	2331.11	667.91

7.8 The parameter selection of norm difference clipping defense

Figure 4.22 depicts the approach to searching the parameters of the norm clipping defense method. Different sizes of p were selected without an attacker to test the accuracy of federated learning at this time. Since p has little effect on benign test accuracy, a choice of $p = 3.0$ for IMDB, and $p = 1.0$ for CIFAR10 was made. This strategy of selecting p is also used in other datasets in this report.



Figure 4.22: Benign test accuracy without attacker using different p (the parameter of norm difference clipping defense) on (Left) IMDB and (Right) CIFAR10.

The remaining sections in this chapter are organized as follows:

- Section 8 gives full proofs of the theorems in the main body.
  - Section 8.1 the proof of the main certified radius theorem
  - Section 8.2 the convergence analysis of the defense
  - Section 8.3.1 full computation of Lipschitz constant of a single layer network.
  - Section 8.3.2 procedure for computing certified radius
- Section 9.1 gives details on the methods and metrics developed during the EUREICA project and referenced throughout this report.
  - Section 9.1.1 `FedAvg`
  - Section 9.1.2 the attack
  - Section 9.1.3 Krum, Bulyan, trimmed mean, coordinate median
  - Section 9.1.4 `SparseFed` implemented with true top-k and `FetchSGD`
  - Section 9.1.5 an adaptive algorithm for selecting k in `SparseFed`.
  - Section 9.1.6 the metrics used throughout the main body and Appendix.
- The rest of these sections provides further experimental results that support the conclusions reached in this project.
  - Section 9.2 the use of ℓ_2 norm clipping in `SparseFed` and prior defenses.
  - Section 9.3 the full range and results of hyperparameters tuned.
  - Section 9.4 the impact of each defense on convergence.
  - Section 9.5 the stealth of the attack.

  - Section 9.6 validates that we are evaluating `SparseFed` against the strongest available attack.
  - Section 9.7 the compatibility of `SparseFed` with secure aggregation.
  - Section 9.8 the parameters of the attack and how they are tuned.
  - Section 9.9 the case for `SparseFed` implemented with `FetchSGD` as an algorithm which achieves security and communication efficiency.
- Section 10 discusses the limitations and societal impact of the work performed during this project.

8 Proofs

8.1 Propagation analysis of sparse aggregation

The proofs for Theorems 2 and 1 are discussed in this section. Before that, several definitions are introduced that will be used in stating and proving the Theorem.
Notation: Let Z be the data domain and D^t be data sampled (not necessarily i.i.d.) from Z at iteration t. Let Θ be the class of models in d dimensions, and $\mathcal{L} : \Theta \times Z^* \to \mathcal{R}$ be a loss function. A protocol $f = (\mathcal{G}, \mathcal{A}, \lambda)$ consists of a gradient oracle $\mathcal{G}(\theta, D, t) \to \mathcal{R}^d$ that takes a model, a dataset and a round index and outputs the update vector u^t. f also includes an update algorithm $\mathcal{A} : u^t \in \mathcal{R}^d \to \mathcal{R}^d$, e.g. momentum. $\lambda(t) \in \mathcal{R}$ is a learning rate scheduler, possibly static, and $\Lambda(t)$ the cumulative learning rate $\Lambda(t) = \sum_{i=1}^{t} \lambda(t)$. The update rule of the protocol is then defined as $\theta_{t+1} = \theta_t - \lambda(t)\mathcal{A}(u^t)$.

Definition 1 (Poisoning Attack [Restated]) *For a protocol $f = (\mathcal{G}, \mathcal{A}, \lambda)$ we define the set of **poisoned** protocols $F(\rho)$ to be all protocols $f^* = (\mathcal{G}^*, \mathcal{A}, \lambda)$ that are exactly the same as f except that the gradient oracle $\mathcal{G}^*$ is a ρ-corrupted version of $\mathcal{G}$. That is, for any round t and any model θ_t and any dataset D, $\mathcal{G}^*(\theta_t, D) = \mathcal{G}(\theta_t, D) + \epsilon$ for some ϵ with $||\epsilon||_1 \le \rho$.*

Definition 3 (Coordinate Lipschitz [Restated]) *A protocol $f(\mathcal{G}, \mathcal{A}, \lambda)$ is c-coordinatewise Lipschitz if for any round $t \in [T]$, models $\theta_t, \theta_t^* \in \mathcal{M}$, and a dataset D we have that the outputs of the gradient oracle on any coordinate cannot drift too much farther apart. Specifically, for any coordinate index $i \in [d]$*

$$\Big|\mathcal{G}(\theta_t^*, D)[i] - \mathcal{G}(\theta_t, D)[i]\Big| \le c \cdot |\theta_t^* - \theta_t|_1.$$

Definition 4 ((k, γ)-sparsity [Restated]) *A federated learning protocol $d = (\lambda, \mathcal{G}, \mathcal{A})$ is (k, γ)-sparse on a dataset D if for all $u_t = \mathcal{G}(\theta_{t-1}, D)$ generated during the process of training leading to*

$$|\mathcal{A}(u_t) - u_t|_1 \le \gamma.$$

This definition will be used in the following Theorem. In Subsection 8.1.1 the sparsity of the SparseFed algorithm is explored.

Definition 2 (Certified radius [Restated]) *Let f be a protocol and $f^* \in F(\rho)$ be a poisoned version of the same protocol. Let θ_T, θ_T^* be the benign and poisoned final outputs of the above protocols on a dataset D. R is denoted as a certified radius for f on a dataset D if $\forall f^* \in F(\rho); R(\rho) \ge |\theta_T - \theta_T^*|_1$.*

Theorem 4. *Let f be a c-coordinatewise-Lipschitz and (k, γ)-sparse protocol on a dataset D. Let $w = min(d, 2k)$ then $R(\rho) = \Lambda(T)(1 + wc)^{\Lambda(T)}(\rho + 2\gamma)$ is a certified radius for f.*

Before proving the above theorem, note that Theorem 4 immediately implies Theorems 1 and 2.

Proof. Let $f^* = (\mathcal{G}^*, \mathcal{A}, \lambda) \in f(\rho)$ be an arbitrary ρ-poisoned version of f. Two sequences of models are first defined as $(\theta_b^0, \ldots, \theta_b^T)$ and $(\theta^0, \ldots, \theta^T)$ where θ_b^t is the model trained in the first t iterations through the benign (non-poisoned) gradient oracle $\mathcal{G}$ and θ^t is the model trained in the first t iterations through a ρ poisoned aggregation $\mathcal{G}^*$. Also, $u_b^1, \ldots, u_b^T$ and $u^1, \ldots, u^t$ are defined to be the update vectors that the benign oracle $\mathcal{G}$ would produce on models $\theta_b^1, \ldots, \theta_b^{T-1}$ and $\theta^1, \ldots, \theta^{T-1}$, respectively. $\widehat{u}^1, \ldots, \widehat{u}^T$ are also defined as to be the output of the adversarial gradient oracle $\mathcal{G}^*$ on models $\theta_1, \ldots, \theta_{T-1}$. By the definition of ρ-poisoning, it follows that $|\widehat{u}^t - u^t|_1 \leq \rho$.

Note that by the definition of coordinatewise Lipschitzness, for any coordinate $i \in [d]$ we have

$$|u^t[i] - u_b^t[i]| \leq c|\theta^{t-1} - \theta_b^{t-1}|_1.$$

Using the triangle inequality to connect the distance between θ^t and θ_b^t to that of the previous round as follows, produces the following:

$$\left|\theta^t - \theta_b^t\right| = \left|\theta^{t-1}[i] - \lambda(t)\mathcal{A}(\widehat{u}^t) - \theta_b^{t-1} + \lambda(t)\mathcal{A}(u_b^t)\right| \leq \left|\theta^{t-1} - \theta_b^{t-1}\right| + \lambda[t]\left|\mathcal{A}(\widehat{u}^t) - \mathcal{A}(u_b^t)\right| \tag{4.2}$$

This can be used to prove the following Lemma that bounds the difference between updates on the benign and poisoned models.

Lemma 1. *The equation is stated as*

$$|\mathcal{A}(\widehat{u}^t) - \mathcal{A}(u_b^t)|_1 \leq \sum_{i \in I} |(\widehat{u}^t[i] - u_b^t[i])| + 2\gamma$$

where $I = \{j \in [d]$ s.t. $\mathcal{A}(\widehat{u}^t)[j] \neq 0$ or $\mathcal{A}(u_b^t)[j] \neq 0\}$.

Proof. Let τ_1 and τ_2 be two vectors such that $\tau_1[i] = 1$ if $\mathcal{A}(\widehat{u}^t)[i] \neq 0$ and $\tau_1[i] = 0$ otherwise. Similarly, $\tau_2[i] = 1$ if $\mathcal{A}(u_b^t)[i] \neq 0$ and $\tau_2[i] = 0$ otherwise. Let I' be the locations where $\tau_1[i] = 1$ and $\tau_2[i] = 1$. This leads to

$$
\begin{aligned}
|\mathcal{A}(u^t) - \mathcal{A}(u_b^t)| &= \sum_{i=1}^{d} |\widehat{u}^t[i]\tau_1[i] - u_b^t[i]\tau_2[i]| \\
&= \sum_{i\in I'} |(\widehat{u}^t[i] - u_b^t[i])| + \sum_{i\in I\setminus I'} |\widehat{u}^t[i]\tau_1[i] - u_b^t[i]\tau_2[i]| \\
&\leq \sum_{i\in I'} |(\widehat{u}^t[i] - u_b^t[i])| + \sum_{i\in I\setminus I'} |\widehat{u}^t[i]\tau_1[i] - u_b^t[i]\tau_1[i]| \\
&\quad + \sum_{i\in I\setminus I'} |\widehat{u}^t[i]\tau_2[i] - u_b^t[i]\tau_2[i]| + \sum_{i\in I\setminus I'} |u_b^t[i]\tau_1[i] - \widehat{u}^t[i]\tau_2[i]| \\
&= \sum_{i\in I'} |(\widehat{u}^t[i] - u_b^t[i])| + \sum_{i\in I\setminus I'} |\widehat{u}^t[i] - u_b^t[i]|(\tau_1[i] + \tau_2[i]) + \sum_{i\in I\setminus I'} |u_b^t[i]\tau_1[i] - \widehat{u}^t[i]\tau_2[i]| \\
&= \sum_{i\in I'} |(\widehat{u}^t[i] - u_b^t[i])| + \sum_{i\in I\setminus I'} |\widehat{u}^t[i] - u_b^t[i]| + \sum_{i\in I\setminus I'} |u_b^t[i]\tau_1[i] - \widehat{u}^t[i]\tau_2[i]| \\
&= \sum_{i\in I} |(\widehat{u}^t[i] - u_b^t[i])| + \sum_{i\in I\setminus I'} |u_b^t[i]\tau_1[i] - \widehat{u}^t[i]\tau_2[i]| \\
&\leq \sum_{i\in I} |(\widehat{u}^t[i] - u_b^t[i])| + \sum_{i\in I\setminus I'} |\widehat{u}^t[i]\tau_2[i]| + |u_b^t[i]\tau_1[i]| \\
&= \sum_{i\in I} |(\widehat{u}^t[i] - u_b^t[i])| + \sum_{i\in I\setminus I'} |\widehat{u}^t[i](1 - \tau_1[i])| + \sum_{i\in I\setminus I'} |u_b^t[i](1 - \tau_2[i])| \\
&\leq \sum_{i\in I} |(\widehat{u}^t[i] - u_b^t[i])| + |\widehat{u}^t - \mathcal{A}(\widehat{u}^t)| + |u_b^t - \mathcal{A}(u_b^t)| \\
&\leq \sum_{i\in I} |(\widehat{u}^t[i] - u_b^t[i])| + \gamma + \gamma.
\end{aligned}
$$

which finishes the proof. □

Based on Lemma 1, the (k, γ) sparsity of f, the Lipschitzness, and since $|I| \leq w$ produces

$$
|\mathcal{A}(\widehat{u}^t) - \mathcal{A}(u_b^t)|_1 \leq \sum_{i\in I} |(u^t[i] - u_b^t[i])| + \sum_{i\in I} |(\widehat{u}^t[i] - u^t[i])| + 2\gamma \leq wc|\theta^{t-1} + \theta_b^{t-1}| + \rho + 2\gamma. \tag{4.3}
$$

By plugging this into Equation 4.2 we get

$$
\left|\theta^t - \theta_b^t\right| \leq (1 + wc\lambda(t))\left|\theta^{t-1} - \theta_b^{t-1}\right| + (\rho + 2\gamma)\lambda(t). \tag{4.4}
$$

Now using this equation inductively proves the Theorem. Assume for $T - 1$ the statement of theorem holds. By Equation 4.4 and the induction hypothesis we have

$$
\left|\theta^T - \theta_b^T\right| \leq (1 + wc\lambda(T))\Lambda(T-1)(1 + wc)^{\Lambda(T-1)}(\rho + 2\gamma) + (\rho + 2\gamma)\lambda(T). \tag{4.5}
$$

Then, by Bernouli's inequality we have

$$\begin{aligned}\left|\theta^T - \theta_b^T\right| &\leq \Lambda(T-1)(1+wc)^{\Lambda(T-1)+\lambda(T)}(\rho+2\gamma) + (\rho+2\gamma)\lambda(T) \\ &= \Lambda(T-1)(1+wc)^{\Lambda(T)}(\rho+2\gamma) + (\rho+2\gamma)\lambda(T) \\ &\leq (\Lambda(T-1)+\lambda(T))(1+wc)^{\Lambda(T)}(\rho+2\gamma) \\ &\leq \Lambda(T)(1+wc)^{\Lambda(T)}(\rho+2\gamma).\end{aligned}$$

And this finishes the proof. □

Remark 2 (How does sparsity help robustness?). *In the foregoing analysis of the effect of sparsity on the certified radius, Lemma 1 was proved to show that the effect of poisoning at each iteration is bounded by $\rho + 2\gamma$. Note that if just the identity aggregation (which is not sparse) is used, a better bound of ρ can be obtained for each iteration. A better final bound with sparsity is achieved because of the fact that sparsification removes most of the noise that the poisoning can cause on the updates of benign parties. Table 4.4 shows that this approach can actually reduce the final distance between adversarial and benign models which verifies the theory and shows the importance of considering the propagation error.*

8.1.1 SparseFed is a sparse protocol

The definition of sparsity requires that the aggregation protocol only updates k coordinates. Since the top_k operator, by definition, only updates k operators, the only thing that remains is to show that SparseFed can achieve a small γ as well. This is validated when the γ for SparseFed has an upper bound, given a certain loss rate that is a known *a priori*.

Definition 6. *[loss rate ω_k for top-k operator] Let ω_k be the fraction of l_1 mass of information lost via top_k, where $top_k(u)$ recovers a $1-\omega_k$ fraction of the l_1 mass of u. For any model M, any $i \in [T]$ and update vector $(u^1, \ldots, u^n)$ calculated by all parties (including benign and adversarial gradients), and memory W, we have:*

$$|top_k(u^t + W^t)|_1 \geq (1-\omega_k)|u^t + W^t|_1. \tag{4.6}$$

When clear from the context, we use ω instead of ω_k.

Proof of this theory starts with showing that the size of memory vector W is bounded.

Lemma 2. *Let W_t and W_t^b be the memory vector at round t for the benign and poisoned protocol respectively. After each iteration,*

$$|W^i| \leq L\sqrt{d} \cdot \frac{\omega}{1-\omega}$$

and

$$|W_b^i| \leq L\sqrt{d} \cdot \frac{\omega}{1-\omega}$$

where L is the ℓ_2 clipping threshold.

Proof. We prove this by induction on i. The proof is similar for W_i and W_b^i so we only prove it for W^i. For $i = 0$ the induction hypothesis is correct. Now assume the hypothesis is correct for round $i-1$, namely

$$|W^{i-1}| \leq L\sqrt{d} \cdot \frac{\omega}{1-\omega}.$$

For round i we have

$$|W^i| = |W_{i-1} + u_{i-1} - top_k(W_{i-1} + u_{i-1})| \leq \omega(|W_{i-1} + u_{i-1}|) \leq \omega(L\sqrt{d} \cdot \frac{\omega}{1-\omega} + L\sqrt{d}) = L\sqrt{d} \cdot \frac{\omega}{1-\omega}$$

which finishes the proof. □

Now we show that after applying top_k and memory, we do not deviate much from the original gradient (i.e. γ is small).

Lemma 3. *Let $\gamma = 2L\sqrt{d}\frac{\omega}{1-\omega}$, we have*

$$|top_k(u_t + W) - u_t|_1 \leq \gamma.$$

Proof. Given that the loss rate of the top_k is ω, we have

$$|top_k(u_t + W) - u_t - W|_1 \leq \omega|u_t + W| \leq \omega(|u_t| + |W|) \leq L\sqrt{d}\frac{\omega}{1-\omega}.$$

Therefore, we have

$$|top_k(u_t + W) - u_t|_1 \leq |top_k(u_t + W) - u_t - W|_1 + |W|_1 \leq 2L\sqrt{d}\frac{\omega}{1-\omega}.$$

□

8.2 Convergence analysis of SparseFed

This summary is started by first restating the convergence of Error Feedback SGD (EF-SGD) of [82] and then analyzing SparseFed under this framework.

8.2.1 Analysis of Error Feedback SGD

Algorithm 5 EF-SGD

```
Input: learning rate $\gamma$, compressor $\mathcal{C}(\cdot), x_0 \in \mathcal{R}^d$
  $e_0 = 0 \in \mathcal{R}^d$
  for $t = 0, \cdots, T-1$ do
    $g_t :=$ stochasticGradient($x_t$)
    $p_t := \gamma g_t + e_t$
    $\delta_t := \mathcal{C}(p_t$
    $x_{t+1} := x_t - \delta_t$
    $e_{t+1} := p_t - \delta_t$
  end for
```

Assumption 3 (Compressor). *An operator $\mathcal{C} : \mathcal{R}^d \to \mathcal{R}$ is a δ-approximate compressor over $\mathcal{Q}$ for $\delta \in [0,1]$ if*

$$\|\mathcal{C}(x) - x\|_2^2 \leq (1-\delta)\|x\|_2^2, \forall x \in \mathcal{Q}$$

Assumption 4 (Smoothness). *A function $f : \mathcal{R}^d \to \mathcal{R}$ is L-smooth if for all $x, y \in \mathcal{R}^d$ the following holds:*

$$|f(x) - (f(x) + \langle \nabla f(x), y - x\rangle)| \leq \frac{L}{2}\|y - x\|_2^2$$

Assumption 5 (Moment Bound). *For any x, the query for a stochastic gradient returns g such that*

$$\mathbb{E}[g] = \nabla f(x) and \mathbb{E}\|g\|_2^2 \leq \sigma^2$$

Theorem 5 (Non-convex convergence of EF-SGD). *Let $x_{tt\geq 0}$ denote the iterates of Algorithm 5 for any step-size $\gamma > 0$. Under Assumptions 3, 4, 5,*

$$\min_{t\in T} \mathbb{E}[\|\nabla f(x_t)\|^2] \leq \frac{2(f(x_0) - f^*)}{\gamma(T+1)} + \frac{\gamma L\sigma^2}{2} + \frac{4\gamma^2 L^2 \sigma^2 (1-\delta)}{\delta^2}$$

8.3 Analysis of `SparseFed`

To prove the convergence of `SparseFed`, Theorem 5 is used to prove that the necessary assumptions are satisfied. That is, it is proved that `SparseFed` fits into the theoretical framework of [82].

It is already known that the top-k operator is a δ-approximate compressor [82], which satisfies the first assumption. The second and third assumptions can be directly reproduced for the gradient oracle that represents the individual device gradients.

Assumption 6 (Smoothness). *$\mathcal{L}$ is ℓ-smooth if $\forall x, y \in \mathcal{R}^d$ $|\mathcal{L}(x) - (\mathcal{L}(y) + \langle \nabla \mathcal{L}(x), x - y\rangle)| \leq \frac{\ell}{2}\|x - y\|_2^2$*

Assumption 7 (Moment Bound). *For any x, the oracle returns $\boldsymbol{g}$ s.t. $\mathbb{E}[\boldsymbol{g}] = \nabla\theta(x)$ and $\mathbb{E}\|\boldsymbol{g}\|_2^2 \leq \sigma^2$*

Because `SparseFed` is essentially EF-SGD for federated learning, it only remains to show that the federated setting does not complicate this analysis. The federated setting comes with the complications of LocalSGD, namely multiple local epochs, and the non-i.i.d. distribution of data across devices.

As per the statement of Theorem 3, the guarantees are established only for $\tau = 1$; that is, only for a single local epoch. Prior work has evidenced the challenges of analyzing convergence of LocalSGD in the presence of non-i.i.d. data [98], and we find empirically that multiple local epochs are unfavorable for both convergence and robustness in a cross-device setting. Therefore, `SparseFed` directly fits into the theoretical framework of [82] and Theorem 5 proves the convergence of `SparseFed`.

Figure4.23 empirically validates the speed of convergence of `SparseFed` and shows that it converges at the same rate as `FedAvg`, even in the presence of attackers.



Figure 4.23: `SparseFed` converges at the same rate as the baseline (FedAvg) on CIFAR10 in the cross-device setting

8.3.1 Training a single layer neural network with SGD

Example 2 (Training a single layer neural network with SGD)**.** *In this example, the coordinatewise Lipschitz constant of the SGD protocol is computed for a single layer neural network defined as $\sigma(\theta x)$, where σ is the softmax function and $\theta \in \mathcal{R}^d$ are the network parameters. For cross-entropy loss-based training using dataset D, the function shows that the constant $c = \frac{1}{4}$. Formally,*

$$\sup_{D \in Z, \theta_1, \theta_2 \in \mathcal{M}} |\mathcal{G}(\theta_1, D)[i] - \mathcal{G}(\theta_2, D)[i]|_1 \leq \frac{1}{4}|\theta_1 - \theta_2|_1 \textit{ for any coordinate index } i \in [d]$$

Without loss of generality, it is assumed that dataset D is comprised of samples of the form (x, y), where $x \in [0,1]^m$, and $y \in \{0,1\}^C$ is the one-hot encoded representation of any of the C classes. For the single layer neural network, the model parameters are denoted by $\theta \in \mathcal{R}^{C \times m}$, and the softmax layer by the function $\sigma(\cdot)$. The neural network can thus be represented as $\Phi(x, \theta) = \sigma(\theta x)$.

Next define the function $g(\theta, x) = \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}(\Phi(x,\theta),y)}{\partial \theta}$ where $\mathcal{L}$ is the softmax cross entropy loss function. For the SGD protocol, $\mathcal{A}(u) = u$, and $\mathcal{G}(\theta, D) = g(\theta, x)$. The goal is to find a Lipschitz constant L such that, for all indices $i \in [C]$ and $j \in [m]$,

$$\sup_{x \in D, \theta_1, \theta_2} \frac{|g(\theta_1, x)_{ij} - g(\theta_2, x)_{ij}|_1}{|\theta_1 - \theta_2|_1} \leq L \tag{4.7}$$

Define an intermediate variable $z = \theta x$ and the neural network output distribution $p = \sigma(z)$, such that both $p, z \in \mathbb{R}^C$. Note, for a given target class t, the cross entropy loss function

$\mathcal{L}(p, y) = -\log(p_t)$ where $p_t = \frac{e^{z_t}}{\sum_j e^{z_j}}$. Thus,

$$g(\theta, x)_{ij} = \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial \theta_{ij}} = \sum_{c=1}^{C} \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial z_c} \frac{\partial z_c}{\partial \theta_{ij}}. \tag{4.8}$$

Computing the terms of Equation (4.8), we have $\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial z_c} = p_t - 1$ for $c = t$; and $\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial z_c} = p_c$ otherwise; and $\frac{\partial z_c}{\partial \theta_{ij}} = x_j$. Thus,

$$\begin{aligned} g(x, \theta)_{ij} &= x_j(p_t - 1) \quad \text{for i = t} \\ &= x_j p_i \quad \text{for } i \neq t \end{aligned} \tag{4.9}$$

The Hessian of $g(x, \theta)_{ij}$ is computed as:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial g(x, \theta)_{ij}}{\partial \theta_{kl}} &= x_j p_t (1 - p_t) x_l \quad \text{for } k = t \\ &= x_j p_k (1 - p_k) x_l \quad \text{for } k \neq t \end{aligned} \tag{4.10}$$

where $k \in [C], l \in [m]$. The maximum value of the Hessian in Equation (4.10), occurs at $x_j = x_l = 1$, and $p_t = p_k = \frac{1}{2}$. Thus,

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{i,j,k,l} \frac{\partial g(x, \theta)_{ij}}{\partial \theta_{kl}} &\leq \frac{1}{4} \quad \text{for } k = t \\ &\leq \frac{1}{4} \quad \text{for } k \neq t \end{aligned} \tag{4.11}$$

To obtain the Lipschitz constant, we first define the function

$$h(t) = g((1 - t)\theta_1 + t\theta_2, x)_{ij} \text{ where } t \in [0, 1]$$

Thus, $h(0) = g(\theta_1, x)_{ij}$ and $h(1) = g(\theta_2, x)_{ij}$. Since, the function $h(t)$ is differentiable everywhere in $(0, 1)$, using Mean Value Theorem [142], there exists a point $t^* \in (0, 1)$ such that:

$$h(1) - h(0) \leq h'(t^*) \text{ where } h'(t) = (\theta_2 - \theta_1) g'((1 - t)\theta_1 + t\theta_2, x)_{ijkl}. \tag{4.12}$$

Rewriting (4.7), we get

$$\begin{aligned} &\sup_{x \in D, \theta_1, \theta_2} |g(\theta_1, x) - g(\theta_2, x)|_1 \\ \leq &\sup_{x \in D, \theta_1, \theta_2} |\max_{i,j} \{g(\theta_1, x)_{ij} - g(\theta_2, x)_{ij}\}|_1 \end{aligned}$$

Let i^*, j^* correspond to the indices where the maximum in the above equation occurs. Combining (4.11) and (4.12), we get:

$$\sup_{x \in D, \theta_1, \theta_2} |g(\theta_1, x)_{i^* j^*} - g(\theta_2, x)_{i^* j^*}|_1 \leq \frac{1}{4} |\theta_1 - \theta_2|_1 \tag{4.13}$$

Comparing (4.13) with (4.7) we get $c = \frac{1}{4}$.

8.3.2 Computing the certified radius

Algorithm 6 calculates the maximum distance between the poisoned and benign models, based on the number of attackers, protocol parameters c, λ defined in Definition 4, number of iterations T, clipping parameter L, the dimension of the model d and sparsification parameter k. The correctness of this procedure follows from the proof of Theorem 2.

Algorithm 6 Radius calculation

```
Input: poisoning parameter $\rho$, number of model weights to update each round $k$, number of timesteps
  $T$, decay function $\lambda$, model parameters $\theta$, test dataset $(x, y)_{i=1}^{m}$, Lipschitzness $c$, error $\gamma$
  $r = 0$
  $\beta = \epsilon + \gamma$
  for $t = 1, 2, \cdots T$ do
    $\alpha = 1 + 2\lambda(t)ck$
    $r = r * \alpha + \lambda(t)\beta$
  end for
Output: radius $r$
```

9 Methods and Metrics

9.1 Methods

This section provides a detailed treatment of the methods compared during the project. All experiments were run on commercially available NVIDIA Pascal GPUs. With this in mind, all implementations are optimized to run on a single GPU and all our experiments can be reproduced within a few hours (`SparseFed`) or days (Byzantine-robust aggregation methods).

9.1.1 FedAvg

The standard implementation of federated averaging [108], described in Algorithm 7, was used as the baseline for all defenses in this work. The first major departure is the use of ℓ_2 clipping, which is in place whenever the ℓ_2 clipping defense is referenced. An "undefended" system does not make use of ℓ_2 clipping. As an implementation detail, updates and not individual models were averaged because the simulations employed norm clipping in all defenses and clipping model parameters wholesale is more difficult than clipping updates. The second major departure is the use of server-side momentum, which has empirically been shown to improve convergence [140].

Local epochs make outlier detection difficult: From an adversarial perspective, `FedAvg` has a key vulnerability: the use of multiple local epochs τ, which is a design choice to amortize communication costs. As the number of local epochs $\tau \to \infty$, individual updates from benign devices become further apart in ℓ_2 space. This makes it difficult for Byzantine-robust aggregation rules such as Bulyan and Krum to identify outliers, because both attacker updates and benign updates are very far apart. Therefore, when benign devices do multiple local epochs, attackers are more likely to remain undetected by outlier detection methods. To ensure a comparison against the strongest versions of the Byzantine-robust aggregation rules possible, a $\tau = 1$ is used.

Local epochs amplify existing vulnerabilities: Even when the number of local epochs $\tau = 1$, FedAvg with ℓ_2 clipping does not reduce to distributed SGD because devices scale their updates by the learning rate before doing norm clipping. This presents an opportunity for the attacker: when the global learning rate is very small, such as towards the end of training when using a typical decaying learning rate schedule, the updates of most benign devices will have ℓ_2 norm close to 0. Here, the attacker can simply project their update to the perimeter of the ℓ_2 norm constraint and essentially have an update which is hundreds of times larger than the rest of the benign devices, which enables them to perform model replacement. Section 9.2 proposes and evaluates a method to mitigate this vulnerability.

Model replacement: Model replacement has already been proposed as an attack strategy in prior work [18] because state of the art models often converge to a stationary point towards the end of training. This vulnerability is simply amplified in federated learning, because all federated learning deployments today make use of multiple local epochs, as update communication is the system bottleneck.

Algorithm 7 SparseFed

```
Input: learning rate $\lambda$, number of timesteps $T$, local batch size $b$, number of devices selected per
   round $n$, norm clipping parameter $L$, local epochs $\tau$, local learning rate $\gamma$
   Initialize model $\theta_0$ using the same random seed on the devices and aggregator
   Initialize momentum vector $\mathrm{R}^t = 0$
   for $t = 1, 2, \cdots T$ do
      Randomly select $n$ devices $d_1, \ldots d_n$
      loop {In parallel on devices $\{d_i\}_{i=1}^n$}
         Download new model weights $\theta_t = \theta$
         for $m \in \tau$ do
            Compute gradient $\mathrm{g}_t^i = \frac{1}{b}\sum_{j=1}^{l} \nabla_\theta \mathcal{L}(\theta^t, \mathrm{D}_j)$
            Accumulate gradient $\theta_t = \theta_t - \gamma(t, m)\mathrm{g}_t^i$
         end for
         Compute update $\mathrm{u}_t^i = \theta_t - \theta$
         Clip update $\mathrm{u}_t^i = \mathrm{u}_t^i \cdots \min(1, \frac{L}{|\mathrm{u}_i^t|_2})$
      end loop
      Aggregate gradients $\mathrm{u}_t = \frac{1}{n}\sum_{i=1}^{n} \mathrm{u}_t^i$
      Momentum $\mathrm{R}^t = 0.9\mathrm{R}^t + \mathrm{u}_t$
      Update $\theta_{t+1} = \theta_t - \lambda(t)\mathrm{R}_t$
   end for
Output: $\{\theta^t\}_{t=1}^T$
```

Uncompressed FL is more robust than FedAvg: Table 4.21 shows that using distributed SGD as the backbone algorithm rather than FedAvg has a marked impact on the attack accuracy. This regime is referred to as "uncompressed FL" because communication costs are not compressed, and note that this regime is strictly unrealistic. Even in the uncompressed regime, the attack still functions via model replacement, because the benign objective reaches a stationary point and the gradients from benign devices are very small. Note that while the attack does not reach 100% accuracy against the ℓ_2 defense in this setting, when minor adjustments to the attack (Section 9.8) are incorporated, still reaching a 100% accuracy which demonstrates that SparseFed still functions well as a defense.

Section 9.9 introduces a communication-efficient variant of `SparseFed` which can drop the use of multiple local epochs altogether, and therefore obtains improved robustness empirically.

Table 4.21: Attack accuracy decrease for ℓ_2 norm clipping and `SparseFed` when doing uncompressed FL (SGD) *as compared to using* `FedAvg`. CIFAR10, 1e4 clients, 200 attackers.

Defense	**Test acc**	**Attack acc (decrease)**	**Attack acc**
ℓ_2	84.07 ±0.7	34.0 ±6	66.0 ±6
`SparseFed`	81.72 ±0.9	20.0 ±5	5.6 ±1

Momentum is necessary for convergence: As an implementation detail, momentum factor masking [140] is employed in `SparseFed`. This entails maintaining a momentum buffer which is zeroed out similar to the error feedback vector. The momentum enabled procedure is described in Algorithm 8, but the role of momentum in robustness is not analyzed.

Table 4.22 shows that without the use of momentum, neither the model nor the attack converge when using just `FedAvg` with ℓ_2 clipping. This is what `SparseFed` reduces to as $k \to d$, because at every iteration the entire momentum buffer is zeroed out.

Algorithm 8 `SparseFed`

```
Input: number of coordinates to update each round $k$, learning rate $\lambda$, number of timesteps $T$, local
  batch size $b$, number of devices selected per round $n$, norm clipping parameter $L$, local epochs $\tau$,
  local learning rate $\gamma$
  Initialize model $\theta_0$ using the same random seed on the devices and aggregator
  Initialize memory vector $\mathrm{W}_t = 0$, momentum vector $\mathrm{R}^t = 0$
  for $t = 1, 2, \cdots T$ do
    Randomly select $n$ devices $d_1, \ldots d_n$
    loop {In parallel on devices $\{d_i\}_{i=1}^n$}
      Download new model weights $\theta_t = \theta$
      for $m \in \tau$ do
        Compute gradient $\mathrm{g}_t^i = \frac{1}{b}\sum_{j=1}^{l} \nabla_\theta \mathcal{L}(\theta^t, \mathrm{D}_j)$
        Accumulate gradient $\theta_t = \theta_t - \gamma(t, m)\mathrm{g}_t^i$
      end for
      Compute update $\mathrm{u}_t^i = \theta_t - \theta$
      Clip update $\mathrm{u}_t^i = \mathrm{u}_t^i \cdots \min(1, \frac{L}{|\mathrm{u}_i^t|_2})$
    end loop
    Aggregate gradients $\mathrm{u}_t = \frac{1}{n}\sum_{i=1}^n \mathrm{u}_t^i$
    Momentum: $\mathrm{R}^t = 0.9 \cdot R^{t-1} + u^t$
    Error feedback: $\mathrm{W}_t = \mathrm{R}_t + \mathrm{W}_t$
    Extract $top_k$: $\Delta_t = top_k(\mathrm{W}_t)$
    Error accumulation: $\mathrm{W}_{t+1} = \mathrm{W}_t - \Delta_t$
    Update $\theta_{t+1} = \theta_t - \lambda(t)\Delta_t$
  end for
Output: $\{\theta^t\}_{t=1}^T$
```

Table 4.22: Test/Attack accuracy decrease for ℓ_2 norm clipping when not using momentum. CIFAR10, 1e4 clients, 200 attackers.

Defense	Test Acc (decrease)	Test acc	Attack acc (decrease)	Attack acc
ℓ_2	31.08 ±0.7	53.14 ±1.7	61.4 ±6	4.6 ±1

9.1.2 The Attack

Algorithm 9 provides the model poisoning attack used throughout this work. This attack is similar to the PGD attack proposed in prior work [159], with the addition of the attacker batch size parameter which enables us to poison models with larger auxiliary datasets. Section 9.8 provides detailed analysis on how the attacker batch size and number of PGD epochs are chosen. The attackers sample data from the "auxiliary dataset", a dataset which is composed of datapoints with their labels flipped that the attacker uses as a proxy to formulate the poisoned gradient.

```
Algorithm 9 Attack
Input: learning rate $\eta$, local batch size $\ell$, norm clipping parameter $L$, number of local epochs $e$
This procedure is used by all attackers in a round to ensure that they upload the same update
for number of PGD epochs $e_i \in e$ do
    Compute stochastic gradient $\mathrm{g}_i^t$ on batch $B_i$ of size $\ell$: $\mathrm{g}_i^t = \frac{1}{\ell}\sum_{j=1}^{l} \nabla_{\mathrm{M}}\mathcal{L}(\mathrm{M}^t_{e_i}, \mathrm{D}_j)$
    Update local model $\widehat{M}^t_{e_{i+1}} = \mathrm{M}^t_{e_i} - \eta \mathrm{g}^t_i$
    Project accumulated update onto the perimeter of the $\ell_2$ constraint $\mathrm{M}^t_{e_{i+1}} = M^t_0 - CLIP(\widehat{M}^t_{e_{i+1}} - M^t_0)$
end for
Output: $\mathrm{M}^t_e$
```

9.1.3 Byzantine-resilient defenses

Every algorithm described in this section is implemented via replacing line 15 in Algorithm 7. This introduces additional computational complexity into the aggregation step, which is the bottleneck in federated learning. This complexity can be minor (trimmed mean) or it can be massive (Bulyan). For this project, experiments with Bulyan take approximately 20× longer to run than our experiments with SparseFed; because these experiments are so computationally infeasible, where possible Bulyan is omitted from comparisons in the rest of the section. These defenses as initially proposed do not make use of ℓ_2 norm clipping, but because ℓ_2 clipping is used in the baseline defense, and because it benefits all defenses (Section 9.2), the input gradients to all the aggregation rules are already clipped.

Trimmed mean: In Algorithm 10 it can be seen that trimmed mean iteratively rejects outliers at each coordinate until it has eliminated $2f$ coordinates. If the attacker's updates have extremely small or large values, then trimmed mean will mitigate the attack. However, if most of the attacker's updates are close to 0 at many coordinates, then trimmed mean will not mitigate the attack. This is the phenomena observed in [21]; the attacker's updates are far

Algorithm 10 Trimmed mean

```
Input: number of compromised devices $f$, set of individual updates $U = \left\{u^t\right\}_{i=1}^n$
for number of compromised devices $f$ do
    for each coordinate $\{c\}_{j=1}^d$ do
        $U_c \leftarrow U_c \setminus \min U_c$
        $U_c \leftarrow U_c \setminus \max U_c$
    end for
end for
Aggregate remaining updates $\mathrm{u}^t = \frac{1}{n-2f} \sum_{i=1}^{n-2f} \mathrm{u}_i^t$
Output: $\mathrm{u}^t$
```

sparser than benign updates, which in turn means that most coordinate values are 0 and thus trimmed mean is ineffective.

Coordinate median: Coordinate median is simply implemented by returning the coordinate-wise median instead of the mean. This does not converge because of the gap between median and mean [37, 114, 173].

Algorithm 11 Krum

```
Input: number of compromised devices $f$, set of individual updates $U = \left\{u^t\right\}_{i=1}^n$
for each update $u_i^t$ do
    $U_i = U$
    for f+2 do
        $U_i = U_i \setminus \arg\max_{u_j^t \in U_i} \left\|u_j^t - u_i^t\right\|$
    end for
    $S_i = \sum_{u_j \in U_i} \left\|u_j^t - u_i^t\right\|$
end for

Output: $\mathrm{u}^t = \arg\min_{u \in U} S$
```

Krum: Algorithm 11 implements Krum, which attempts a Byzantine-resilient variant of the barycentric aggregation rule [23]. Krum selects a single update from the aggregated set to update the global model. In the cross-device federated setting, this will never converge. Essentially, SGD was used instead of minibatch SGD, and it takes 100× longer to do one pass over the entire dataset. Because Bulyan uses Krum and trimmed mean, Krum in isolation was not analyzed in depth.

Bulyan: Algorithm 12 describes Bulyan [111] implemented with Krum as the base aggregation rule. Bulyan builds a set by iteratively applying Krum onto the set of aggregated updates, and then returns the trimmed mean of this set. If Krum selects the attacker, it is known that trimmed mean is not likely to reject the attacker. However, why Krum will select at least one attacker still remains to be understood. In the non-i.i.d. setting, benign update vectors are sufficiently far away that a very small number of colluding attackers at each iteration can minimize their distance to all other vectors by sending the same update, which ensures that they have a distance of 0 from each other. Thus, Krum selects at least one attacker, and Bulyan fails, as shown in experiments performed during this project.

Algorithm 12 Bulyan

```
Input: number of compromised devices $f$, set of individual updates $U = \{u^t\}_{i=1}^n$
$\Theta = n - 2f$
$S = \emptyset$
while $|S| < \Theta$ do
    $p = \texttt{KRUM}(U, f)$
    $U \leftarrow U \setminus p$
    $S \leftarrow S \cup p$
end while
Output: $\mathrm{u}^t = \texttt{TRIMMEAN}(S, f)$
```

It is readily apparent that for large values of n, Bulyan is fairly computationally inefficient even when implemented efficiently. Although the asymptotic complexity of Bulyan is the same as that of Krum, the constant factor is quite large ($n = 100$).

9.1.4 SparseFed

The main body of this chapter includes the algorithm for SparseFed implemented with true top-k. As an implementation detail, the algorithm is in the uncompressed regime, where no local epochs are performed and the learning rate is multiplied after the top-k coordinates are extracted.

FetchSGD: Algorithm 13 is the FetchSGD algorithm [140] combined with ℓ_2 clipping. FetchSGD approximates true top-k and has been empirically shown to be communication efficient; Section 9.9 contains validation the robustness of SparseFed implemented with FetchSGD. Because SparseFed implemented with FetchSGD can achieve communication efficiency without the use of multiple local epochs, it has improved robustness over SparseFed implemented with true top-k, which still requires multiple local epochs for communication efficiency.

9.1.5 Adaptively choosing k in SparseFed

The hyperparameter k is critical for the convergence of SparseFed. Algorithm 14 provides an adaptive algorithm for selecting k. The algorithm requires the maximum information loss tolerance due to sparsification as an input, and essentially just performs binary search over a range of reasonable values of k until finding the smallest k that does not lose "too much" information.

9.1.6 Metrics

Preivously, this report described the use of the attack accuracy metric for the fixed cross-silo and cross-device settings. However, noting that accuracy is not a perfect metric, the rest of the report does not always use this setting when it does not illustrate a full breadth of a trend. For example, when trying to poison 1 point, the attackers can trivially obtain 100% attack accuracy, but this is not the case when they are trying to poison 100 points. Similarly, 100 attackers will have an easier time poisoning 1 point than 1 attacker will. To address these shortcomings, a new metric is introduced.

Algorithm 13 `SparseFed` implemented with `FetchSGD` instead of global top-k

```
Input: number of model weights to update each round $k$
Input: learning rate $\eta$
Input: norm clipping parameter $L$
Input: number of timesteps $T$
Input: momentum parameter $\rho$, local batch size $\ell$
Input: Number of clients selected per round $W$
Input: Sketching and unsketching functions $\mathcal{S}, \mathcal{U}$
Initialize $\mathrm{S}_u^0$ and $\mathrm{S}_e^0$ to zero sketches
Initialize model $\theta_0$ using the same random seed on the devices and aggregator
for $t = 1, 2, \cdots T$ do
    Randomly select $n$ devices $d_1, \dots d_n$
    loop {In parallel on devices $\{d_i\}_{i=1}^n$}
        Download new model weights $\theta_t = \theta$
        Compute gradient $\mathrm{g}_t^i = \frac{1}{b}\sum_{j=1}^{l} \nabla_\theta \mathcal{L}(\theta^t, \mathrm{D}_j)$
        Clip $\mathrm{g}_i^t$ according to $L$: $\mathrm{g}_i^t = \mathrm{g}_i^t * \min(1, \frac{L}{|\mathrm{g}_i^t|_2})$
        Sketch $\mathrm{g}_i^t$: $\mathrm{S}_i^t = \mathcal{S}(\mathrm{g}_i^t)$ and send it to the Aggregator
    end loop
    Aggregate sketches $\mathrm{S}^t = \frac{1}{W}\sum_{i=1}^{W} \mathrm{S}_i^t$
    Momentum: $\mathrm{S}_u^t = \rho \mathrm{S}_u^{t-1} + \mathrm{S}^t$
    Error feedback: $\mathrm{S}_e^t = \eta \mathrm{S}_u^t + \mathrm{S}_e^t$
    Unsketch: $\Delta^t = \text{Top-k}(\mathcal{U}(\mathrm{S}_e^t))$
    Error accumulation: $\mathrm{S}_e^{t+1} = \mathrm{S}_e^t - S(\Delta^t)$
    Update $\theta^{t+1} = \theta^t - \Delta^t$
end for
Output: $\{\mathrm{w}^t\}_{t=1}^T$
```

Algorithm 14 Selecting k

```
Input: model $\theta$, maximum information loss $\omega$, number of model parameters $d$, number of iterations
    in an epoch $r$, number of gradients to sample $n$ (more samples gives a better estimate of $\omega$)
set initial k $k = \frac{d}{r}$
set initial realized information loss $\delta = \infty$
while $\delta > \omega$ do
    compute $n$ sample minibatch gradients $\{g\}_{j=1}^n | g_j = \nabla_\theta \mathcal{L}(\theta, \mathrm{z}_j)$
    extract top-$k$ $\{u\}_{j=0}^n | u_j = top_k(g_j)$
    calculate average $l_1$ mass lost $\delta^* = \frac{1}{n}\sum_{j=1}^n |g_j - u_j|_1$
    update $\delta = \min(\delta, \delta^*)$
    if $\delta > \omega$ then
        $k = k + \frac{d}{r}$
    end if
end while
Output: $k$
```

Outsized Impact Factor (OIF) Let S be the set of agents participating in federated learning, and S_b the set of benign agents so that $I = \frac{|S \backslash S_b|}{|S|}$ is the influence of the attacker on the system, represented as the fraction of agents which are compromised. It is also proposed that the baseline for any model poisoning attack should be such that the attackers are able to poison datapoints (e.g. flip the label on that datapoint) $\widehat{X}_m$ proportional to their influence I. Therefore, if $|\widehat{X}_m|$ is the number of datapoints successfully poisoned and n is the total number of datapoints controlled by all agents in the system, we define $\frac{|\widehat{X}_m|}{I \cdot n}$, which is the ratio of datapoints successfully poisoned relative to the influence of the attacker, normalized by the size of the dataset, as the *outsized impact factor* (OIF). This quantity determines the extent to which the attacker is able to 'punch above its weight' in terms of impacting the final model to a larger extent than its influence would already allow.

For simulations conducted during this project, an OIF of 1 was used as a standard for a successful attack. This means that the attacker can poison the same fraction of the dataset as of the client population they control. By using this OIF metric as a heuristic for attack success, efficacy of attacks across parameter settings when different numbers of attackers are present can be easily compared.

9.2 Norm Clipping

Adaptive clipping to mitigate the vulnerability of `FedAvg` As noted in Section 9.1.1, the key vulnerability of `FedAvg` is that benign devices multiply their gradients by a small learning rate that can vary over the course of training, which can make their gradients smaller than the specified ℓ_2 norm clipping bound when the learning rate is small (e.g. when warming up the learning rate schedule at the start of training). However, the attack is under no such compulsion, and this can present an easy vulnerability for the attacker. Mitigations considered in this project included the use of an adaptive ℓ_2 clipping schedule which simply mirrors the learning rate schedule. At each iteration, before clipping the device gradient to the specified norm L, L was scaled by the learning rate $L := L \cdot \lambda(t)$. Table 4.23 shows the effectiveness of this ablation on trimmed mean and Bulyan.

Defense	Attack Accuracy (without)	Attack Accuracy (with)
Trimmed mean	100	81.4
Bulyan	100	81.8

Table 4.23: In the cross-device setting of CIFAR10, trimmed mean and Bulyan benefit greatly from the use of adaptive clipping.

Sparsification needs norm clipping

During this project, ablations were performed to demonstrate sparsification as a defense against model poisoning attacks, with and without the use of ℓ_2 norm clipping.

Figure 4.24 compares the efficacy of the combination of the distributed poisoning attack and the PGD attack against the top_k defense, with and without ℓ_2 clipping with parameter 3. We observe that when ℓ_2 clipping is in place, sparsification completely mitigates the attack. However, without any clipping the attacker is able to successfully flip the labels of their entire auxiliary dataset. This is because without any constraint on the norm of its update, the attacker can massively magnify its update and ensure that all the coordinates in the top_k are in the direction of the adversarial optimum.



Figure 4.24: Pareto frontier of the combination of distributed poisoning and PGD attacks against `SparseFed` defenses with and without ℓ_2 clipping. Without ℓ_2 clipping, sparsification is entirely unable to mitigate the attack. CIFAR10, 10000 devices, 100 attackers.

Byzantine-Robust Aggregation Benefits from Norm Clipping Prior defenses such as Krum, Bulyan, trimmed mean, coordinate median do not require norm clipping as part of the implementation. Norm clipping will either help the defense by limiting the impact of the attacker, in which case the server will enforce norm clipping, or it will hurt the defense by making the attack more stealthy, in which case the attacker will use norm clipping. Table 4.24 compares the changes in test and attack accuracy for Bulyan and trimmed mean when implementing norm clipping (Krum and coordinate median do not converge). As expected, norm clipping limits the impact of the attacker and helps Bulyan mitigate the attack when no colluding attackers are present.

Table 4.24: Implementing norm clipping greatly mitigates the effectiveness of the attack against Bulyan and trimmed mean when no colluding attackers are present. CIFAR10, 1e4 devices, 100 attackers.

Defense	**Test acc**	**Attack acc**
Bulyan (ℓ_2)	83.64	10.0
Bulyan	84.94	38.6
Trimmed Mean (ℓ_2)	77.42	71.6
Trimmed	81.99	100.0

9.2.1 Robustness in the DP defense costs accuracy

Prior work proposed combining ℓ_2 norm clipping and adding Gaussian noise to ensure robustness, similar to the process adopted in DP-SGD. For this project, it was assumed that practitioners would not be willing to adopt defenses which negatively impact the test accuracy of their models in scenarios where attackers are not present. Note that this is distinct from the accuracy degradation incurred from using a communication-efficient algorithm such as `FetchSGD` as a defense, or deploying DP-SGD to ensure differential privacy. In these cases, adversarial robustness can be seen as an additional benefit that 'comes for free'. However, the analyses performed during this project revealed that while several of the parameters allow for some adversarial robustness at the cost of test accuracy for the DP defense, they do not actually enable any differential privacy. As a result, these parameters were not used for most of the experiments due to the belief that *practitioners will adopt a defense which significantly negatively impacts their model performance.*

Figure 4.25 examines the effect of adding noise $n \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2 = 0.001)$. This noise parameter is identical to the one chosen in [3] As mentioned above, this amount of noise is entirely insufficient to ensure any differential privacy guarantees. The experiments also demonstrate the pareto frontier of the combination of distributed poisoning and PGD against the ℓ_2 defense with a parameter of 5, with and without noise addition. A result of these exercises is that when no attackers are present, adding noise reduces the test accuracy by a minimum of 12%, whereas not adding noise does not reduce the test accuracy at all. Therefore, while adding noise can make the model more robust, it is also guaranteed to significantly degrade model performance. In keeping with the aforementioned systemic assumption that practitioners will not use defenses which damage model performance, noise addition was not used in most experiments performed during this project. Nevertheless, a comparison of the DP defense with ℓ_2 parameter 5 and noise addition with $\sigma^2 = 0.001$, against `SparseFed` was conducted. The results are shown in Figure 4.26 which reinforce the prior conclusions that while adding noise with strict clipping is sufficient to mostly mitigate the attack, it comes at the cost of an egregious 20% drop in the test accuracy. By comparison, `SparseFed` suffers little accuracy degradation and mitigates the attack even better.

[3] Sun et. al. 2019: https://arxiv.org/abs/1911.07963



Figure 4.25: Pareto frontier of the ℓ_2 defense with clipping parameter 5, with and without noise addition, against the attack. Although noise addition can improve the robustness of the model to attackers, it also degrades test accuracy. In situations where no attackers are present, adding enough noise to mitigate any possible attackers will reduce the test accuracy by $> 10\%$. Assuming that practitioners will not adopt any defense which is guaranteed to reduce the performance of their models by such a nontrivial amount, noise addition was not used for tests conducted during this project. (points with low OIF either do not make use of PGD or have too small batch sizes) CIFAR10, 10000 devices, 100 attackers.



Figure 4.26: Pareto frontier of the ℓ_2 defense with noise addition and clip parameter 3, and `SparseFed` implemented with top_k and `FetchSGD` with clip parameter 3, against the combination of distributed poisoning and PGD. The attack was given the same grid search against all 3 defenses: $[50, 100, 200, 400] \times [5, 7, 9]$. Although noise addition is able to mitigate the attack, it suffers dramatically reduced test accuracy when compared to `SparseFed`; `SparseFed` achieves lower OIF with 10% higher test accuracy. CIFAR10, 10000 devices, 100 attackers.

9.3 Hyperparameter Tuning

9.3.1 Dataset Parameters

CIFAR Parameters: All FL experiments during this project utilized 24 epochs, with 1% of clients participating each round, for 2400 total iterations. The standard train/test split of 50000/10000 was used where the dataset was split into 10000 clients, each of which has 5 points from a single target class. In each round 100 clients were assumed to have participated, inducing a batch size of 500 (this is of course increased when an adversary participates). Standard data augmentation techniques such as random crops, and random horizontal flips were used, and the images are normalized according to the mean and standard deviation during training and testing. Batch normalization was not used in any of our experiments, since it does not work well on batches of 5 (batch normalization has to be conducted at a per-client level). A triangular learning rate schedule which peaks at 0.2 and a momentum constant of 0.9 were used. These training procedures and the ResNet9 architecture are drawn from Page [4].

FEMNIST Parameters: The FEMNIST dataset is composed of 805,263 28 × 28 pixel grayscale images which are distributed unevenly across 3,550 classes/users. Per user, there are an average of 226.83 datapoints, with a standard deviation of 88.94. The script in the LEAF repository with the command:
`./preprocess.sh -s niid -sf 1.0 -k 0 -t sample`. Discarding some datapoints results in a dataset of 706,057 training samples and 80,182 validation samples across 3,500 clients ala Leaf [5].

The model architecture consisted of a 40M-parameter ResNet101, but the batch norm was replaced with layer norm because batch norm does not work well with small batch sizes. The average batch size is ≈ 600 but it can vary based on the clients that are sampled. Once again, the standard data augmentations of random cropping and flips were used along with a triangular learning rate schedule. Training was conducted for only 1 epoch which mimics the federated setup where each client is expected to be used only once. The learning rate was increased from 0 to 0.01 over $\frac{1}{5}$th of the dataset, and then decreased the learning rate back to zero.

`FedAvg` **Parameters:** As discussed in Section 9.1, a standard implementation of `FedAvg` was used where there are three algorithmic hyperparameters: the number of local epochs, the local batch size, and the local learning rate decay. It was recognized that prior work has already shown that the use of multiple local epochs does not improve convergence in the regime of small and non-i.i.d. datasets [140], and multiple algorithmic variants have been proposed to address this [97]. These are however not evaluated for this project. Furthermore, the prior defenses considered in this work rely on approximating some consensus mechanism between benign devices based on the closeness or agreement of benign updates [111]. As the number of local epochs increases, this consensus falls apart. Therefore, for the sake of fairness, defenses with more than one local epoch were not evaluated in this project. Table 4.25 shows that the experiments performed during this project validate that `FedAvg` convergence does not benefit from multiple local epochs.

[4] https://myrtle.ai/learn/how-to-train-your-resnet/

[5] https://tinyurl.com/u2w3twe

Table 4.25: `FedAvg` convergence does not benefit from doing multiple local epochs. A local learning rate=0.9 was used, but even for a small number of local epochs convergence does not benefit. Also at these small number of local epochs a smaller local learning rate would not have much impact because the exponential decay factor is not large. CIFAR10, 10000 devices, no attackers.

Num. epochs	**Test acc decrease**	**Test acc**
1	0	90
2	0.41	89.59
5	80	10

9.3.2 Defense parameters

Norm clipping parameter: For the ℓ_2 defense, the clipping parameter was tuned with values $(1, 3, 5, 10)$. Where possible, a grid search was conducted over as many parameters as possible to find the limit of the attacker's ability.

Table 4.26: The appropriate choice of the norm clipping parameter greatly mitigates the effectiveness of the baseline attack on CIFAR with auxiliary set of size 500. CIFAR10, 10000 devices, 100 attackers.

Clipping param.	**Test acc**	**Attack acc**
10	0.7972	1
5	0.83	0.136
1	0.691	0.014

Validation of the ℓ_2 defense against the baseline attack is represented empirically in Table 4.26, which shows that by appropriately choosing the ℓ_2 parameter, the OIF is reduced significantly. There is a clear tradeoff: using stricter ℓ_2 norm clipping mitigates the attack further, but at the cost of reduced test accuracy.

Figure 4.27 depicts the effect of using stricter clipping in the ℓ_2 defense. The pareto frontier of the attack is shown against the ℓ_2 defense with two choices of the ℓ_2 parameter: 3 and 5. Figure 4.27 also shows that when no attackers are present, using a parameter of 3 admits a minimum of 5% test accuracy degradation, while using a parameter of 5 does not reduce test accuracy at all in the same scenario. Therefore, while using a smaller norm clipping parameter can make the model more robust, it is also guaranteed to always reduce test accuracy. In keeping with the aforementioned systemic assumption that practitioners will not use defenses which damage model performance, the parameter of 5 was used in most experiments. For all further experiments, the value 5 was chosen as the parameter for the ℓ_2 defense, balancing test accuracy and adversarial robustness.



Figure 4.27: Pareto frontier of the ℓ_2 defense, comparing clipping parameters of 3 and 5. Although using a stricter norm clipping parameter can reduce OIF, it comes at the cost of test accuracy degradation. Findings indicate that when no attackers are present, using a norm clipping parameter of 5 does not sacrifice any test accuracy, whereas using a norm clipping parameter of 3 sacrifices $> 5\%$ test accuracy. Because practitioners will not likely adopt any defense which is guaranteed to reduce the performance of their models by such a nontrivial amount, a clipping parameter of 5 is used. CIFAR10, 10000 devices, 100 attackers.

`SparseFed` parameters: For `SparseFed` the number of coordinates k are updated at each iteration. Using test values of $[1, 5, 10, 50, 100, 200, 400] \times 10^3$ and report most experiments using the value of 5×10^3 on CIFAR10/CIFAR100/FMNIST, and use the value of 400×10^3. Graphs of the test results are provided throughout this report which show the tradeoffs around k.

FIgure 4.28 shows the tradeoff between k, test accuracy, and attack accuracy for the uncompressed setting. As defined previously in this report, `FedAvg` is the baseline and as noted in [18], the attacker can simply perform model replacement at the last iteration because the learning rate is nearly 0. However, in the uncompressed setting this is not possible, so the same trend is not evident. Section 9.9 showcases an algorithm which can realistically be implemented without using `FedAvg` to compress communication costs.



Figure 4.28: Tradeoff between sparsification parameter k (x axis, in logscale from 1000 to $k = d = 6568640$), test accuracy when attackers are present (left axis, blue), and attack accuracy (right axis, red) for *uncompressed* FL. In the uncompressed setting, no choice of k allows the attack to succeed, because as $k \to d$ no momentum is present and neither the attack nor the model converge. CIFAR10, 10000 devices, 200 attackers.

9.4 Impact of Defenses on Test Accuracy

Practitioners in federated learning prioritize the convergence of their models, and attempt to optimize tradeoffs of convergence with communication efficiency, security, and privacy. Table 4.27 shows the decrease in test accuracy when no attackers are present for each defense evaluated during this project. Each model is trained for exactly 2400 iterations using the same triangular learning rate schedule. Because the Byzantine-resilient aggregation rules rely on outlier detection, they must necessarily throw away information even when attackers are not present. Because including a full curve is computationally infeasible, the robustness parameter is set to $f = 5$ to give an idea of the tradeoff for these algorithms. Bulyan drops more test accuracy than trimmed mean, because Bulyan throws away $4f + 2$ updates at each coordinate whereas trimmed mean only throws away $2f$ updates at each coordinate. As explained previously, in the main body of the work, Krum and coordinate median do not converge in this setting.

Table 4.27: Comparing the impact on test accuracy of the defenses. CIFAR10, 10000 devices, no attackers (averaged over 3 runs).

Defense	**Test Acc. decrease**	**Test Acc**
No defense	0 ±0	90.0 ±0.1
ℓ_2	2.0 ±0.1	88.0 ±0.1
Krum	80.0 ±0	10.0 ±0
Median	80.0 ±0	10.0 ±0
Trimmed mean ($f = 5$)	12.58 ±0.8	77.42 ±0.8
Bulyan ($f = 5$)	18.88 ±0.79	71.12 ±0.79
Bulyan ($f = 10$)	66.48	23.52
`SparseFed` ($k = 5e3$)	6.82 ±0.7	83.18 ±0.7
`SparseFed` ($k = 5e4$)	3.0 ±0.01	87.0 ±0.01

9.5 Stealth of Attack

Successful attacks are stealthy attacks: A necessary component of a successful attack is relative stealth. For this project, an attacker is not considered viable if it can only successfully poison the model by overwriting all of the model's parameters that are necessary to achieve good performance on benign data. In any practical deployment, the entity coordinating federated learning would simply discard a model with such low accuracy after running the model on a private test set. Also, drawing points for the auxiliary dataset from the test set can force the test accuracy to drop by as much as 5% when the attacker poisons the model with perfect accuracy over an auxiliary set of size 500 out of a test set of total size 10000. Table 4.28 includes the decrease in test accuracy on the validation set **not including the auxiliary set** of size 500 , and confirms that the attack has an element of stealth. For the attacks on CIFAR10, CIFAR100, and FMNIST, the auxiliary dataset is drawn randomly from all classes and the decrease in test accuracy is also evenly distributed across the classes.

Table 4.28: Attack accuracy and decrease in test accuracy on CIFAR10, 10000 devices, 200 attackers.

Name	**Test acc decrease**	**Attack acc**
Trimmed Mean	4.78	100
Bulyan	7.35	92.6
Clipping	7.1	100
SparseFed (Ours)	6.61	**25.6**

Note that for the semantic backdoor task, the attack is not stealthy by definition.

9.6 Strength of attack

In this section, a thorough evaluation of the attack described in Algorithm 1 for both defended and undefended systems is discussed. Note that the attack is more powerful than previously considered, and that collusion can break existing defenses, poisoning attacks can also be used to induce Byzantine failures. The discussion also evaluates model replacement attacks, and consider the possibility of an adaptive attack against `SparseFed`.

9.6.1 The outsized impact of model poisoning attacks on undefended systems

In this section, the effectiveness of the baseline model poisoning attack against undefended federated learning systems is evaluated. Results indicate that the attack achieves a high OIF across a number of attack scenarios, much higher than considered by previous work.

Table 4.29: Increasing the size of the auxiliary set can typically result in higher OIF with greatly reduced stealth when using the baseline attack against undefended model on CIFAR.

Aux. set size	**Test acc**	**OIF**
0	0.9001	0
500	0.7796	1
1000	0.6981	2
5000	0.3107	6.258

Table 4.30: The attack is effective against an undefended model on CIFAR, across a broad range of attacker population sizes. Prior work has not achieved high OIF values, ranging from 0.0063 to 0.126 [18].

Aux. set size	**No. attackers**	**Test acc**	**OIF**
500	100	0.7796	1
500	10	0.8332	9.74
50	10	0.8842	1
50	1	0.887	1.1
5	1	0.8927	1

In Tables 4.29 and 4.30, the baseline attack achieves higher OIF on CIFAR10 than any previous work has been able to attain. Here, 100 attackers corresponds to a frequency of 1, meaning 1 attacker is selected in every round, and 1 attacker corresponds to a frequency of 0.01, meaning 1 attacker is selected every 100 rounds. Given a total dataset size of 50000 and a client population of 10000, each attacker "should" only be ableto flip the labels of 5 datapoints, because that is the amount of data controlled by any agent in the system. Therefore, when 10 attackers are able to flip the labels of 500 datapoints with high accuracy, they achieve a remarkably high OIF.

This validates a hypothesis that *model poisoning attacks may be orders of magnitude more powerful than has been shown previously.*

Table 4.31: The attack on the FEMNIST dataset far outperforms prior benchmarks which achieve at most an OIF of 0.03 [159].

Attacker batch size	**Test acc**	**OIF**
0	0.8198	0
300	0.7517	1.461
600	0.7618	1.456
1200	0.7614	1.405
3000	0.7969	0.0146

9.6.2 Colluding attackers break the norm clipping defense

This task systematically evaluate the ℓ_2 norm clipping defense proposed in Sun et al. [159] against the strong attack with the ability for attackers to collude.

CIFAR10: In Fig. 4.29 the attacker batch size and number of PGD epochs (more details in Section 9.8) are varied and obtain an attack which recovers an OIF close to 1. Against a defended system with a moderate stealth threshold of 5%, the attack can achieve an OIF of 0.5 which is significantly higher than any prior work claims [159]. Therefore, *colluding attackers can break the ℓ_2 defense.*

FEMNIST: This experiment compares directly with [159] and examine the OIF they obtain in their paper. For the comparison, the percentage of attackers is the same and so is the attack and defense (PGD and ℓ_2 clipping), and observe that when we scale up the setting and the size of the auxiliary set, the defense does not scale. Table 4.31 shows that an OIF > 1 was achieved. This corresponds to flipping the labels of nearly every datapoint from the considered task, which indicates that the peak OIF could be higher if considering different tasks. This OIF is about 50× that of [159]. Crucially, appropriate auxiliary set minibatching is required for success at this scale with low frequency. If the attacker batch size is too large, the adversary does not make enough progress on the iterations where it is present and the benign agents quickly revert the model on subsequent non-adversarial iterations.

Scaling up from [159]: The expected goal when doing experiments on FEMNIST is to evaluate a dataset where each device is only chosen to participate once. Furthermore, each iteration should include a somewhat realistic number of devices ($10-100$) without exceeding the optimal batch size for the proposed residual architecture ($500 - 600$). Under these constraints, each batch was split into 9 to 10 devices so that $10s$ of devices could be sampled at each iteration while maintaining a good batch size. Believing that this is an important experimental setting for federated learning, models were trained to converge in one pass over the dataset, sampling each device only once.

Note on the attack: When attempting to modify the behavior of the benign model on a large number of datapoints, every additional point of OIF requires giving up more stealth, because every "misflipped" point reduces stealth but doesn't increase OIF. Further, increasing the number of PGD epochs, or the attacker batch size, moves along the OIF-stealth tradeoff. This suggests the following strategy for an attacker with an OIF goal in mind: while the goal is not met, increase the batch size as much as possible while maintaining convergence, then only increase the number of PGD epochs.



Figure 4.29: Pareto frontier of the attack against the ℓ_2 defense on CIFAR, for fixed auxiliary dataset size of 500, norm clipping parameter of 5, 10000 clients and 100 workers with 100 attackers. This attack achieves an OIF 5× higher than the baseline attack against the ℓ_2 defense.

9.6.3 Byzantine attacks

Prior work has evaluated model poisoning attacks with the objective of inducing Byzantine failure against the same cadre of Byzantine-resilient aggregation rules [51]. Using a better architecture, larger number of devices, smaller number of attackers, more severe non-i.i.d. partitioning, and smaller participation rate, the Byzantine failure rate induced by the proposed attack is compared to previous work in Table 4.4. In this instance, the attack was modified to return arbitrary gradients projected onto the perimeter of the ℓ_2 norm ball. The results show that the scale of this evaluation reveals a much higher rate of Byzantine failure.

9.6.4 Model replacement attack against `SparseFed`

For this test case, the experimental setting of the model replacement attack of [18] was replicated. In particular, insertion of a semantic backdoor on the Reddit dataset was attenoted. The LSTM model architecture, dataset details, and all other experimental parameters are identical to those in the experiments of [18]. The semantic backdoor inserted is again drawn from their experiments: "people in athens are rude". When compared to the backdoors inserted for computer vision datasets, it is easy to see that this backdoor makes up a relatively small portion of the training dataset in comparison. Therefore, the attack itself is much stronger, and this has been observed by [164] as it is an "edge-case" attack rather than the model poisoning attack previously discussed in this report which is very much a "base case" attack. Figure 4.30 depicts the evaluation of the model replacement attack against the baseline ℓ_2 clipping defense with a threshold of 3, and that the minimum value does not degrade test accuracy, and `SparseFed` with the same ℓ_2 clipping parameter. In the model replacement attack, the attacker compromises a small percentage of devices for a short period of time, and the goal is to enable the backdoor to persist for as long as possible while the benign devices continue training the model. However this study only compares the speed that the baseline defense and `SparseFed` erase the backdoor. A detailed study of the staying power of the model replacement attack is deferred to future work. Also, the hyperparameter k for the new LSTM architecture is not tuned and the same value of k is used, as in the computer vision experiments, that does not degrade convergence. The attack is inserted slightly faster when `SparseFed` is implemented, which is expected because the convergence-robustness tradeoff is not optimized. Even unoptimized, `SparseFed` reduces the attack accuracy of the backdoored model significantly faster than the baseline defense.



Figure 4.30: Model replacement attack on the Reddit dataset. `SparseFed` quickly returns the model to the benign optimum.

9.6.5 Adaptive attack against `SparseFed`

It is recognized that producing attacks which can overcome strong defenses such as ℓ_2 norm clipping and Bulyan requirese use of adaptive attacks which incorporate knowledge of the defense into their attack strategy. Specifically, to beat ℓ_2 clipping the attacker should use PGD, and to beat Bulyan (or other Byzantine-resilient aggregation rules such as trimmed mean) the attackers should collude. For an adaptive attack against `SparseFed`, the attacker would need information about the top-k that will be updated, which is unrealistic in practice. Nevertheless, an adaptive attacker is hereby introduced for testing the effectiveness of `SparseFed`.

The main idea is to use PGD under the coordinate-wise constraint, with the assumption that the attacker has perfect knowledge of all gradients at the current timestep and is able to project their update onto the top-k coordinates which will be updated. This attack will only succeed if the attacker has any signal in the true top-k coordinates; otherwise, the attacker will simply keep updating their local model with noise and no progress will be made. Table 4.32 summarizes the adaptive attack against `SparseFed` and shows that the adaptive attack only obtains a negligible improvement over the baseline attack, indicating the strength of the

Algorithm 15 Adaptive attack against `SparseFed`

```
Input: learning rate $\eta$, local batch size $\ell$, norm clipping parameter $L$, number of local epochs $e$
Input: true top-$k$ coordinates to be updated at this iteration $K$
This procedure is used by all attackers in a round to ensure that they upload the same update
for number of PGD epochs $e_i \in e$ do
    Compute stochastic gradient $\mathrm{g}_i^t$ on batch $B_i$ of size $\ell$: $\mathrm{g}_i^t = \frac{1}{\ell}\sum_{j=1}^{l} \nabla_{\mathrm{M}}\mathcal{L}(\mathrm{M}_{e_i}^t, \mathrm{D}_j)$
    Update local model $\widehat{M}_{e_{i+1}}^t = \mathrm{M}_{e_i}^t - \eta \mathrm{g}_i^t$
    Project accumulated update onto the true top-$k$ coordinates
    Project accumulated update onto the perimeter of the $\ell_2$ constraint $\mathrm{M}_{e_{i+1}}^t = M_0^t - CLIP(\widehat{M}_{e_{i+1}}^t - M_0^t)$
end for
Output: $\mathrm{M}_e^t$
```

`SparseFed` defense. The combination of clipping and small number of possible coordinates to update represent a fundamental barrier for the attacker.

Table 4.32: The adaptive attack against `SparseFed` performs similarly to the base attack.

Attack	**Attack acc**	**Test acc**
Baseline	3.8	76.57
Adaptive	4.4	77.02

9.7 Range proofs for `SparseFed`

An in depth discussion on a proposed implementation of range proofs in a federated learning system is not presented for the following three main reasons.

First, prior work on defenses does not make any claims about the computational or communication efficiency of their proposed robust aggregation mechanisms, including the methods that are compared to in this work (Bulyan, Krum, etc.) This includes the works which initially proposed L2 norm clipping as a defense (Sun et. al. 2019). Given this, the project team did not feel that there is a precedent for defense papers which utilize L2 norm clipping and its variants to propose an efficient range proof that is compatible with existing systems, as this would fall more in the realm of an applied-cryptography/systems-security paper.

Second, industry experience indicates that not all existing deployments make use of secure aggregation due to its costly overhead and inefficiency at scaling up to larger numbers of clients. Because this is the case, a federated learning system which does not use secure aggregation can implement L2 norm clipping at the server very efficiently.

Third, to the best of the project team's knowledge, existing defenses against model poisoning attacks all need some degree of verification of whether or not a client's gradient updates is L2 norm clipping or checking the sign of the gradient. SparseFed, unlike schemes which require consensus such as Bulyan or sign aggregation, does not require any additional secure computation beyond L2 norm clipping because there is no need to establish consensus between clients. In this regard, it is most suited for deployment in a setting which requires secure aggregation assuming that a secure multiparty computation for L2 norm clipping has already been deployed.

Despite the above qualifications, this exercise now address the issue of how to implement range proofs for L2 norm clipping efficiently, using an informal description of how such a range proof can be achieved. While specific details are not provided here, the project team believes that the method presented can lead to an actual proof in future work. The parties in a federated learning system are one server and one or more clients. The server will play the role of the verifier and the clients will be provers. Because the proposed protocol does not require any coordination between clients, the system can be simplified to one prover and one verifier. In the first step of the protocol, the prover generates a commitment to their update vector over the floating point domain. Next, the prover computes the sum of squares via a zkSNARK circuit (zero knowledge succinct non interactive argument of knowledge). Assuming that a custom SNARK is constructed for this application and the prover is using a standard multi-CPU chip found in the latest smartphones, the proving time would be less than thirty seconds (citation 1). This is minimal compared to the existing overhead in secure aggregation, which can take many minutes when accounting for multiple rounds of dropped users. For a very conservative assumption about how much information is leaked, the sum of squares can be treated as a secret committed value and use a bulletproof to ensure that it falls within the range of (0, L**2) where L is the L2 norm clipping constraint. Since bulletproofs are fairly small and scale logarithmically in the number of commitments, all 100 L2 norms can be validated in one bulletproof for just 1MB in space, and all of this can be verified in 2ms by the verifier's hardware. If leaking the sum of squares is acceptable, this process can be made public and the verifier can check it outside the circuit. In either case, only provers who pass the verification will have their update vectors aggregated. This protocol sketch can be implemented without significantly increasing either the communication complexity (which is already quite large given that it is at minimum upload gradients of deep networks) or the computation complexity (again, quite large because the device already has to compute gradients on local data).

9.8 Tuning Attack Parameters

CIFAR attack parameters: This exercise considers various numbers of attackers: $[100, 200, 400, 1000]$ but most experiments are conducted with $100 - 200$ attackers which corresponds to having $1 - 2$ attackers present in every round. The project team considers this to be in line with a real world threat model. Typical federated learning training cycles take place over the course of a few days, and in order to use data from as many agents as possible, each round must draw data from many agents. Agents are called on to participate when they fulfill a number of criteria, and an attacker can forge these criteria in order to control when they are selected. Therefore, it should be straightforward for a small number of attackers to ensure that they are selected in every round. All auxiliary datapoints are drawn from the CIFAR validation set. Each point is randomly given a label from one of the 9 classes which it does not belong to. There are a number of unique attack hyperparameters which are searched over. For the boosting factor, the range [1,4,6,8,10,20] was searched over and revealed that a boosting factor of 20 works well for these experiments to ensure that PGD projects the update onto the perimeter of the ℓ_2 constraint. However, tuning the boosting factor does not make an impact whenever the ℓ_2 defense is in place with a sufficiently small clipping threshold. For these experiments, the attacker's local batch size is tuned when the attacker are doing PGD.

The values of $[N/10, 2N/10, 4N/10, 8N/10]$ were used where N is the size of the auxiliary set. Similarly, when the attacker is using PGD, the number of epochs is tuned using the values of $[1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11]$.

9.8.1 Hyperparameter Tuning in Attacks

The hyperparameters considered for these experiments include the attacker's **local batch size**, and the **number of local epochs for PGD**.

Figure 4.31 depicts the impact of changing the attacker batch size across two different auxiliary set sizes: 500 and 5000, against the ℓ_2 defense with parameter 5. The ensuing results show that varying the attacker batch size for the smaller auxiliary set size reveals a smooth pareto frontier which enables the attacker to double its attack efficacy against the ℓ_2 for a moderate stealth budget when compared to the baseline attack. Increasing the attacker batch size up to a certain point increases the efficacy of the attack at the expense of stealth; further increasing the attacker batch size does not continue moving along the pareto frontier. This is because, as shown in the initial validation of the ℓ_2 defense, attempting to backdoor the entire auxiliary set at every iteration for the smaller auxiliary set results in a very small OIF.

Figure 4.32 shows the effect of tuning the number of PGD epochs against the ℓ_2 defense with parameter 5 at two different auxiliary set sizes, 500 and 5000. Performing a larger number of gradient descent iterations over the auxiliary set overfits the gradient significantly, which enables the attacker to insert a backdoor with higher OIF at the expense of a considerable degree of stealth.



Figure 4.31: Pareto frontier of the attack when varying the batch size against the ℓ_2 defense with a parameter of 5, using auxiliary set sizes of 500 and 5000. While tuning the batch size does not achieve an OIF of 1, it does improve the pareto frontier for the attacker. Results indicate that varying the attacker batch size moves along the OIF-stealth tradeoff; larger backdoors correspond to better OIF, at the expense of stealth.



Figure 4.32: Pareto frontier of the PGD attack against the ℓ_2 defense with a parameter of 5, using auxiliary set sizes of 500 and 5000. Increasing the number of epochs improves the OIF at the expense of stealth.

9.8.2 Additional Results

In Figure 4.33 the size of the auxiliary set was varied to observe how successful a more "ambitious" attacker can be. Generally, increasing the auxiliary set size enables the baseline attack to achieve a higher OIF at the expense of considerable stealth. These results are summarized in Table 4.29 included earlier in this report.

In Figure 4.34, the attack is used to insert a large number of backdoors against an undefended system on the FEMNIST dataset. As mentioned in this report, the resulting OIF is notably $\approx 50\times$ that of the attack benchmarked in prior work. By considering attackers that use a subset of the auxiliary set by minibatching, use of a much larger overall auxiliary set size in the attack is enabled. These results are summarized in Table 4.31.

Figure 4.35 shows the baseline attack against a system on CIFAR100 with 50000 clients, each client possessing 1 datapoint, 500 workers and 100 attackers. When the system is undefended, the small number of attackers are able to insert an attack with OIF 1. However, enforcing the ℓ_2 defense with parameter 5 successfully mitigates this attack. Results for the adaptive attack were shown previously in this report in Figure 4.29, where the attack reaches 100% accuracy against the ℓ_2 defense.



Figure 4.33: Pareto frontier of the baseline attack against the undefended system on CIFAR10 with 10000 clients and 100 workers. Annotation is the size of the auxiliary set.



Figure 4.34: Pareto frontier of the attack against the undefended system on FEMNIST. Annotation is the attacker batch size, and the size of the auxiliary set. Using a larger auxiliary set with an appropriately tuned batch size allows for much higher OIF.



Figure 4.35: Baseline attack against CIFAR100 systems, with and without a DP-based ℓ_2 defense in place.

In Figure 4.36 the number of attackers is varied against various defenses. The results indicate that the defense which has the absolute highest robustness is: uncompressed `SparseFed` with $k = d$, which is equivalent to uncompressed ℓ_2 clipping without momentum. However, the test accuracy of this approach is low (44%). Overall, `SparseFed` dominates the other defenses significantly, especially for a smaller number of attackers.



Figure 4.36: Attack against various defenses on CIFAR10 with varying number of attackers.

Table 4.33 presents the results of varying the nature of the semantic backdoor when attacking FEMNIST and indicates that both semantic backdoors perform similarly by targeting the pair of digits 4 and 9 instead of 1 and 7.

Table 4.33: Varying the semantic backdoor does not have a significant impact on the success of the attack against FEMNIST.

Defense	Attack acc (1/7)	Attack acc (4/9)
ℓ_2	100	100
`SparseFed`	1.95	6.72

9.9 `FetchSGD`: The Case for Sparsification



Figure 4.37: Pareto frontier of `SparseFed` using top_k and `FetchSGD` with ℓ_2 clipping using parameter 5, against varying hyperparameters of the colluding PGD attack, with a fixed auxiliary dataset of size 500. This is the best that the strongest available attack can perform against the proposed defense leading to a factor of $5 - 10\times$ improvement over the ℓ_2 defense.

Figure 4.37 depicts results of evaluating the proposed provable defense using two implementations of `SparseFed`: top-k and FetchSGD sparsification. As an implementation detail, top-k and the ℓ_2 defenses were used in the uncompressed setting, and FetchSGD is in the "uncompressed" setting where the overall communication cost is reduced by a factor of 10. In all experiments, only $k = 5e4$ gradient parameters were updated at every iteration. For producing a defended system with a moderate stealth threshold of 5%, the attack achieves 0.05 OIF. Thus the `SparseFed` defense outperforms the ℓ_2 defense by a factor of $10\times$ (recall that the ℓ_2 defense incurs an OIF of 0.5 under comparable constraints in Figure 4.29). Both implementations mitigate the attack, and using FetchSGD for robustness simultaneously achieves communication efficiency and enables operation in the uncompressed setting, thereby resulting in further robustness.

10 Limitations and societal impact

Limitations: For the work performed during this project, empirical limitation forced the project team to make imperfect simulations of cross-device federated settings because of not having access to real federated datasets at the scale of tens of thousands of devices. For CIFAR10, CIFAR100, and FMNIST, lacking any natural non-iid partitioning, the simulation strategy was to simulate each device only drawing samples from the distribution of one class than multiple classes. But this may not necessarily be true in the real world. The federated learning community is encouraged to contribute real-world and large-scale datasets to overcome such limitations for future studies.

Security considerations: Analysis of existing Byzantine resilient defenses during this project, reveals that colluding attackers can successfully attack systems which may use these defenses today. To mitigate these attacks, stakeholders that have deployed these systems are urged to inspect their vulnerabilities using the same powerful attacker implemented for this project.

The field of federated learning has seen a great deal of research interest lately. Federated learning systems today utilize data from millions of users and serve millions more, so adversarial robustness is of paramount importance. Prior work in the field of targeted model poisoning attacks has examined the impact that attacks have in the cross-silo setting. The EUREICA project complements this body of work by demonstrating the outsized impact of model poisoning attacks on systems at scale and showing that existing defenses can be broken by colluding attackers. This project also introduced `SparseFed`, and proved practical robustness guarantees for our novel defense. `SparseFed` was compared to existing defenses and was confirmed that it outperforms these against strongest available attacks empirically at large scales. Although future work may introduce attacks which are stronger than those considered here, this study emphasizes that `SparseFed` will maintain provable robustness against any attack. Investigation of the tradeoffs between other proposed attacks and defenses is relegated to future work.

Chapter 5

A Framework for Resiliency Metric of Distribution Systems with Privacy Concerns: WVU Team

This chapter proposes a framework for a resiliency metric in distribution systems with a range of heterogeneous devices with disparate owners. As these devices increase in penetration, complexity, and capabilities, we need to develop metrics that assess the trustability of these devices and their resilience to various vulnerabilities.In this chapter, we develop a trustability score using cyberphysical features of IoTs. These metrics are utilized in order to develop a reconfiguration algorithm that determines the most resilient path for all trustable generation sources that accommodates all critical loads in the region of interest in the distribution grid.

11 Introduction

Distribution automation and grid modernization has led evolution to a cyber-physical distribution system from a physical system [52, 73]. This has led to a more efficient and flexible power distribution system as associated communication infrastructure and digital devices have significantly improved the system measurement, computation, and control [74, 155].

With increasing Internet of Things (IoT) based intelligent devices, systems are more adaptable, and flexible. IoT is now evolving to the Internet of Everything, as it incorporates and builds a system that includes wireless networks, sensors, cloud servers, analytics, smart devices, and advanced technologies. IoT is a regime that consists of millions of intelligent devices connected to analyze and influence our day-to-day activities [38, 113, 150]. IoT records one of the fastest growth rates in computing technologies, with an estimated 5.3 billion global Internet users and more than three times the global population of devices connected by the year 2023 [50]. As the grid becomes more connected, computations and data managements are increasingly moving to the devices at the network edge. Encouraged by availability, latency, and privacy issues, IoT devices can now perform local computations on these data to provide services to the users without transferring any personal data to a central server, thereby improving privacy. The IoT helps deploy these devices, many of whom can perform local computations on data they hold to provide services to end-users. In particular, IoT can provide connectivity between distributed energy resources (DER) along critical energy supply corridors and within groups of vital facilities, accommodating privacy concerns and constraints of availability. Resilience is defined as the ability of the microgrid or distribution system to supply the critical load even in the case of multiple contingencies [41, 120]. Recent cyberattacks on the power grid have been of increasing complexity and intricacy, thereby adding to the various threats faced by the power grid. It is essential that the power grid remains resilient to such threats and supplies power to critical loads when subjected to various stress levels. Considering that these risks cannot be eliminated, resiliency becomes vital to enable the essential infrastructure to continue to perform when faced with such threats. In 2017, the National Academy of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) released a report titled "Enhancing the Resiliency of the Nation's Electricity System," in which, among other recommendations [41, 120], details the need for defining resilience metrics that can drive planning and operational decisions. The main focus of the EUREICA project was to develop a resilient control solution against cyber-events and driven by cyber-physical resiliency metrics by leveraging the ubiquitous presence of IoT nodes.

The increasing use of IoT devices in distribution systems brings many other concerns like data integrity, data privacy, data quality, and network communication latencies. When it comes to cyber-physical resilience analysis for planning and operational decisions in the presence of IoT devices, it is imperative to address the concerns mentioned above. Various literature approaches use artificial intelligence (AI) and federated learning (FL) to train data models to enable intelligent applications in the presence of IoTs [93, 122, 123, 165].

To address these issues, this project started by analyzing the distribution system with IoTs and modeled cyber-physical system along with IoTs to better understand overall changing behaviors of distribution systems. Next, the cyber-physical features of IoTs typically present in the distribution grid were identified and appropriate unsupervised machine learning along with federated learning were applied to identify anomaly and formulate IoT Trustability score. This IoT Trustability score and other topological factors from the secondary level feeder were combined using Fuzzy multi-criterion decision making (MCDM) to calculate primary node level resiliency (PNR). Finally, overall distribution system resiliency was formulated using game theoretic Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) using PNR and other topological factors of all the primary nodes of the distribution system. This formulation was later extended and modified to accommodate the secondary transformer node resiliency (STNR) using a similar approach. Adding this STNR along with PNR as resiliency score facilitates the calculation of the trustability score with the help of commitment scores from the Secondary Market Agent (SMA) and Secondary Market Operator (SMO) from the market module respectively.

The developed metrics will be valuable for i) monitoring the distribution system resiliency considering a holistic cyber-power model; ii) enabling data privacy by not utilizing the raw user data, and iii) enabling better decision-making to select the best possible mitigation strategies towards resilient distribution system. The developed ITS, PNR, STNR, and DSR metrics were validated with multiple case studies for the IoTs-integrated IEEE 123 node distribution system with satisfactory results. For this project, these IoT Enabled Coordinated Assets (ICA) were used to create a possible reconfiguration path from generating sources to critical loads and a corresponding resiliency metric for each path. These paths and metrics help provide situational awareness to the grid operator at large. The reconfiguration paths will be determined based on the stress levels of the grid and the corresponding degree of failed ICA, the tolerance bands of the ICA, and the security levels and privacy needs of each ICA.

The reconfiguration algorithm first takes all the available generation sources and their capacity as a list. The algorithm then tries to find all the possible shortest paths for each generation source and critical load pair present within the same microgrid cluster from the power system graph network. If the available generation is not enough to supply the total critical load, then the algorithm searches for the next likely resource. This will continue until the critical load is fully covered. As the generation sources are assigned to critical loads, if any source's capacity is more than the assigned load, the source's partial remaining capacity will be assigned to other loads. For each microgrid cluster, the load generation balance will be performed in this way. Once all the feasible paths for reconfiguration have been established, the resiliency score is computed for each path, which will support the operator in making the appropriate operational decision.

12 Analysis and Modeling of Distribution System with IoTs

A distribution system typically starts from a 69 kV substation where it is connected to the transmission network. A step-down transformer then steps down the high voltage from the transmission line to the primary distribution level voltage. With the modernization of the power system, distribution systems are also going through significant changes. More digital and IoT devices are being introduced every day, requiring multiple changes in the distribution system in order to support increasing IoT integration.

12.1 IoT Definition for Distribution Power System

There are many definitions available for the Internet of Things in literature. A few of those definitions are included below:

"Internet of Things" semantically means a worldwide network of interconnected objects uniquely addressable, based on Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and Internet Protocol (IP) [57].

Things with identities and virtual personalities operating in smart spaces using intelligent interfaces to connect and communicate within social, environmental, and user contexts [138] .

IoT has the comprehensive sense (using sensors to collect information from any objects anytime and anywhere), intelligent processing, reliable transmission via communications networks and the Internet [174].

According to Substation Automation Committee, anything in the substation is an IoT. Any device that does its own monitoring and control is considered as IoT for the control center.

Considering all of the above definitions,any device can be considered as IoT if they have the following attributes:

- Connected to others and can exchange information.

- Has digital computing capability.

- Plug & Play.
- Has unique identifier like an IP address.
- Performs some autonomous activity.

Based on the above characteristics, any device/component (relay, switch, transformer, etc.) of the distribution system can be treated as an IoT.



Figure 5.1: IEEE 123 test feeder.

12.2 Distribution System Analysis with IoTs

Let us consider the IEEE 123-node test feeder system shown in Figure 5.1 where a microgrid is connected to node 350. This microgrid can be part of a military installation for which the utility's distribution system operator has no access. Consequently, this microgrid can be considered an IoT node in the power system. The changing distribution system can be modeled from the primary level node to the downstream consumers. The primary level nodes can be modeled into three categories based on the configuration of other downstream primary level nodes.

12.2.1 Physical Primary Node

Though the modernization of the distribution system is everywhere, there are still many distribution feeders with legacy operation/control devices. Primary Nodes in this category have no digital component in the secondary level and hence every operation is typically done manually.



Figure 5.2: Typical configuration of primary node and its downstream components.

12.2.2 Cyber-Physical Primary Node without IoTs

This second category covers any Primary Node with digital devices (relays, circuit breakers, switches, etc.) but no IoT devices in the secondary level. Figure 5.2 shows the typical configuration of this type of node.

12.2.3 Cyber-Physical Primary Node with IoTs

For Primary Nodes in the third category, IoTs such as EV, energy storage, HVAC, PV, etc., exist downstream. This type of node can have three types of feeder configuration in terms of connectivity. They are-

- *Type-A:* Feeders connected to individual houses with IoTs where the utility does not have access within the house as shown in Figure 5.3 (a),
- *Type-B:* Feeders connected to large buildings with IoTs such as roof-top PV, building energy storage, EV charging parks where the utility has access shown in Figure 5.3 (b),
- *Type-C:* Big PV farms, energy storage type IoTs are directly connected at the primary voltage level, and there is no secondary level as shown in Figure 5.3 (c).



Cyber-Physical Primary node with IoTs in the secondary level

Cyber-Physical Primary node with IoTs and no secondary level

Figure 5.3: Typical configuration of Primary Node and its downstream IoTs.

12.3 Physical System Modeling in Gridlab-D


Distribution Transformer 13.2/4.16KV
Primary Node X
Pole top Transformer 4.16/0.12KV
Pole top Transformer 4.16/0.12KV
Pole top Transformer 4.16/0.12KV

Figure 5.4: Secondary level of a typical distribution system.

For the various experiments conducted during this project, a typical secondary level feeder was built from a primary level node 'X' as shown in Figure 5.4. A total of six houses and one commercial building equipped with normal loads and HAVC was considered. Five houses have solar PV, two houses have battery storage, one house has an EV, and the commercial building has battery storage and solar PV.

This overall secondary feeder is modeled in Gridlab-D^{TM}. Gridlab-D^{TM} simulation can include real-world climate data in the simulation. Here, all the individual houses and buildings have their own schedule for different common loads that vary from time to time. The house class in Gridlab-D^{TM} is utilized for both. The house class has its own parameters and takes various parameters from climate data, and based on all those parameters; it determines the inside temperature. HVAC operates based on the temperature setpoint, and inside house temperature coming from the house class. This mimics the real-world scenario for HVAC perfectly. Solar PV also depends on climate as it relies on solar irradiation along with its own settings. Battery storage normally follows the settings and based on that, it either charges or discharges. Since EV does not yet have any model in Gridlab-D^{TM}, it was considered a constant load that only turns on at night for charging. This overall Gridlab-D^{TM} simulation provides all the necessary data which can be easily used to determine the behavior of the physical system of IoTs. Figure 5.5 shows a few examples of those data coming from the simulation.


Outside Temperature, Solar irradiance
Climate
Appliances
HVAC
PV
Battery
EV
Power usages (Different schedule for each house)
Power usages, set point
Power generation, Capacity
Charging/Discharging rate, Current SoC
Charging rate, Current SoC

Figure 5.5: Gridlab-D^{TM} model of a typical house/building with IoTs.

12.4 IoT Network Emulation in MININET-Wi-Fi

MININET is suitable for emulating a virtual cyber network for a power system [146]. It is a network emulator that creates a virtual network with hosts, switches, controllers, and links. For this project, MININET-Wi-Fi was used, which is a fork of the MININET SDN network emulator. For each IoTs considered in this project, four virtualized Wi-Fi stations were created for four devices and connected them to an access point, and all of these are based on the standard Linux wireless drivers and the 80211_*hwsim* wireless simulation driver. Next the EMS/IoT Hub application was run in the access point. Figure 5.6 shows overall network. For each IoT, another application was run in the Wi-Fi station for each type of device. This application reads the specific device data generated in the Gridlab-D^{TM} simulation, represented by the IoT Wi-Fi station. Client-server-based communication settingswas utilized to exchange customized network packets encapsulating the device data from Gridlab-D^{TM} and any instruction from the IoT Hub that communicates to the user via the internet. The IoTs' network traffic was captured through this emulation and different features of that traffic was utilized for IoT Trustability score formulation.



Figure 5.6: House/building IoT network emulation with MININET-Wi-Fi network emulator.

13 IoT Trustability Score using Federated Learning

Monitoring and operating a resilient power grid requires data from all over the system, including the consumers. With the increasing amount of data utilization for the operation and control purpose of the distribution system, the risk of exposing consumers' valuable data is also increasing. While more data helps utilities to operate better, it also raises privacy concerns. So, in scenarios where data privacy is required, data use needs to be done in a secure way that will provide the highest possible utilization of data for monitoring and control purposes while maintaining privacy. Uses of IoT devices in secondary feeders of the distribution system (as shown in Figure 5.3) fall under this type of scenario. Federated self-learning [124] can be applied here to monitor the IoT devices inside any privacy-protected area such as houses, buildings, etc. This helps to protect privacy as the IoTs' raw data does not need to go outside of the network perimeter.

During this project, an IoT Trustability score is computed by utilizing the federated self-learning concept. This formulation not only utilized the IoT cyber network data as considered in [124], but also incorporated the physical system data associated with the IoTs. For the purposes of this project, HVAC, solar PV, battery storage, and electric vehicle(EV) are included as they are a very significant part of distribution systems and are considered as IoTs in nature according to the discussion in Section 12.

The IoT Trustability score provides an insider view of the operating status of IoTs without accessing raw user data. Anomalies in IoTs data are the main factor in the formulation of the IoT Trustability score. The IoTs market commitment history, while currently very small in portion, also needs to be considered. So, as a first step for the EUREIA project, IoT network packets were studied for feature selections, and these selections have been inspired by work presented by Nguyen et al. [124]. IoT network packet features selected for this project will be the same for all devices. Additionally, features from the physical system simulation data were utilized for specific devices. More details of the features are shown in Table 5.1.

Table 5.1: Features considered for each type of data

Data Source	**Features**
IoTs network packet	Source/Destination IP, Source/Destination port, Packet length, Protocols, Intra-packet arrival time
HVAC	Timestamp, Load, Indoor temperature, outdoor temperature, Temperature setpoint, Indoor area, Building thermal insulation
PV	Timestamp, Power generation, Rating, Solar irradiance
Battery	Timestamp, Charging/Discharging rate, SoC, KW capacity
EV	Timestamp, Charging rate, SoC

13.1 Autoencoder for Unsupervised Learning

For federated learning exercises during this project, an autoencoder neural network for unsupervised learning was used. Autoencoder is very useful for anomaly detection in cyber-physical systems [14, 103] and is efficient for complex data. Here, the input and the output of the model are the same. During training, the autoencoder model minimizes the reconstruction error (RE), which is the mean squared distance between input and output as shown in Equation (5.1). For this project, an autoencoder neural network model is built by Keras [39] was used. An optimized model is constructed with five fully connected hidden layers with 6,3,2,3,6 neurons, respectively as shown in Figure 5.7. The neuron number of the input and output layer depends on the data feature number.

$$L(x, x') \approx \|x - x'\| \tag{5.1}$$



Figure 5.7: Autoencoder model.

13.2 Overview of Federated Learning

In general, Federated Learning architecture consists of a curator or server that sits at its center and coordinates the training activities. For this project, houses/buildings are considered as clients who have IoT devices. The clients first communicate with the server to receive the current global model weights of each of the IoT devices. Then they train the model on each of their local device data to generate updated parameters for that device model and upload it back to the server for aggregation via Federated Averaging Algorithm, which is an averaging operation.

For example, assume that there are M clients or houses/buildings. Then, utilizing the concept of the Federated Averaging Algorithm [107], if the clients estimate their weight parameters W_i^t for minimum RE for each type of IoT device, the weight parameters of all clients can be scaled and summed to get the final global weight W_G for each type of IoT devices as shown in Equation (5.2).

$$W_G = \sum_{i=1}^{M} \frac{n_i}{n} W_i^t \tag{5.2}$$

where, n_i is the number of data points on client i for a specific IoT device, and n is the total data point which is the sum of the number of data points of that IoT device of all M clients. An overview of federated learning is shown in Figure 5.8.



Figure 5.8: An overview of federated learning.

13.3 IoT Trustability Score Formulation

For each type of IoT device, the federated learning explained above is applied here. For each client, there will be one autoencoder model for each IoT device to train on its physical data and one more autoencoder model to train only on IoT network packet data. During the training session, each client's IoT devices are closely monitored to ensure that the client trains the IoT network packet autoencoder model with normal network data and their device-specific autoencoder models with device-specific physical system normal data received via IoT network packet communication. Once all the clients go through the federated learning process for each IoT device and receive the global weight parameter W_G for all the autoencoder models, the monitoring session starts. The client monitors all the network packet and physical system data of each of its IoT devices and reconstructs them using the global weight parameter W_G in the autoencoders. For each type of data, there is a tolerance value T_{err} for the RE. If any data point (DP) crosses T_{err}, then that is flagged as an anomalous data point (ADP). So, for any reporting time period Δt, non-anomaly ratio (NAR) is calculated using Equation (5.3) given by

$$NAR = 1 - \frac{\text{Total ADP number over } \Delta t}{\text{Total DP number over } \Delta t} \tag{5.3}$$

At this point, the ITS Algorithm block calculates the cumulative non-anomaly ratio ($CNAR$) to capture behaviors of the IoTs for some of the most recent time periods. $CNAR$ at time t is formulated as Equation (5.4) where T is a fixed total time period before t and always divisible by Δt. Based on the distribution system, operators can decide on the values of Δt and T.

$$CNAR_t = \sum_{j=1}^{\frac{T}{\Delta t}} \frac{T}{j\Delta t} NAR_{t-j\Delta t} \tag{5.4}$$

Then, IoT Trustability Score (ITS) for time t and house i is calculated using Equation (5.5) where $CNAR$s ensures the stability of the score by gradually changing it for actual anomalies in the data points over certain reporting Δt periods rather than sudden changes at time t due to some short events which are not harmful to the IoT devices.

$$ITS_{t,i} = w_t \times NAR_t + w_{t-} \times \frac{CNAR_t}{CNAR_{max}} \tag{5.5}$$

where,

$$w_t \geq w_{t-} \quad \& \quad w_t + w_{t-} = 1 \tag{5.6}$$

For the next step, $CNAR_{max}$ is calculated using (5.4) with maximum NAR value $NAR = 1$ for whole T time period. Operator of the distribution system will choose w_t and w_{t-} based on the system satisfying (5.6) so that ITS_t depends more on current time NAR while retaining immediate past behaviors of IoTs. Finally to get the overall ITS of any observation node with IoTs, the ITS_t of all the clients of that observation node is averaged to calculate ITS as,

$$ITS = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{M} ITS_{t,i}}{M} \tag{5.7}$$

where M is the total clients or buildings/houses of that observation node.

In summary, IoTs are either load or generation type and can participate in the future market. In order to reflect their behavior in market, any available score can be combined with ITS score as necessary with some modification.

The overall formulation of the IoT Trustability Score is shown in Figure 5.9.


Federated Learning
W^t_i , n_i
W_G
Physical System Data from Gridlab-D Models
IoTs Network Emulation with MININET-WIFI
IoTs network Traffic
Training Session(t)
Monitoring Session
Unsupervised Machine Learning Autoencoder
Local Autoencoder
Algorithm
Market commitment Score
House/Building level IoT Device Trustability Score
Building/House level

Figure 5.9: An Overview of implementation of IoT Trustability score formulation.

14 Resiliency Metric Formulation

14.1 Factors Influencing Resiliency

Modeling and analysis of cyber-physical power systems help us determine the factors responsible for the resilient operation of the system. These factors vary along with the configuration.

Factors that can be determined directly from the secondary level configuration of each primary node are described below.

14.1.1 Available generation

Total amount of generation capacity in the secondary level is considered in this factor. Generation from PV and stored energy, are included here. The total amount of committed power supplied by all the downstream participants of any primary node is the available generation for that node.

14.1.2 Amount of critical load

For any primary node, the total amount of critical load located downstream of that node is considered for this factor.

14.1.3 Connectivity redundancy

Graph topology-based physical connectivity is used to determine the connectivity redundancy among all the critical load that is downstream of any primary node, all the secondary node with power supply capacity, and the primary node. This includes all the possible paths through which a critical load can receive power for normal operation.

14.1.4 Device and communication vulnerabilities in Secondary Network

The common vulnerability scoring system (CVSS)[109] is one of several methods to measure the impact of vulnerabilities in devices known as Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE). It is an open set of standards used to assess a vulnerability of a software and assign a severity along a scale of 0-10 [7]. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) analyzes all identified vulnerabilities and catalogs them in NIST's National Vulnerability Database (NVD). At first all the device and communication vulnerabilities presented in the secondary (DCVS) level of a primary node are identified using the NVD. Then the DCVS factor is calculated as,

$$DCVS = \frac{1}{\sum_{s=1}^{N_s} CVSS_s} \tag{5.8}$$

where N_s is the number of total vulnerability presented in the secondary level. In case of absence of any vulnerability, DCVS will be equal to 1.

14.1.5 IoT Device Trustability Score

The IoT trustability score utilizes federated learning, and P-Q commitment history to determine the IoT devices' trustability presented in any primary node and its downstream nodes/components.

Table 5.2 shows the factors considered for resiliency calculation for each type of distribution system configurations.

Table 5.2: Factors considered for resiliency calculation of each type of configuration.

Primary node configuration	Factors
Physical Primary Node	Available generation Amount of critical load Connectivity redundancy
Cyber-Physical Primary Node without IoT	Available generation Amount of critical load Connectivity redundancy Device and communication vulnerabilities
Cyber-Physical Primary Node with IoT (Type-A, B, C)	Available generation Amount of critical load Connectivity redundancy Device and communication vulnerabilities IoT Device Trustability Score

14.2 Weight Assignment and Aggregation

Evaluating the impact of factors in the resiliency of cyber-physical power systems is a very complex task. This requires expert decisions from different domains such as power systems, cyber-physical systems, and cyber system experts. It may again raise ambiguities and uncertainties in the existing information, which can be handled by fuzzy multiple-criteria decision-making(MCDM). In Fuzzy MCDM models, the linguistic terms or comparisons of different experts are represented by fuzzy numbers [28].

Fuzzy Analytic Hierarchy Process (Fuzzy AHP) is an improvement of a standard AHP [143] method using the fuzzy logic approach. The Fuzzy AHP method incorporates the impreciseness of human judgment raised due to the subjective or qualitative nature of the criteria that cannot be represented by exact numbers. Fuzzy AHP [28] controls the uncertainty and vagueness in the decision makers' opinions through fuzzy set theory. For the EUREICA project, a fuzzy rating aggregation method [35] is integrated with Fuzzy AHP to the incorporated decision of multiple experts. Fuzzy set theory can easily navigate and incorporate all decisions to evaluate the impacts of each factor.

The linguistic preference values introduced by Saaty in [143] are fuzzified using the triangular fuzzy numbers. Table 5.3 shows the triangular fuzzy conversion scale along with Saaty's scale.

Table 5.3: Linguistic Preferences with Scale for Pairwise Comparison [143], [81]

Linguistic preferences	Saaty's Scale	Saaty's Reciprocal Scale	Triangular Fuzzy Scale	Triangular Fuzzy Reciprocal Scale
Equally strong	1	1	(1, 1, 1)	(1, 1, 1)
Moderately strong	3	1/3	(2, 3, 4)	(1/4, 1/3, 1/2)
Strong	5	1/5	(4, 5, 6)	(1/6, 1/5, 1/4)
Very strong	7	1/7	(6, 7, 8)	(1/8, 1/7, 1/6)
Extremely strong	9	1/9	(9, 9, 9)	(1/9, 1/9, 1/9)
Intermediate values	2, 4, 6, 8	1/2, 1/4, 1/6, 1/8	(1, 2, 3), (3, 4, 5), (5, 6, 7), (7, 8, 9)	(1/3, 1/2, 1), (1/5, 1/4, 1/3), (1/7, 1/6, 1/5), (1/9, 1/8, 1/7)

Let there be K number of experts. Once all the experts uses the above scale to provides their fuzzy pairwise comparison ratings $R_k = (l_k, m_k, u_k), k = 1, 2, ..., K$, the aggregated fuzzy ratings can be defined as [35],

$$R = (l, m, u) \tag{5.9}$$

where,

$$l = \min_k l_k$$

$$m = \frac{1}{K}\sum_{k=1}^{K} m_k$$

$$u = \max_k u_k$$

The aggregated fuzzy pairwise comparison matrix $D = [R_{ij}]$ is constructed using the aggregated ratings. For n number of factors, the fuzzy pairwise comparison matrix will be,

$$D = \begin{bmatrix} (1,1,1) & R_{12} & \cdots & R_{1n} \\ R_{21} & (1,1,1) & \cdots & R_{2n} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ R_{n1} & R_{n2} & \cdots & (1,1,1) \end{bmatrix}$$

Then, the fuzzy geometric mean value r_i, for each factor i is computed as

$$r_i = (R_{i1} \times R_{i2} \times ... \times R_{in})^{\frac{1}{n}} \tag{5.10}$$

The fuzzy weight w_i for each factor is calculated as,

$$w_i = r_i \times (r_1 + r_2 + ... + r_n)^{-1} \tag{5.11}$$

where, $r_i = (l_i, m_i, u_i)$ and $(r_i)^{-1} = (1/u_i, 1/m_i, 1/l_i)$.

The Center of Area method is used to defuzzify the fuzzy weights $w_i = (l_i, m_i, u_i)$ as shown in the equation below to get the weight w_i for each factor.

$$w_i = \frac{l_i + m_i + u_i}{3} \tag{5.12}$$

Finally, normalization is done to get the final weight W_i for each factor as shown in the equation below:

$$W_i = \frac{w_i}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} w_i} \tag{5.13}$$

When it comes to aggregation, the multiplicative approach offers superior performance than an additive approach [161]. Again, the adoption of multiplicative performance measures is preferred in General Systems Performance Theory [85]. The formulation for the secondary transformer node resiliency (STNR) scoring mechanism is as follows.

$$STNR_j = \prod_{i=1}^{n_c} F_i^{W_i} \tag{5.14}$$

where n_c is the total number of factors for the category of the secondary level node, F_i is the value for each factor, and W_i is the normalized weight for each factor.

15 Resiliency Metric for SMO and SMA

The market module employs a commitment score to assess the performance of both the Secondary Market Operator (SMO) and the Secondary Market Agent (SMA). For the various exercises conducted during this project, resiliency metrics were integrated with the commitment scores to enhance the calculation of the trustability score. A more detailed description of this integration can be found in Chapter 6 of this report. To support this integration, the model was refined to incorporate both the secondary transformer node and the primary node, enabling more detailed resiliency analysis at a granular level as shown in Figure 5.10.



Primary Node
Pole top Transformer 4.16kV/120V
substation
Secondar Transformer Node
IoT devices
Federated Learning
W'i , ni
WG
Physical System Data from Gridlab-D Models
IoTs Network Emulation with MININET-WIFI
IoTs network Traffic
Training Session(t)
Unsupervised Neural Network Autoencoders
Monitoring Session
Local Autoencoders
ITS Algorithm
Client level IoT Device Trustability Score
Building/House as Client
IoT Trustability Score
Neural Network Autoencoder
Federated Learning
Secondary Transformer Node Resiliency (STNR)
Primary Node Resiliency Score (PNR)
Distribution System Resiliency (DSR)
Fuzzy Multiple-Criteria Making based weight assignment and multiplicative aggregation
Fuzzy Multiple-Criteria Making based weight assignment and multiplicative aggregation
Game-Theoretic Data Envelopment Analysis based optimized weight assignment and multiplicative & additive aggregation
Factors Computed
- Available Generation
- Amount of Critical Load
- Connectivity Redundancy,
- Device & Communication Vulnerabilities
Factors Computed
- Available Generation
- Amount of Critical Load
- ∑ ITS score
- ∑ STNR score
- Number of Houses in each Primary Node
Factors Computed
- Available power outflow
- Primary Node Centrality
- Device & Communicati on Vulnerabilities
Network & Physical level Data
Applications of the Developed Resiliency Metrics
# To compute trustability based commitment score for the market participants in distribution market
# To develop most resilient reconfiguration pathway for service restoration
# Planning upgrades or updates driven by resiliency
# Design resilient microgrids and compare the resiliency of different microgrid designs
# Perform root cause analysis of degraded operational resiliency
# Post-event resilient reconfiguration

Figure 5.10: Resiliency Metric Generation and Application

When evaluating secondary node resiliency within a network, several factors are considered, including the changes in load, availability of generation, presence of numerous houses, and distributed energy resources across different nodes. The resiliency score is calculated through a method involving the weighted multiplication of five critical factors: available generation, critical load, device and communication vulnerabilities (DCV) at houses with IoT devices, connectivity redundancy (CR), and the IoT Trustability score (ITS). Furthermore, this evaluation extends to primary node resiliency, taking into account the number of secondary feeder nodes connected to primary nodes along with the other factors considered for the secondary feeder node's score calculation. This holistic approach aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of resiliency within the network.

To facilitate this assessment, several steps are undertaken. Firstly, the modified Gridlab-D^{TM} model is simulated to obtain secondary feeder loads, analogous to the Secondary Market Agents (SMA) in the market model. This simulation is followed by the calculation of generation values for each secondary feeder node based on the net injection value of each SMA and the loads generated by Gridlab-D^{TM}. Additionally, the previously designed model provides information about the number of houses in each SMA. However, modifications to the Gridlab-D^{TM} model included the introduction of new primary feeder nodes, necessitating informed assumptions to determine the number of houses associated with these new primary nodes and their respective secondary nodes.

Two critical factors, available generation (AG) and critical load (CL), play a pivotal role in the assessment. AG is derived from the generation at each SMA, with a normalized factor reflecting that only 60% of the total generation capacity should be considered when assessing network availability. Similarly, for CL, the load values of each SMA are considered to output a normalized value for CL, aligning with the understanding that not all loads are critical, and prior research indicates that 30% of loads are categorized as critical. Connectivity redundancy (CR) is calculated as the reciprocal of the total number of houses within a given SMA, contributing to the overall resiliency score. Additionally, device and communication vulnerabilities (DCV) are assigned a constant value across all SMAs, assuming a uniform device vulnerability score Since the vendors and manufacturer of the IoT devices are assumed to be from the same source, DCV can be assumed to be constant throughout the network.

The Non-anomaly ratio (NAR) involves determining global weights (WG) for each type of IoT device, NAR calculation, formulation of cumulative non-anomaly ratio (CNAR) over a specified time period, and the computation of the IoT Trustability score (ITS) at different time intervals. The overall ITS score is then determined, considering the total number of clients or buildings/houses within the secondary node. Finally, the resiliency score is obtained through the weighted product model considering the factors: AG, CL, DCV, CR, and ITS for each specific SMA.

The formulation for the secondary transformer node resiliency (STNR) scoring mechanism is as follows.

$$STNR_j = \prod_{i=1}^{n_c} F_i^{W_i} \tag{5.15}$$

where n_c is the total number of factors for the category of the secondary level node, F_i is the value for each factor, and W_i is the normalized weight for each factor.

The formulation further extends to generate a weighted average of the STNR considering the number of SMAs and their associated houses to generate the PNR score using the equation (5.16) for PNR. The formulation offers a standardized framework for assessing resiliency across both primary and secondary feeder nodes, and is given by

$$PNR_k = \frac{\sum_{j=1}^{n}(STNR_j \times W_j)}{\sum_{j=1}^{n} W_j} \tag{5.16}$$

where W_i is the weighted coefficient for the ith secondary feeder node, considering the aggregated count of SMAs and the corresponding houses, and n is the total number of SMAs. The formulation offers a standardized framework for assessing resiliency across both primary and secondary feeder nodes.

16 Resiliency Metric Formulation for a Distribution System with IoTs

Distribution system level resiliency(DSR) will define the overall resiliency of the system, as shown in this Section.

16.1 Factors Influencing Resiliency

The DSR calculation involves attributes from the primary voltage level of distribution system.

16.1.1 Primary Node Level Resiliency

Primary node level resiliency(PNR) considers all attributes of the secondary level configuration of a primary node. The value of PNR can be calculated following the method described earlier using Equation (5.16).

16.1.2 Available power outflow

Available power outflow (APO) from the primary node is the difference between the available power from different generation and storage resources, and the total amount of critical load found downstream of that primary node.

16.1.3 Primary node centrality

Primary node centrality (PNC) provides the importance of a primary level node in the whole distribution system in terms of connectivity. In this project, the concept of leverage centrality [79] was utilized to identify the criticality of each network nodes. The degree of centrality of a node relative to its neighbors is considered in Leverage centrality and identifies those nodes that are connected to more nodes than their neighbors. A well connected node i can pass information to many neighbor nodes. But if those neighbor nodes have a high degree of centrality, they do not need to relay much on that node i. Thus, node i ends up with low leverage in the network. In general, nodes with high leverage centrality control the content and quality of the information received by their neighbors. Although leverage is derived from degree centrality, it is very effective compared to other centralities in determining the importance of any node in a network where network flow can happen in any direction rather than only along the shortest path or in a serial fashion [79]. With modernization, distribution systems have also become this type of network as power flow can now happen in any direction now. So, to determine the importance of any individual node in the distribution network, PNC is formulated using the concept of leverage centrality as shown in Equation (5.17):

$$PNC_i = \frac{d_i}{\sum_{j \in N_i} d_j} \tag{5.17}$$

where, N, d_i, N_i and d_j are the total number of nodes, degree of a given node, directly connected neighbors of the node i and the degree of those neighbors respectively. Also, PNC formulation in Equation (5.17) does not increase computational burden as the distribution system becomes larger.

16.1.4 Device and communication vulnerabilities in primary network

Once any vulnerability is identified using the NVD, it is assigned to its corresponding primary node based on the location of the source of the vulnerability. In this way all vulnerabilities presented in the primary level can be assigned to primary nodes of the distribution system.

Consequently, device and communication vulnerabilities of each primary node (DCVP) is calculated as,

$$DCVP = \frac{1}{\sum_{p=1}^{N_p} CVSS_p} \tag{5.18}$$

where N_p is the number of total vulnerabilities related to that specific primary level node. In case of absence of any vulnerability, DCVP will be equal to 1.

16.2 Weight Assignment and Aggregation

The weight distribution for each factor of each primary node considered in DSR calculation determines the contribution of any node to overall system resiliency. For this project, this weight distribution problem is formulized as a Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) problem where the "weights" in DEA are derived from the data instead of being fixed in advance [33]. Also, the concept from "Egoist's dilemma: a DEA game" [119] is used to determine the weights so that each node will have the best set of weights.

Let $F = (f_{ij}) \in R_{+}^{m \times n}$ be the factors value matrix, where f_{ij} is the value of factor i of primary node j. The node will contribute more to the resiliency metric in regard to that factor as the value of f_{ij} increases. Following the DEA analysis, each node p can choose a set of weights $w^p = (w_1^p, ...w_m^p)$, where, $\sum_{i=1}^{m} w_i^p = 1$. Now the relative contribution(RC) of the node p to the total contribution of all the nodes towards DSR as measured by node k's weight selection can be evaluated as,

$$RC^p = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{m} w_i^p f_{ip}}{\sum_{i=1}^{m} w_i^p \sum_{j=1}^{n} (f_{ij})} \tag{5.19}$$

Ideally, each node wants to maximize this ratio in Equation (5.19) to have the best set of weights so that they can contribute to the maximum possible value in DSR. Again, dominance of any specific factor in comparison to other factors in DSR calculation for different distribution systems can vary depending upon the distribution system configuration. As a result, an option is introduced to the operators or experts of that system to set a minimum threshold of weight w_i^{ex} for each factor depending upon the distribution system configuration. This process results into the following formulation:

$$\max_{w^p} \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{m} w_i^p f_{ip}}{\sum_{i=1}^{m} w_i^p \sum_{j=1}^{n} (f_{ij})} \tag{5.20}$$

$$s.t. \quad w_i^k \geq w_i^{ex}, \quad \sum_{i=1}^{m} w_i^k = 1$$

where, $w_i^{ex} = [0, 1]$

Once Equation (5.20) provides the weight vector for each node, combination of multiplicative and additive methods are used to get the DSR as shown in Equation (5.21):

$$DSR = \sum_{j=1}^{n} \left(\prod_{i=1}^{m} (f_{ij})^{w_i^j} \right) \tag{5.21}$$

17 Reconfiguration Concepts

An algorithmic formulation developed from the the switching procedures to change the network topology is commonly known as the network reconfiguration. The main objective is to find an optimal operation scheme for maximizing reliability. Solutions for this formulation have typically required the selection of the most suitable functional topology among all the possible configurations. However, reviewing all possible re-configurations is expensive and time-consuming for existing distribution systems since the number of possible combinations grows exponentially given the number/type of switches, and their location in the feeder [147].

Network reconfigurations performed by power utilities vary depending upon the intended objective. A variety of work has been done related to the optimal distribution system reconfiguration in the past. For instance, in Goswami, Swapan Kumar et al. [59], proposed a power-flow-minimum heuristic algorithm for determining the minimum loss configuration of radial distribution networks. In [42] the author presented network reconfiguration using heuristic rules and a fuzzy approach with multiple objectives to minimize the real power loss, deviation of nodes voltage, and branch current constraint violation while subject to a radial network structure in which all loads must be energized. In [13], the particle swarm optimization (PSO) algorithm is presented for solving the optimal distribution system reconfiguration problem for power loss minimization. Syahputra, Ramadoni et al. [160] presents an optimal distribution network reconfiguration with penetration of distributed energy resources. The reconfiguration is performed by accomplishing the minimum active power loss of radial distribution networks with DER penetration. [56] presented power flow methodology focused on the need for reconfiguration analysis in modern distribution networks.

Subsequently, the power grid is identified as one of the critical infrastructures. The grid resiliency must be enabled to keep the critical loads (such as Hospitals, Police Stations, Fire Stations, and other infrastructure) energized, or needed to be quickly brought back online, ensuring minimal service disruption. Ever-increasing DER deployment, integrating various micro-generating resources, and increasing storage devices have drastically reduced the dependency of the transmission system on the power distribution network operations. Such local resource capability and availability of DER enables the loads within the distribution network to survive even with the unavailability of the transmission network. Moreover, growing placement of advanced telemetry and information processing devices such as advanced metering infrastructure (AMI), remote terminal units (RTUs), intelligent electronic devices (IEDs), availability of both manual, remote, and automated tie switches, and reclosers provides the needed flexibility so that the distribution network can connect or disconnect to the transmission network as required and operate as microgrids [60, 94].

When an interruption of the supply to the critical infrastructure facilities occurs, most of these vital loads need to be brought back online quickly, ensuring minimal service distraction. Given the limited availability of tie-switches and microgrid controller, only some of the isolated loads and generators can be recovered. However, deciding on which tie-switches to operate and implementing new set-point provision for the generators, recovering some of the isolated loads can be computationally expensive.

To address these issues, this project proposes network reconfigurations that enhance the distribution system's resiliency during extreme events, including natural events or man-made cyber events and high-impact, low probability events. Presently, most grid-connected distribution feeders inverter-based DERs use grid-following control mode, which usually uses a phase-lock-loop (PLL) and a current control loop to achieve tight control of the inverter's output currents. This mode doesn't regulate the voltage and frequency, but depends on a peripheral voltage source to deliver the voltage and frequency references. Grid-following inverters maintain their output currents or output power almost constant during any disturbances. During an extreme event or when the primary grid doesn't have enough resources, the distribution feeder will isolate from the primary grid and form multiple small microgrids with their boundaries. One inverter-based DER will be in grid forming mode in each microgrid, and other inverters will follow it as in grid-following mode. In this project, this feature of the smart IoT based inverters was utilized to develop the resiliency based reconfiguration algorithm.

18 Modeling and Analysis of Distribution System with IoTs

The IEEE 123-node feeder test system has been chosen for the test case scenarios analyzed in this project. This feeder represents the currently existing distribution system. For this analysis, this system was modified to represent the ongoing modernization of traditional distribution systems where more and more DERs with IoT-based smart inverters are being introduced.

In order to maintain the highest possible resilient operation of the distribution system, it is necessary to identify all the DERs and critical loads' location and size. Table 5.4 shows the information for this modified IEEE 123-node feeder test system.

Table 5.4: DER and Critical Load distribution in the IEEE 123 Feeder Test System

	DERs (KVA)			**Critical Loads (KVA)**		
Node	**Ph-1**	**Ph-2**	**Ph-3**	**Ph-1**	**Ph-2**	**Ph-3**
1	**22.36068**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
2	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
4	**0**	**0**	**26.83282**	**0**	**0**	**0**
5	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
6	**0**	**0**	**20.12461**	**0**	**0**	**13.41641**
7	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
9	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
10	**11.18034**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
11	**29.06888**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
12	**0**	**4.472136**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
16	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
17	**0**	**0**	**15.65248**	**0**	**0**	**0**
19	**26.83282**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
20	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
22	**0**	**17.88854**	**0**	**0**	**17.88854**	**0**
24	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
28	**15.65248**	**0**	**0**	**22.36068**	**0**	**0**
29	**22.36068**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**

30	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
31	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**6.708204**
32	**0**	**0**	**13.41641**	**0**	**0**	**0**
33	**8.944272**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
34	**0**	**0**	**26.83282**	**0**	**0**	**0**
35	**22.36068**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
37	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
38	**0**	**13.41641**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
39	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
41	**0**	**0**	**10.06231**	**0**	**0**	**0**
42	**6.708204**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
43	**0**	**11.18034**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
45	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
46	**6.708204**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
47	**21.50581**	**21.50581**	**21.50581**	**10.75291**	**10.75291**	**10.75291**
48	**30.10814**	**30.10814**	**30.10814**	**17.20465**	**17.20465**	**17.20465**
49	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
50	**0**	**0**	**24.59675**	**0**	**0**	**0**
51	**0**	**0**	**0**	**8.944272**	**0**	**0**
52	**26.83282**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
53	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
55	**4.472136**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
56	**0**	**6.708204**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
58	**0**	**11.18034**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
59	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
60	**13.41641**	**0**	**0**	**8.944272**	**0**	**0**
62	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**8.944272**
63	**20.12461**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
64	**0**	**33.10589**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
65	**12.90349**	**12.90349**	**25.80698**	**17.20465**	**17.20465**	**34.4093**
66	**0**	**0**	**16.55295**	**0**	**0**	**0**
68	**13.41641**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
69	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
70	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
71	**24.59675**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
73	**0**	**0**	**8.944272**	**0**	**0**	**0**
74	**0**	**0**	**13.41641**	**0**	**0**	**0**
75	**0**	**0**	**22.36068**	**0**	**0**	**0**
76	**59.4017**	**38.71046**	**38.71046**	**39.60114**	**25.80698**	**25.80698**
77	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
79	**15.65248**	**0**	**0**	**13.41641**	**0**	**0**
80	**0**	**17.88854**	**0**	**0**	**8.944272**	**0**
82	**8.944272**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**

83	0	0	0	0	0	0
84	0	0	11.18034	0	0	6.708204
85	0	0	0	0	0	0
86	0	11.18034	0	0	0	0
87	0	17.88854	0	0	0	0
88	0	0	0	0	0	0
90	0	0	0	0	0	0
92	0	0	0	0	0	0
94	26.83282	0	0	0	0	0
95	0	10.06231	0	0	0	0
96	0	4.472136	0	0	0	0
98	26.83282	0	0	0	0	0
99	0	8.944272	0	0	0	0
100	0	0	13.41641	0	0	0
102	0	0	13.41641	0	0	0
103	0	0	0	0	0	13.41641
104	0	0	13.41641	0	0	0
106	0	22.36068	0	0	13.41641	0
107	0	0	0	0	0	0
109	26.83282	0	0	17.88854	0	0
111	11.18034	0	0	0	0	0
112	6.708204	0	0	0	0	0
113	0	0	0	0	0	0
114	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	521.9392	293.9766	366.3534	156.3175	111.2184	137.3673
Total	1182.26927			404.9032558		

This analysis helps to attain proper reconfiguration so that the maximum amount of critical loads and other loads are supplied by power fro all available sources. The DERs amount is the installed capacity and will vary with time. Both PVs and storage batteries are considered here as DERs.

Two new switches were inserted in the test system, between nodes 13 and18 and nodes 76 and 86 and identified seven possible microgrid clusters as shown in Figure 5.11. The formation of these microgrid clusters is possible due to the presence of DERs with IoT-based smart inverters. These IoT-based inverters and the IoT-based loads and building energy management systems will be utilized in the reconfiguration algorithm to decide the reconfigured topology of the distribution system during any event.



Figure 5.11: Modified IEEE 123-node system feeder with 7 possible microgrid clusters.

During normal operation, the distribution system is mainly fed by the substation at node 150 which is connected to the transmission grid. All the available DERs in the distribution system follow the grid. The status of all the switches during normal operation is given in Table 5.5. In addition, all loads are assumed to be connected via smart meters, and these meters have load shedding capability to regulate load amount according to the distribution system operator's command.

Table 5.5: Switch Status During Normal Operation

Node A	Node B	Switch Status
13	152	CLOSED
18	135	CLOSED
60	160	CLOSED
61	610	CLOSED
97	197	CLOSED
150	149	CLOSED
250	251	OPEN
450	451	OPEN
300	350	OPEN
95	195	OPEN
54	94	OPEN
151	300	OPEN
13	18	CLOSED
86	76	CLOSED

19 Resiliency Based Reconfiguration

The proposed reconfiguration algorithm utilizes the resiliency metrics developed during this project for monitoring and analysis of a Cyber-Power Distribution System with IoTs [144]. Loss of power system components such as generation from distribution substations, DERs, or loads due to any physical or cyber event reduces distribution system resiliency. In this situation, the reconfiguration algorithm will start to find the possible topology that produces the highest distribution system resiliency.

The reconfiguration algorithm first determines all the available generation sources and their capacity. Then it tries to find all the possible shortest paths for each generation source and critical load pair present within the same microgrid cluster from the power system graph. The path distance is measured in terms of hop number between the source and load node. In this case, Dijkstra's Shortest Path Algorithm is used to determine the paths [45]. Then for each critical load, the generation source with the shortest path distance is assigned for that load. If the source capacity is less than the load amount, then the next generation source with the next best shortest path is assigned. This iteration will continue until the critical load is fully covered. As the generation sources are assigned to critical loads, if any source's capacity is more than the assigned critical load, the source's partial remaining capacity will be assigned to other critical loads. For each generation source, once any amount of the available generation is assigned to a critical load, that amount will be discarded from the available generation list so that the algorithm can make sure no generation amount is assigned more than once. This load generation balance process will be performed for each microgrid cluster in the proposed approach.

Once the internal load generation balance is done for each microgrid, any extra generation or deficiency of generation for each microgrid cluster will be identified. Suppose any microgrid cluster has extra generation available after feeding all the critical loads within the cluster. In that case, it will reroute that extra generation to other critical loads in different microgrid clusters with deficiency. When there are not enough internal generation sources to feed all of its critical loads, this rerouting of power will be done through the shortest path between the generation-sharing microgrid clusters. Dijkstra's Shortest Path Algorithm is also used here to determine the paths. This rerouted power can supply a critical load in full or partially depending on the available amount of rerouted power.

After covering all critical loads within the whole distribution system, a similar process is repeated for all other loads until all available generation sources are fully assigned.

When inter-microgrid paths and intra-microgrid paths are finalized, the switching sequence for those paths is decided. Since the distribution system is typically radial, a loop check and elimination of loop are performed for all reconfiguration topologies. Similarly, a power flow check is done with the Gridlab-D^{TM}. If the power flow does not converge for any topology, the generation-load balance is again done by varying the load amount in steps until power flow converges for at least one topology. Then, the resiliency metric for all of those topologies which pass the power flow check are calculated using the developed resiliency metrics in [144]. If more than one possible reconfiguration topology exists, then the top three topologies with the highest resiliency value are sent to the operator to choose one and initiate the appropriate switching action. Figure 5.12 shows the reconfiguration algorithm.


Start
For each microgid cluster, assign available generations to the critical loads within the cluster using shortest path algorithm
Determine extra or deficiency amount of generation for each microgrid in terms feeding its own critical loads
Reroute the extra generations from microgrid cluster with extra generation to the cluster with deficiency in generation using the shortest path algorithm
Store the intra-cluster final shortest paths to the path database
Store the inter-cluster final shortest paths to the path database
Path database
Determine all the switching sequence for the paths in the Path database and their corresponding topologies
Is there any loop in the topology resulted from any switching sequence?
Yes
Eliminate all the loops
No
Does powerflow converge for at least topology among all the topology?
Yes
Adjust load amount
No
Calculate resiliency metrics for all the topologies which meet powerflow convergence criteria
Send operator the switching sequence for the top three topologies with highest resiliency metric

Figure 5.12: Reconfiguration Algorithm.

The prototype of the network reconfiguration was modeled and validated using the test scenarios developed for this project, which led to the blue sky and black sky scenarios mentioned in this report. These were tested using the proposed reconfiguration method.

20 Grid Reconfiguration and Restoration

During this project, a novel resiliency-based load restoration technique is introduced for three-phase unbalanced power distribution system leveraging demand response through Internet of Things devices to enhance resiliency. The proposed hierarchical optimization framework includes a continuous linear program for primary optimization and a binary linear program for secondary optimization. Its objective is to achieve load-source energy equilibrium and prioritize the connection of secondary-level household loads based on their criticality. In addition, a deep neural-based system loss calculation method was explored.


GridLAB-D™
Gridlab-D Model For Secondary Level
Representative secondary feeder
substation
Outcomes
• DER and load management with Demand Response
• Distribution system restoration utilizing Edge devices
Co-simulation Platform
HELICS
Simulations Are Better Together
• Resiliency Metric / Reconfiguration module wrapper
• HELICS registering
• Data collection
• Data identification/sorting
• Run RM Module
• Dsipatch Reconfiguration Commands
Initialization
Parameter Weights Calculation
Network Model Determination
Load & Source Forecast
Machine-Learning based Loss Estimation
DNN Model for fast Loss Estimation
Saved Component Models
Reconfiguration Module with Hierarchical Energy-based Optimization
Resiliency Metrics Module
RM Score $< T$
Yes
Switches Status & Load Shed
Parallel Secondary Optimization
Primary Optimization

Figure 5.13: Overview of the end-to-end testbed for restoration in unbalanced distribution systems with house/building level DERs and Demand Response with IoT-integration

20.1 Distribution system with secondary level edge devices

A distribution system model was developed with detailed secondary feeder nodes with the primary feeder model. These nodes include residential and commercial buildings with or without HVAC systems, edge devices like typical appliances, lights, and plugs, occupant-based load dynamics, and DERs such as PV panels, BESSs, and diesel generators. House loads are divided into two categories, main load (all electrical load except HVAC and water heaters) and other loads (HVAC and water heaters).

20.2 Distribution System Loss Calculation with Deep Neural Networks

Calculation of distribution system losses for different line configurations, transformers, and capacitors through traditional approaches becomes increasingly complex with the rise of DERs while considering single, three, and split phases. This complexity is addressed by developing tuned Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) for loss analysis, where each distribution line or transformers have their own individual DNN model for loss estimation.

20.2.1 A. Deep Neural Network Modeling

DNNs are feed-forward neural networks that have multiple layers where each layer has several neurons with inter-layer weighted connections among those neurons. For each layer l, the output vector y_l is given by:

$$y_l = \phi\left((W_l)^T y^{l-1} + b^l\right) \tag{5.22}$$

where $\phi(\cdot)$ is the activation or transfer function, $W_l = [w^{l^l}_{ij}]$ is the weight matrix, and b_l is the bias vector. The loss function is chosen as the Huber loss:

$$L(y_{tr}, y_{pr}) = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{2}(y_{tr} - y_{pr})^2 & \text{if } |y_{tr} - y_{pr}| < \delta \\ \delta|y_{tr} - y_{pr}| - \frac{1}{2}\delta^2 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \tag{5.23}$$

The Huber loss is less sensitive to outliers and heterogeneity originating from large changes in energy consumption in active distribution systems. To minimize the loss, the weights w^l_{ij} are updated using the back-propagation algorithm:

$$\Delta w_{ij} = -\eta \frac{\delta L}{\delta w_{ij}} \tag{5.24}$$

where Δw_{ij} is derived by the chain rule, and η represents the learning rate. Lastly, the Adaptive Moment Estimation (Adam) is used, which is a stochastic gradient descent optimizer and uses adaptive learning rates.

Note that distribution systems have various types of components with multiple configurations. Thus, having a single DNN model for all components or one DNN model for each type of component to calculate the overall loss of the system is not adequate. To address this challenge, in the EUREICA project, each component, whether distribution lines or transformers losses, has its own individual DNN model for each configuration regardless of its type. The models are denoted as $m_c \in M$. Given that there are hundreds of models to represent the distribution system, the following section describes a step-by-step procedure to tune the DNN hyperparameters for each of the individual models.

20.2.2 B. Hyper-parameter Tuning and Implementation

To estimate the per-phase energy loss, each distribution system component is modeled according to its phase configuration. Since the model complexity depends on the phase configuration of the component the number of hidden layers and the number of neurons in the hidden layer are tuned for hyper-parameter optimization. For hyper-parameter tuning, GridSearchCV is utilized, which performs an exhaustive search over a user-defined grid of hyper-parameter values. The machine learning model is built with Keras and GridSearchCV, and is implemented using a wrapper for Scikit-Learn API.

Due to a large number of distribution system components, exhaustive search via varying the number of layers and neurons may lead to a more complex model relative to the complexity of the component. As a result, the model may perform well on the training data but poorly on new, unseen data, resulting in overfitting. To prevent overfitting, EarlyStopping is used to stop the training when the model becomes complex and accuracy stops improving. To address the problem of vanishing gradient, the Leaky ReLU activation function is used:

$$f(x) = \begin{cases} x & \text{if } x \geq 0 \\ \alpha x & \text{if } x < 0 \end{cases} \tag{5.25}$$

where α is a small positive constant that represents the slope of the function for negative inputs. For weight initialization, the He Normal initialization is used:

$$W_{ij} \sim \mathcal{N}\left(0, \sqrt{\frac{2}{n_{in}}}\right) \tag{5.26}$$

where W_{ij} is the weight connecting neuron i in the previous layer to neuron j in the current layer, and n_{in} is the number of input connections to neuron j. The He normalization sets the initial weights of the neural network using a Gaussian distribution with zero mean and a standard deviation of $\sqrt{\frac{2}{n_{in}}}$.

20.3 Resiliency Based IoT Load Restoration

For load restoration, several modules work together: initializing available resources, conducting energy-based optimization for primary-level resource determination, assessing losses and topology, and optimizing load shedding at the secondary level considering DR-based load profiles. As a step towards Loss and Topology Determination, Algorithms in Figures Figures 5.14 to 5.17 are used to determine reconfigured topology for selected loads and sources, and distribution system losses for the topology.



```
**Input:** Path $p$, load value $ld$, source value $sr$
**Output:** Path loss $p_{loss}$
Load $p$-path components DNN models $M$;
**if** $ld > \left(\frac{N_{comp}}{100}\right) * sr$ **then**
    Adjust $ld$ according to $sr$;
**end**
$p_{loss} = \emptyset$;
**for** *component model* $m_c \in M$ **do**
    $loss_c = m_c(ld)$;
    $ld = ld + loss_c$;
    $p_{loss} = p_{loss} + loss_c$;
**end**
**return** $p_{loss}$;
```

Figure 5.14: Procedure L_{DNN} (returns loss for a path).

```
Input: Overall network $G$, Source node data $S_n$, Load node data $L_n$
Output: losses $loss$, updated Source node data $S_n$, updated Load node
        data $L_n$
$loss = \emptyset$;
while $True$ do
    // balancing load and source for the common nodes
    common nodes, $n_{SL} = L_n \cap S_n$;
    for $node\ x \in n_{SL}$ do
        balance $x_{ld}$ and $x_{sr}$;
        if $x_{ld} = 0$ then
            remove node $x$ from $L_n$;
        end
        if $x_{sr} = 0$ then
            remove node $x$ from $S_n$;
        end
    end
    // balancing load for the leaf nodes
    find leaf nodes $n_{L,leaf}$ in $L_n$;
    for $node\ i \in n_{L,leaf}$ do
        find next node $j$ and path $p_{ij}$ from $G$;
        $sr_d = 2 * i_{ld}$ ;              // dummy source for $L_{DNN}$ function
        $p_{ij}$ loss, $l_{p_{ij}} = L_{DNN}(p_{ij}, i_{ld}, sr_d)$;
        $j_{ld} = i_{ld} + l_{p_{ij}}$;
        $loss = loss + l_{p_{ij}}$;
        remove node $i$ from $L_n$;
        update $L_n$ with node $j$;
        remove node $i$ from $G$ if $i$ not in $S_n$;
    end
    if $n_{L,leaf}$ $is\ empty$ then
        break;
    end
end
return $S_n, L_n, loss$;
```

Figure 5.15: Procedure Com_leaf (returns losses for the common node and leaf node for loads and sources).

```
Input: All possible paths $Path_x$, switch list $SW$, Closed switch list
       $SW_{cl}$, Cluster networks $G_C$
Output: Shortest path $p_x$, updated Closed switch list $SW_{cl}$, updated
        Cluster network $G_C$
Data: Initialize: $SW \leftarrow \{\}$, $SW_{cl} \leftarrow \{\}$, $G_C \leftarrow \{\}$
foreach $path \in Path_x$ do
    if $path$ is valid and radial then
        if $length(path) < length(p_x)$ then
            $p_x \leftarrow path$ ;
        end
    end
end
foreach $sw \in SW$ do
    if $sw$ is not in $SW_{cl}$ then
        $SW_{cl} \leftarrow SW_{cl} \cup \{sw\}$ ;
    end
end
return $p_x, SW_{cl}, G_C$
```

Figure 5.16: Determine the shortest path and switch status while maintaining radiality.

```
Input: Overall network $G$, Cluster networks $G_C$, Source node data $S_n$,
       Load node data $L_n$, switch list $SW$, Closed switch list $SW_{cl}$
Output: Cluster networks $G_C$, Closed switch list $SW_{cl}$, total loss
        $loss_{tot}$
$S_n, L_n, loss_{tot} = Com\_leaf(G, S_n, L_n)$;
$L_n \downarrow$ based on load value;
for $node\ x \in L_n$ do
    shortest path to all source, $Path_x = \emptyset$;
    for $node\ y \in S_n$ do
        if $x\ and\ y\ have\ nonzero\ value\ in\ same\ phases$ then
            add $shortest\_path(x, y, G)$ to $Path_x$;
        end
    end
    $Path_x \uparrow$ based on electrical distance;
    $p_x, SW_{cl}, G_C = Path\_Select(Path_x, SW, SW_{cl}, G_C)$;
    load node $i = p_x[1]$, source node $j = p_x[-1]$;
    $p_x$ path loss, $L_{px} = L_{DNN}(p_x, i_{ld}, j_{sr})$;
    balance $i_{ld}$ and $j_{sr}$ considering $L_{px}$;
    $loss_{tot} = loss_{tot} + L_{px}$;
    if $i_{ld} == 0$ then
        remove node $i$ from $L_n$;
        break;
    end
    if $j_{sr} == 0$ then
        remove node $j$ from $S_n$;
    end
    if $L_n\ or\ S_n\ is\ Empty$ then
        break;
    end
end
return $G_C, SW_{cl}, loss_{tot}$;
```

Figure 5.17: Minimum Loss Path (Determines minimum loss path for selected loads and sources and Closed switch list).

20.4 Primary Level Optimization

The primary-level optimization problem aims to achieve a balance between load and source energy at the primary voltage level with DR participation of the house loads. The goal of the primary-level optimization problem is to balance the load and source energy amount in the primary voltage level, considering the demand response (DR) participation of house loads described in Section 12.2.3 for all three phases. The primary-level optimization is formulated as a continuous linear programming problem. The energy-based optimization ensures continuous load serving while taking into account load profile variation during the entire period of the reconfiguration process.

The primary level loads are categorized into six groups:

1. Critical main load $ld_{Cm,DR}$
2. Other loads $ld_{Co,DR}$ of critical loads with demand response
3. Critical loads without demand response ld_C
4. Normal main load $ld_{Nm,DR}$
5. Other load $ld_{No,DR}$ of normal loads with demand response
6. Normal load without demand response ld_N

The rank of criticality of these loads is considered as:

$$ld_{Cm,DR} > ld_C > ld_{Nm,DR} > ld_N > ld_{Co,DR} > ld_{No,DR} \tag{5.27}$$

With the energy profile of PV (sr_{pv}), battery (sr_{bat}), diesel generator (sr_{dg}), and the loads, the following formulation maximizes the load served:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{maximize} \quad & WSr \cdot Sr + WLd \cdot Ld && (5.28)\\ \text{subject to} \quad & Ld + ELoss \leq Sr && (5.29)\\ & 0 \leq Sr \leq Sr_{\max} && (5.30)\\ & 0 \leq Ld \leq Ld_{\max} && (5.31) \end{aligned}$$

Here, WSr and WLd are the weights assigned to the available sources and loads, respectively. Sr represents the set of source variables sr_{pv}, sr_{bat}, and sr_{dg}, and Ld represents the set of load variables $ld_{Cm,DR}$, ld_C, $ld_{Nm,DR}$, ld_N, $ld_{Co,DR}$, and $ld_{No,DR}$. $Sr_{\max}$ and $Ld_{\max}$ represent the maximum value of the constraints for the sources and loads, respectively, which are derived from the forecast data. Incorporating WSr and WLd in the optimization problem ensures maximization of the critical load amount served.

In the primary level optimization, there are two stages as shown in Figure 5.18. For the first stage, generation-based percentage energy loss $ELoss$ is assigned to quickly determine the set of connected sources and loads position and initial values. This percentage energy loss $ELoss$ is assumed to be higher than the average energy loss of the system obtained by studying the loss data in Section 20.2. Then, the loss and topology determination modules determine the loss for selected loads/sources and switch statuses for the network. In the second stage, the primary level optimization and loss and topology determination modules work together to finalize loads, sources, and loss values. Here, the ratio of the losses in optimization and losses from the DNN models is compared to a tolerance value d for stopping.


Initialization
Criticality
Electrical Distance
Weight parameters
Detailed Model
Forecast
Initial Primary node level optmization
Primary
Secondary
Primary Optimization
Machine Learning-based Loss Calculation Block
Primary node level optmization
Minimum Loss Path
DNN ML Loss
opt_{loss}
$path_{loss}$
$path_{loss}$
No
$\frac{opt_{loss}}{path_{los}} < d$
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Output
Parallel Secondary Optimization
sec o/p diff than primary?
Reconfiguration (switch, load shed)
Gridlab-D

Figure 5.18: Secondary level reconfiguration flow.

20.5 Secondary Level Optimization

The aim of the secondary-level optimization is to prioritize the connection of secondary-level house loads based on their criticality level. Further, there is a direct control over connecting/disconnecting main and other loads inside houses. The objective of the secondary-level optimization is to connect secondary-level house loads according to their criticality level as long as the source amount can supply energy to each discrete load. The secondary node level optimization is formulated as a binary linear programming problem. Let $X_i \in [0, 1]$ be a set of binary variables that indicates the secondary level individual house load connectivity for each type of load under a primary node i. For each house participating in the demand response, there are two types of load: main and other loads, as discussed in Section 20.1. For other houses, all loads are considered to be main load. The number of binary variables depends on the number of houses in the secondary level of that primary node. The load L_{di} assigned by the primary level optimization is considered as available generation sources for the secondary loads. The secondary-level optimization problem is formulated as:

$$\text{maximize } W_{\text{Ltype}} \cdot X_i \tag{5.32}$$

subject to:

$$X_i \cdot L_h \leq L_{di} \tag{5.33}$$

where W_{Ltype} represents the weights for different types of loads. Here, a similar criticality rank of loads for different houses is assigned as in primary-level load optimization.

Since the primary-level optimization is solved as a continuous linear problem, the distribution of the continuous value in a discrete format may result in unassigned load values which may not be enough to be assigned to the next available secondary load. To address this issue, the following steps are taken:

1. For all primary nodes, the average remaining secondary level load and criticality values are calculated in parallel.

2. Excess generation is accumulated and reassigned to other primary nodes with the lowest remaining average load and highest criticality value. This reassignment leads to changes in the primary-level load allocation.

3. If these changes remain within a tolerance level, then the house loads are shed.

4. Otherwise, the new primary-level load value is sent to the loss and topology determination module to calculate changes in the losses and iterate the process of primary-level optimization, as shown in Figure 5.19.

The overall secondary-level optimization is shown in Figure 5.19.


Primary Optimization
Parallel Secondary Optimization
Secondary node level optimization
Secondary node level optimization
Secondary node level optimization
o/p - individual house level decision - load on/off status and remaining load and excess generation
avg remaining load and criticality value
Ranking - top (highest critical and lowest avg remaing load)
Accumulate excess generation and adjustment
Assignment
Gen still remains?
Primary Optimization

Figure 5.19: Primary level reconfiguration flow.

21 Case Studies and Results

For calculating primary node level and distribution system level resiliency, values of all factors need to be determined following the methods mentioned in the previous sections.

21.1 Primary node level resiliency

This section provides details about primary node level resiliency calculation for a cyber-physical node with IoTs. Similarly, Section 23, further explains primary node level resiliency calculation for a cyber-physical node without IoTs.

Table 5.6 shows values of factors for a cyber-physical node with IoTs. As an example, assume that there are two operators or experts who provide pairwise comparison matrices as shown below:

Table 5.6: Factors Value for a typical Cyber-Physical Primary Node with IoT

Factors Name	Value(F_i)
Available generation	0.6
Amount of critical load	0.3
Connectivity redundancy	0.2
Device and communication vulnerabilities	0.1
IoT Device Trustability Score	.95

$$M1 = \begin{bmatrix} 1.0 & 3.0 & 7.0 & 5.0 & 0.333 \\ 0.333 & 1.0 & 2.0 & 7.0 & 0.143 \\ 0.143 & 0.5 & 1.0 & 0.333 & 0.111 \\ 0.2 & 0.143 & 3.0 & 1.0 & 0.111 \\ 3.0 & 7.0 & 9.0 & 9.0 & 1.0 \end{bmatrix} \tag{5.34}$$

$$M2 = \begin{bmatrix} 1.0 & 2.0 & 5.0 & 6.0 & 0.5 \\ 0.5 & 1.0 & 3.0 & 3.0 & 0.167 \\ 0.2 & 0.333 & 1.0 & 0.333 & 0.125 \\ 0.167 & 0.333 & 3.0 & 1.0 & 0.111 \\ 2.0 & 6.0 & 8.0 & 9.0 & 1.0 \end{bmatrix} \tag{5.35}$$

The fuzzified version of these two matrices are,

$$M1_{Fuzzy} = \begin{bmatrix} (1.0, 1.0, 1.0) & (2.0, 3.0, 4.0) & (6.0, 7.0, 8.0) & (4.0, 5.0, 6.0) & (0.25, 0.33, 0.5) \\ (0.25, 0.33, 0.5) & (1.0, 1.0, 1.0) & (1.0, 2.0, 3.0) & (6.0, 7.0, 8.0) & (0.12, 0.14, 0.17) \\ (0.12, 0.14, 0.17) & (0.33, 0.5, 1.0) & (1.0, 1.0, 1.0) & (0.25, 0.33, 0.5) & (0.11, 0.11, 0.11) \\ (0.17, 0.2, 0.25) & (0.12, 0.14, 0.17) & (2.0, 3.0, 4.0) & (1.0, 1.0, 1.0) & (0.11, 0.11, 0.11) \\ (2.0, 3.0, 4.0) & (6.0, 7.0, 8.0) & (9.0, 9.0, 9.0) & (9.0, 9.0, 9.0) & (1.0, 1.0, 1.0) \end{bmatrix} \tag{5.36}$$

$$M2_{Fuzzy} = \begin{bmatrix} (1.0, 1.0, 1.0) & (1.0, 2.0, 3.0) & (4.0, 5.0, 6.0) & (5.0, 6.0, 7.0) & (0.33, 0.5, 1.0) \\ (0.33, 0.5, 1.0) & (1.0, 1.0, 1.0) & (2.0, 3.0, 4.0) & (2.0, 3.0, 4.0) & (0.14, 0.17, 0.2) \\ (0.17, 0.2, 0.25) & (0.25, 0.33, 0.5) & (1.0, 1.0, 1.0) & (0.25, 0.33, 0.5) & (0.11, 0.12, 0.14) \\ (0.14, 0.17, 0.2) & (0.25, 0.33, 0.5) & (2.0, 3.0, 4.0) & (1.0, 1.0, 1.0) & (0.11, 0.11, 0.11) \\ (1.0, 2.0, 3.0) & (5.0, 6.0, 7.0) & (7.0, 8.0, 9.0) & (9.0, 9.0, 9.0) & (1.0, 1.0, 1.0) \end{bmatrix} \tag{5.37}$$

Now the combined fuzzy pairwise matrix is,

$$Mat_{Fuzzy} = \begin{bmatrix} (1.0, 1.0, 1.0) & (1.0, 2.5, 4.0) & (4.0, 6.0, 8.0) & (4.0, 5.5, 7.0) & (0.25, 0.42, 1.0) \\ (0.25, 0.42, 1.0) & (1.0, 1.0, 1.0) & (1.0, 2.5, 4.0) & (2.0, 5.0, 8.0) & (0.12, 0.16, 0.2) \\ (0.12, 0.17, 0.25) & (0.25, 0.42, 1.0) & (1.0, 1.0, 1.0) & (0.25, 0.33, 0.5) & (0.11, 0.12, 0.14) \\ (0.14, 0.18, 0.25) & (0.12, 0.24, 0.5) & (2.0, 3.0, 4.0) & (1.0, 1.0, 1.0) & (0.11, 0.11, 0.11) \\ (1.0, 2.5, 4.0) & (5.0, 6.5, 8.0) & (7.0, 8.5, 9.0) & (9.0, 9.0, 9.0) & (1.0, 1.0, 1.0) \end{bmatrix} \tag{5.38}$$

By following all the steps of fuzzy AHP explained earlier one can obtain the weights shown in Table 5.7 from Mat_{Fuzzy}.

Table 5.7: Weights of factors for a typical Cyber-Physical Primary Node with IoT

Factors Name	Weight(W_i)
Available generation	0.27
Amount of critical load	0.129
Connectivity redundancy	0.042
Device and communication vulnerabilities	0.055
IoT Device Trustability Score	0.504

Finally primary node level resiliency for this cyber-physical primary node with IoTs can be calculated using Equation (5.16) where factors value and weights are coming from Tables 5.12 and 5.7 respectively. The PNR of this node is 0.599.

A similar process can be used to find the PNR of all the primary level nodes of the distribution system.

21.2 Secondary node level resiliency

As mentioned earlier, STNR calculation requires Load and Generation profile before, during, and after attack scenarios. For some nodes, there are both generation and load devices. Depending on various factors such as the availability of generation resources, the flexibility of load demand, and the strategy for battery dispatch, these nodes can alternate between being net generators and net consumers of electricity. This is evidenced by the net injection at these nodes shifting from negative (representing load) to positive (representing generation) over a 24-hour simulation and recorded with 5 minutes time step. Net injection data provided by MIT was used to obtain load and generation profiles. First, load values were obtained for a total of 314 SMOs using Gridlab-D^{TM}. Once the load values are simulated, the generation values are obtained as the $Generation - Load = NetInjection$. The changes in the resiliency scores for ITS, STNR, and PNR are shown in Figure 5.20, where the impact of the generator attack is conspicuous during the specific period of attack.



(a)

(b)

(c)

Figure 5.20: Change in ITS, STNR, and PNR score during attack 1.0 (DG attack) in IEEE-123 test case

21.3 Distribution system level resiliency

Primary node level resiliency can be calculated for all the primary nodes as mentioned above. For a normal operating scenario, the factors for all the primary nodes are calculated by following the process described in Section 16.1. Then using Equation (5.20), the weights of each factors for each node is determined. Finally, the distribution system level resiliency is calculated as 67.59 using Equation (5.21). Table 5.8 shows all the factors values, weights and resiliency contribution towards distribution system level resiliency of each node. For this exercise, minimum threshold of weights for factors were set to $0.4, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1$ respectively for PNR, APO, PNC, and DCVP. Equation (5.20) shows the procedure for computing the values of the weights in the Weights columns in Table 5.8.

Table 5.8: Node Factor values, weight and contribution in DSR

Node	PNR	APO	PNC	DCVP	w1	w2	w3	w4	Node DSR Contribution
node 1	0.411	0.317	0.5	0.479	0.4	0.1	0.1	0.4	0.4342
node 2	0.599	0.609	0.25	0.128	0.4	0.4	0.1	0.1	0.4735
node 3	0.415	0.62	0.429	0.157	0.4	0.4	0.1	0.1	0.4436
node 4	0.143	0.624	0.333	0.284	0.4	0.4	0.1	0.1	0.3005
node 5	0.297	0.776	0.5	0.472	0.4	0.4	0.1	0.1	0.4812
node 6	0.471	0.468	0.5	0.338	0.4	0.1	0.4	0.1	0.4664
node 7	0.342	0.186	0.25	0.27	0.4	0.1	0.1	0.4	0.2837
node 8	0.867	0.25	0.5	0.335	0.7	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.6589
node 9	0.348	0.112	0.286	0.12	0.7	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2739
node 10	0.442	0.725	0.333	0.229	0.4	0.4	0.1	0.1	0.4904
node 11	0.528	0.787	0.333	0.283	0.4	0.4	0.1	0.1	0.5557
node 12	0.89	0.14	0.25	0.169	0.7	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.5518
node 13	0.778	0.412	0.364	0.175	0.7	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.5829
node 14	0.311	0.159	0.75	0.234	0.4	0.1	0.4	0.1	0.402
node 15	0.84	0.418	0.75	0.304	0.4	0.1	0.4	0.1	0.6763
⋮	⋮	⋮	⋮	⋮	⋮	⋮	⋮	⋮	⋮
node 120	0.728	0.588	0.68	0.453	0.4	0.1	0.4	0.1	0.6613
node 121	0.203	0.315	0.444	0.251	0.4	0.1	0.4	0.1	0.2963
node 122	0.594	0.737	0.169	0.1	0.4	0.4	0.1	0.1	0.4778
node 123	0.707	0.69	0.69	0.116	0.4	0.1	0.4	0.1	0.583

21.4 Resiliency-based Reconfiguration

For validation of the primarily proposed reconfiguration algorithm, it was assumed that due to some events the distribution system substation at node 150 and some nearby nodes in microgrid cluster 1 are compromised. As a result the whole distribution system is disconnected from the transmission grid and that the microgrid cluster also loses its local DERs and all the critical loads. For other microgrid cluster, local DER generations are the only available power source. Also, at the time of the day when the events happened, the PVs and batteries are assumed to be operating in low capacity. Table 5.9 shows the available generations and total critical loads in each microgrid cluster.

Table 5.9: Available generations and critical loads in Microgrid Clusters.

Microgrid Cluster	**Available Generations**	**Critical Loads**
1	**0**	**0**
2	**61.33**	**46.95743**
3	**93.51**	**92.81694**
5	**113.67**	**120.284**
6	**30.12**	**0**
4	**33.91**	**44.72136**
7	**63.23**	**86.70715**
Total	**395.77**	**391.4868**

It is clear from the table that there is enough available generation to feed all the critical loads. But cluster 2 and 6 needs to provide power to node 4, 5 and 7 to fulfill their deficiencies. Following the shortest paths, cluster 6 can directly feed cluster 5 and 7 when the switch between nodes 76-86 and 54-94 are closed respectively. The extra available generations at cluster 2 can then be rerouted to cluster 4 via either cluster 1 and 7, or cluster 3. In both cases, the path distance is the same, but the path via cluster 1 and 7 results in a lower resiliency value compared to the path via cluster 3 as nodes in cluster 1 are already compromised. As a result, IoT trustability score and Device and communication vulnerabilities factors values will be very low in that cluster. Since introduction of those nodes from cluster 1 reduces the resiliency of the overall system, the switches between nodes 18-135 and 151-300 need to be closed for higher resiliency value. After rerouting the necessary generations to meet the deficiencies of cluster 4, the rest of the generations of cluster 2 is assigned to the non-critical loads. As a result, all the non-critical loads which are not assigned any generation in cluster 2 and all the non-critical loads in cluster 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 are shed by the operator.

21.5 Grid Reconfiguration and Restoration

This section illustrates a practical use case based on the reconfiguration algorithm detailed in the previous sections. The scenario demonstrates the effectiveness of the algorithm in stabilizing the grid during an orchestrated disconnection and subsequent reconnection.

The results are validated on the IEEE 123 node test feeder which includes 1008 house models with all electric load HVAC, and water heater load. In addition, there are IoT devices such as HVAC and water heaters, small electronics, lights, and pluggable loads, and DERs such as PV, batteries, and diesel generators.

The grid outage scenario is as follows: At 13:00 hours, an unforeseen event occurs at distribution system substation node 150, that results in the disconnection of the distribution system from the main grid. It is subsequently reconnected back to the main grid at 14:00 hours.

21.5.1 Switching of DERs

The primary level optimization module finds the optimal switch status for reconfiguration, shown in Table 5.10. As seen from the optimization solution, the available diesel generators in the primary node are connected by closing the 48-48dg and 65-65dg switches. Figure 5.21 shows the grid and DG outputs for all the phases before, during, and after the grid outage.

Table 5.10: Switch Status During Normal Operation and Outage

Node A	**Node B**	**Switch Status (Normal)**	**Switch Status (Outage)**
13	152	CLOSED	CLOSED
18	135	CLOSED	CLOSED
60	160	CLOSED	CLOSED
61	610	CLOSED	CLOSED
97	197	CLOSED	CLOSED
150	**149**	**CLOSED**	**OPEN**
250	251	OPEN	OPEN
450	451	OPEN	OPEN
300	350	OPEN	OPEN
95	195	OPEN	OPEN
54	94	OPEN	OPEN
151	300	OPEN	OPEN
13	18	CLOSED	CLOSED
86	76	CLOSED	CLOSED
48	**48dg**	**OPEN**	**CLOSED**
65	**65dg**	**OPEN**	**CLOSED**

21.5.2 Load Shedding and IoT-based House Appliance-level Control

Loads to be shed in the secondary level are determined by the primary level optimization module based on criticality level, resulting in the disconnection of 516 out of 1008 houses in the secondary level. Table 5.11 shows that among critical loads taking part in Demand Response, 39 houses have main load connected, whereas 3 houses have HVAC and water heater connected. Observations from Figure 5.21 indicate that the optimization problem for reconfiguration effectively sustains grid voltages within thresholds across all primary nodes. As shown in Figure 5.22, it is also observed that the actions taken by the Reconfiguration and restoration strategy can maintain the grid voltages within specified limits at all the primary nodes during the grid outage conditions.

Table 5.11: Post reconfiguration house status overview.

House Type	House Number	Connected Main Load	Connected Other load
Critical Load with Demand Response	39	39	3
Critical Load without Demand Response	36	36	36
Normal Load with Demand Response	213	213	8
Normal Load without Demand Response	720	186	186



Figure 5.21: Grid Reconfiguration and Restoration



Figure 5.22: Primary node voltage for grid outage

22 Discussions and Summary

Work performed during the EUREICA project provides a framework for cyber-physical resiliency formulation for the electric distribution system with a resiliency-based reconfiguration strategy. The introduction of more IoTs based DERs, loads, and other devices leads to better and more efficient operation with flexibility, but also brings vulnerabilities. Detailed monitoring of all the resources and efficient restoration actions are becoming critical due to the increasing cyber-attack surface and complexity of the system. This also leads to privacy concerns. Federated learning-based monitoring can elevate these problems where detailed monitoring is not possible. Thus, without breaching privacy, the overall resiliency framework presented in this report can provide situational awareness and critical information to the distribution system operators for a distribution system with IoTs. Furthermore, the grid's stability and resilience can be maintained through the developed resiliency metric-based reconfiguration algorithm. The use case also shows that the algorithm can help distribution system operators with reconfiguration decisions for which the distribution system can have the highest possible resiliency considering all the cyber-power attributes.

The following tasks have been completed as discussed in this final report:

- Modeling of distribution system with IoTs,
- Cyber-physical simulation of distribution system with IoTs,
- Distribution system analysis with IoTs,
- Implementation of federated learning-based unsupervised machine learning to monitor IoTs,
- Formulized IoT Trustability score using federated learning-based monitoring,
- Implemented primary level node resiliency formulation using fuzzy multi-criterion decision making (MCDM) considering IoTs,
- Implemented distribution system resiliency formulation using DEA game,
- Demonstrated resiliency calculation for the normal operating scenario for the IEEE 123 node distribution system with IoTs.
- Resiliency metric formulation and generation for trust on SMO/SMA using trustability score
- Developed Resiliency Driven Reconfiguration Path, a hierarchical optimization approach for both primary and secondary levels, tailored to complex distribution systems and
- Proposed an energy-based optimization method to manage generation and load variability during reconfiguration with DR.

23 23 Resiliency Calculation of a Cyber-physical Primary Node Without IoT

This section discusses primary node level resiliency calculation of a cyber-physical primary node without IoT:

23.1 Generalized primary node level resiliency

Table 5.12 shows the values of factors of a cyber-physical node without IoT.

Table 5.12: Factors Value for a typical Cyber-Physical Primary Node without IoT

Factors Name	Normalized Value
Available generation	0.1
Amount of critical load	0.2
Connectivity redundancy	0.3
Device and communication vulnerabilities	0.25

As an example, assume there are two operators or experts that provide the pairwise comparison matrices ($M1$ and $M2$) shown below.

$$M1 = \begin{bmatrix} 1.0 & 3.0 & 5.0 & 5.0 \\ 0.333 & 1.0 & 2.0 & 3.0 \\ 0.2 & 0.5 & 1.0 & 0.333 \\ 0.2 & 0.333 & 3.0 & 1.0 \end{bmatrix} \tag{5.39}$$

$$M2 = \begin{bmatrix} 1.0 & 4.0 & 5.0 & 6.0 \\ 0.25 & 1.0 & 3.0 & 3.0 \\ 0.2 & 0.333 & 1.0 & 0.333 \\ 0.167 & 0.333 & 3.0 & 1.0 \end{bmatrix} \tag{5.40}$$

The fuzzified version of these two matrices are,

$$M1_{Fuzzy} = \begin{bmatrix} (1.0, 1.0, 1.0) & (2.0, 3.0, 4.0) & (4.0, 5.0, 6.0) & (4.0, 5.0, 6.0) \\ (0.25, 0.33, 0.5) & (1.0, 1.0, 1.0) & (1.0, 2.0, 3.0) & (2.0, 3.0, 4.0) \\ (0.17, 0.2, 0.25) & (0.33, 0.5, 1.0) & (1.0, 1.0, 1.0) & (0.25, 0.33, 0.5) \\ (0.17, 0.2, 0.25) & (0.25, 0.33, 0.5) & (2.0, 3.0, 4.0) & (1.0, 1.0, 1.0) \end{bmatrix} \tag{5.41}$$

and

$$M2_{Fuzzy} = \begin{bmatrix} (1.0, 1.0, 1.0) & (3.0, 4.0, 5.0) & (4.0, 5.0, 6.0) & (5.0, 6.0, 7.0) \\ (0.2, 0.25, 0.33) & (1.0, 1.0, 1.0) & (2.0, 3.0, 4.0) & (2.0, 3.0, 4.0) \\ (0.17, 0.2, 0.25) & (0.25, 0.33, 0.5) & (1.0, 1.0, 1.0) & (0.25, 0.33, 0.5) \\ (0.14, 0.17, 0.2) & (0.25, 0.33, 0.5) & (2.0, 3.0, 4.0) & (1.0, 1.0, 1.0) \end{bmatrix} \tag{5.42}$$

The combined fuzzy pairwise matrix is given by

$$Mat_{Fuzzy} = \begin{bmatrix} (1.0, 1.0, 1.0) & (2.0, 3.5, 5.0) & (4.0, 5.0, 6.0) & (4.0, 5.5, 7.0) \\ (0.2, 0.29, 0.5) & (1.0, 1.0, 1.0) & (1.0, 2.5, 4.0) & (2.0, 3.0, 4.0) \\ (0.17, 0.2, 0.25) & (0.25, 0.42, 1.0) & (1.0, 1.0, 1.0) & (0.25, 0.33, 0.5) \\ (0.14, 0.18, 0.25) & (0.25, 0.33, 0.5) & (2.0, 3.0, 4.0) & (1.0, 1.0, 1.0) \end{bmatrix} \tag{5.43}$$

Following all the steps of fuzzy AHP explained earlier produces the weights shown in Table 5.13 from Mat_{Fuzzy}.

Table 5.13: Weights of factors for a typical Cyber-Physical Primary Node with IoT

Factors Name	Weight
Available generation	0.567
Amount of critical load	0.229
Connectivity redundancy	0.082
Device and communication vulnerabilities	0.122

Finally, the resilience of the cyber-physical energy system at the primary node without IoT can be calculated using Equation (5.16) where factors value and weights are coming from Tables 5.12 and 5.13 respectively. The PNR of this node is 0.143.

A similar process can be used to find the PNR of all the primary level nodes of the distribution system.

Chapter 6

Summary of market module: MIT

In order to provide visibility into a distribution grid, the EUREICA project proposed to investigate an LEM that is hierarchical (see Figure 2.1 in Chapter 2) in nature and electrically collocated with a radial network. The starting point for the overall LEM is a distribution system operator (DSO) that oversees several substations in the distribution grid with multiple primary and secondary downstream markets and acts as their representative in its transactions with the wholesale electricity market (WEM). The substation connects the distribution grid to the high voltage transmission grid at the point of common coupling (PCC) (node 150 in Figure 2.2). The dual-layer market downstream of the substation consists of a primary market (PM) and a secondary market (SM), and is the core of the resilience infrastructure analyzed during the project and discussed in this report. The PM consists of Primary market operators (PMOs) and Primary market agents (PMAs). The PMAs at each of the primary nodes either own a DER at a primary feeder node or are aggregators representing DERs at the secondary feeder level and below. In the latter case, the PMA plays a second role as an SM operator (SMO) and coordinates with SM agents (SMAs). The PMO, PMAs/SMOs, and the SMAs are located at the coupling between the substation and the primary feeder, primary feeder nodes, and secondary feeder nodes, respectively (see Figure 2.2). The PM and SM operate at medium- and low-voltage levels, respectively. The DSO supervises the entire distribution grid and, for purposes of this project, could be viewed as an expansion of the present responsibilities of a DSO, which comprise grid maintenance and grid reliability, and may include market oversight and regulation as well. In this sense, the role of the DSO would be analogous to that of existing independent system operators for transmission grids [70].

24 Example instance of LEM

This Section outlines a possible (hypothetical) instantiation of the proposed dual-layer LEM for the city of Boston, MA. Figure 6.1 shows the IEEE 39-bus transmission system [17] which is a synthetic representation of the entire New England region, with a peak load of 6254 MW and a total of around 7 million homes. This corresponds to $\approx$ 162 MW and 180,000 homes per bus. Given that the IEEE 123-node distribution feeder has a peak load of roughly 3.6 MW, an estimated 44 such primary feeders per transmission bus and 4100 homes per feeder will need to modeled. Thus, the city of Boston with a total of 300,000 homes [29], will be represented by

73 primary feeders across 2 transmission buses.



Figure 6.1: IEEE 39-bus transmission system.

Section 25 shows a breakdown of different entities to form a hierarchical LEM for Boston. Note that the main market operators and agents that are relevant for this work are marked in green.


ISO for transmission grid
Wholesale Market
DSO at each transmission bus
DSO$_1$
DSO$_2$
2
Transmission buses serve the whole Boston area
5
Substation operator under each transmission bus
SO$_1$
SO$_2$
SO$_3$
SO$_4$
SO$_5$
14
IEEE 123-node feeders per substation
PMO$_1$
PMO$_2$
PMO$_{14}$
85
Active primary nodes (with DERs) per feeder
SMO$_1$
SMO$_2$
SMO$_{85}$
5
Radial secondary feeders per primary node
SMA$_1$
SMA$_2$
SMA$_5$
5*14*85*5*10 ≈ 300,000 homes
10
Homes connected to each secondary feeder
Home 1
Home 2
Home 10

Figure 6.2: Example of hypothetical LEM for the city of Boston, MA.

25 Situational awareness (SA)

Formally, SA is defined at an operator x as the tuple

$$\mathrm{SA}_x = \{\mathrm{ICA}_x, \mathrm{RS}_x\}, \tag{6.1}$$

where ICA_x stands for the IoT-coordinated assets and denotes the generator and/or consumption flexibilities of DERs under the purview of agent $x \in \{\mathrm{SMA}, \mathrm{SMO}\}$, and RS_x denotes their resilience scores, to be defined in Section 26.5. As demonstrated in the following paragraph, RS_x can be determined based on the asset's market performance and security against possible attacks.

shows a breakdown of different entities to form a hierarchical LEM for Boston. Note that the main market operators and agents that are relevant for this project are marked in green. It also shows how the LEM, made up of the PM-SM layers, will allow the computation of SA. The operation of a distribution grid is challenging due to its scale, complex topology, and presence of various active DER assets and fixed load nodes. This complex task is separated by having the PM focus on grid-specific costs and constraints while the SM focuses on consumer-centric costs and constraints. This exercise assumes that PM and SM clear once every 5 minutes and 1 minute respectively. The main reason for this separation of timescales is that the SM typically needs to monitor fewer assets than the PM, and is closer to DER devices (such as rooftop solar and batteries) and therefore may need to operate at a faster timescale than a PM. The starting point for both markets is the submission of bids by the corresponding agents. Bids for the SM are submitted by the SMAs exogenously, whereas bids for the PM are computed by the SMOs via the SM. Accordingly, the operation of the SM is discussed before going into the details of the PM.

26 Secondary market

Operation of the SM consists of three sequential stages: bidding, clearing, and monitoring. $\mathcal{N}$ denotes the set of all SMOs in the network and $\mathcal{N}_i$ is the set of all SMAs under a given SMO $i \in \mathcal{N}$.

Figure 6.3 shows the inputs and outputs for different levels of the hierarchical LEM. For both the SM and the PM, the inputs consist of the baseline power injections and flexibility bids, while the outputs are the market schedules (setpoints for power injections) and their associated flexibility ranges, along with the corresponding electricity prices of tariffs.



Every 5 min
WEM
LMPs
Every 5 min
PMO
13.2 kV
d-LMPs
$\overrightarrow{B_i} = [P_i^0, Q_i^0, \Delta P_i, \Delta Q_i]$
$\overrightarrow{S_i^*} = \left[P_i^*, Q_i^*, \mu_i^{P^*}, \mu_i^{Q^*}\right]$
Every 1 min
SMO i
4.16 kV
Local retail tariffs
Flexibility bids
Cleared solutions (schedules)
$\overrightarrow{B_j^i} = [P_j^{i0}, Q_j^{i0}, \Delta P_j^i, \Delta Q_j^i]$
$\Delta P_j^i = \left[\underline{P_j^i}, \overline{P_j^i}\right], \Delta Q_j^i = \left[\underline{Q_j^i}, \overline{Q_j^i}\right]$
$\overrightarrow{S_j^{i*}} = \left[P_j^{i*}, Q_j^{i*}, \delta P_j^{i*}, \delta Q_j^{i*}, \mu_j^{iP^*}, \mu_j^{iQ^*}\right]$
$P_j^i = P_j^{iG} - P_j^{iL}, Q_j^i = Q_j^{iG} - Q_j^{iL}$
SMA j
120-240 V
δP_j^{i*}
$\underline{P_j^i}$
P_j^{i0}
P_j^{i*}
$\overline{P_j^i}$
ΔP_j^i

Figure 6.3: Overall inputs and outputs in the LEM.

26.1 SM bidding

During the bidding phase, each SMA $j \in \mathcal{N}_i$ submits a bid $\mathcal{B}_j^{iS}$ defined as

$$\mathcal{B}_j^{iS} = \{P_j^{i0}, Q_j^{i0}, \underline{P}_j^i, \underline{Q}_j^i, \overline{P}_j^i, \overline{Q}_j^i, \beta_j^{iP}, \beta_j^{iQ}\}.$$

P_j^{i0} and Q_j^{i0} denote the baseline active and reactive injections of SMA j, along with the upward $(\overline{P}_j^i, \overline{Q}_j^i)$ and downward flexibility $(\underline{P}_j^i, \underline{Q}_j^i)$. β_j^{iP} and β_j^{iQ} denote the disutility parameters associated with providing active and reactive power flexibility, respectively. It should be noted that Bid B_j^{iS} requires SMA j to have a realistic estimate of its energy profile for the next 1 minute. Since it is not always trivial to predict future power availability, agents deploy a decentralized federated learning (FL)-based framework [163] to determine their bids. Using FL helps ensure that the privacy of the participating agents is preserved and the computational aspects of the prediction algorithm scale well as the number of agents increases. Further details on the FL implementation can be found in Chapter 8. Figure 6.3 summarizes details of the overall LEM.

26.2 SM clearing

Once the SMO i has received bids from the participating SMAs, it clears the market with active and reactive power injection setpoints (P_j^{i*}, Q_j^{i*}) and the corresponding retail tariffs $(\mu_j^{iP*}, \mu_j^{iQ*})$. In addition, the SMO also solves for the optimal flexibility ranges $(\delta P_j^{i*}, \delta Q_j^{i*})$ for $j \in \mathcal{N}_i$. The SMO clears the markets with the following four objectives: (O1) maximization of aggregate resilience f_i^1, (O2) minimization of the net cost to the SMO, f_i^2, (O3) maximization of total flexibility f_i^3 that the SMO can extract from all its SMAs and (O4) minimization of the disutility of the SMAs f_i^4, arising from flexibility provision. This gives rise to a multiobjective constrained optimization problem:

$$\min_{\mathbf{y}_i^S} f_i^S = \{f_i^1, f_i^2, f_i^3, f_i^4\}^\top \tag{6.2a}$$

$$\text{s.t.}\underline{P}_j^i + \delta P_j^i \leq P_j^i \leq \overline{P}_j^i - \delta P_j^i \ \forall j \in \mathcal{N}_i, \ \forall \text{ constraints} \tag{6.2b}$$

$$\underline{Q}_j^i + \delta Q_j^i \leq Q_j^i \leq \overline{Q}_j^i - \delta Q_j^i \tag{6.2c}$$

$$\delta P_j^i, \ \delta Q_j^i \geq 0, 0 \leq \mu_j^{iP} \leq \overline{\mu}^{iP}, 0 \leq \mu_j^{iP} \leq \overline{\mu}^{iQ} \tag{6.2d}$$

$$\sum_{t_p} \sum_{t_s} \sum_{j \in \mathcal{N}_i} \mu_j^{iP}(t) P_j^i(t) \Delta t_s \leq \sum_{t_p} \mu^{iP^*}(\widehat{t_p}) P_i^*(\widehat{t_p}) \Delta t_p \tag{6.2e}$$

$$\sum_{t_p} \sum_{t_s} \sum_{j \in \mathcal{N}_i} \mu_j^{iQ}(t) Q_j^i(t) \Delta t_s \leq \sum_{t_p} \mu^{iQ^*}(\widehat{t_p}) Q_i^*(\widehat{t_p}) \Delta t_p \tag{6.2f}$$

$$\sum_{j \in \mathcal{N}_i} P_j^i(t_s) = P^{i*}(\widehat{t_p}), \quad \sum_{j \in \mathcal{N}_i} Q_j^i(t_s) = Q^{i*}(\widehat{t_p}) \tag{6.2g}$$

The constraints include capacity limits and operational bounds on SMA injections (including flexibilities), budget balance constraints, price ceilings, and lossless power balance. Note that, the equations do not account for all the power physics. These will be considered in the PM in Section 27. The decision variables consist of the P and Q injection setpoints as well as retail tariffs for each SMA i.e. $\mathbf{y}_i^S = \{\mathbf{y}_j^{iS}\} \ \forall j \in \mathcal{N}_i$ where $\mathbf{y}_j^{iS} = [P_j^i, Q_j^i, \delta P_j^i, \delta Q_j^i, \mu_j^{iP}, \mu_j^{iQ}]$. Note that from the choice of f^1, the solution of Equation (6.2) requires the resilience scores RS_j^i. This is assumed to be communicated by the secondary resilience manager (SRM) to the SMA, the details of the SRM are addressed in the next section.

In general, the optimization problem in Equation (6.2) has multiple solutions known as Pareto points, with each solution prioritizing different objectives. However, since the objective functions have different units, instead of finding the Pareto solutions, a hierarchical approach is used, as proposed in [115] where the SMO optimizes one objective at a time in descending order of importance. While optimizing the subsequent objective functions, additional constraints on the degradation of prior objectives are added to the optimization problem (see [118] for details). The cleared market schedules $\mathbf{y}_i^{S*}$ are sent by the SMO to their corresponding SMAs, as well as to their SRM.

26.3 Objective functions for optimization in the Secondary Market

The four objective functions considered in the SM clearing are defined as:

O1. Maximization of aggregate resilience, f_i^1, given by the following, where RS_j^i denotes the resilience score of SMA j under SMO i

$$f_i^1 = -\sum_{j=1}^{n} RS_j^i((P_j^i - P_j^{i0})^2 + (Q_j^i - Q_j^{i0})^2)$$

O2. Minimization of net cost, f_i^2 to the SMO for running the SM

$$f_i^2 = \sum_{j=1}^{n} \mu_j^{iP} P_j^i + \mu_j^{iQ} Q_j^i$$

O3. Maximization of total flexibility, f_i^3 that the SMO can extract from all its SMAs

$$f_i^3 = -\sum_{j=1}^{n} (\delta P_j^i + \delta Q_j^i)$$

O4. Minimization of disutility of the SMAs, f_i^4 arising from flexibility provision

$$f_i^4 = \sum_{j=1}^{n} \beta_j^{iP} (P_j^i - P_j^{i0})^2 + \beta_j^{iQ} (Q_j^i - Q_j^{i0})^2.$$

26.4 Three-phase SM optimization problem

$$\min \sum_{j\in\mathcal{N}_{J,i}} \{f^i_{j,1}, f^i_{j,2}, f^i_{j,3}, f^i_{j,4}\} \tag{6.3a}$$

$$f^i_{1,j} \succ f^i_{2,j} \succ f^i_{3,j} \succ f^i_{4,j},\ \ \Phi = \{a, b, c\} \tag{6.3b}$$

$$f^i_{j,1} = -C^i_j \left(\sum_{\phi\in\Phi} (P^{i,\phi}_j - P^{i0,\phi}_j)^2 + (Q^{i,\phi}_j - Q^{i0,\phi}_j)^2\right)$$

$$f^i_{j,2} = \sum_{\phi\in\Phi} \mu^{iP,\phi}_j P^{i,\phi}_j + \mu^{iQ,\phi}_j Q^{i,\phi}_j$$

$$f^i_{j,3} = -\sum_{\phi\in\Phi} (\delta P^{i,\phi}_j + \delta Q^{i,\phi}_j)$$

$$f^i_{j,4} = \beta^{iP}_j \sum_{\phi\in\Phi} \left(P^i_j - P^{i0}_j\right)^2 + \beta^{iQ}_j \sum_{\phi\in\Phi} \left(Q^i_j - Q^{i0}_j\right)^2$$

subject to:

$$P^{i,\phi}_j - \delta P^{i,\phi}_j \geq \underline{P}^{i,\phi}_j\ Q^{i,\phi}_j - \delta Q^{i,\phi}_j \geq \underline{Q}^{i,\phi}_j \tag{6.3c}$$

$$P^{i,\phi}_j + \delta P^{i,\phi}_j \leq \overline{P}^{i,\phi}_j,\ Q^{i,\phi}_j + \delta Q^{i,\phi}_j \leq \overline{Q}^{i,\phi}_j \tag{6.3d}$$

$$\delta P^{i,\phi}_j,\ \delta Q^{i,\phi}_j \geq 0,\ 0 \leq \mu^{iP}_j \leq \overline{\mu}^{iP}, 0 \leq \mu^{iP}_j \leq \overline{\mu}^{iQ} \tag{6.3e}$$

$$\sum_{t_s}^{t_s+\Delta t_p} \sum_{j\in\mathcal{N}_{J,i}} \sum_{\phi\in\Phi} \left(\mu^{iP,\phi}_j(t) P^{i,\phi}_j(t) + \mu^{iQ,\phi}_j(t) Q^{i,\phi}_j(t)\right) \Delta t_s$$

$$\leq \sum_{\phi\in\Phi} \left(\mu^{P^*,\phi}_i(\widehat{t}_p) P^{\phi^*}_i(\widehat{t}_p) + \mu^{Q^*,\phi}_i(\widehat{t}_p) Q^{\phi^*}_i(\widehat{t}_p)\right) \Delta t_p \tag{6.3f}$$

$$\sum_{j\in\mathcal{N}_{J,i}} P^{i,\phi}_j(t_s) = P^{\phi^*}_i(\widehat{t}_p), \quad \sum_{j\in\mathcal{N}_{J,i}} Q^{i,\phi}_j(t_s) = Q^{\phi^*}_i(\widehat{t}_p) \tag{6.3g}$$

26.5 SM monitoring and resilience scores

The final stage in the SM is monitoring. During the market operation, the responses of each SMA j to the market schedules, in terms of its actual DER injections $\widehat{P}^i_j$ and $\widehat{Q}^i_j$ are suitably monitored by its corresponding SRM.



Figure 6.4: Sequence of communication steps and events leading to SA with an LEM. The red arrows indicate the entities and communication links that would be affected by an attack. A more detailed diagram can be found in Figure 6.5.

In addition to the market operators, the addition of two new entities is proposed and denoted as the primary resilience manager (PRM) and the SRM, both of which provide grid functionalities, with the PRM located at the primary circuit level and the SRM at the secondary level, as shown in Figure 6.4. With the market clearing providing the first step of awareness in the form of power available at each of the nodes at the secondary and primary level, the PRM and SRM monitor the actual injections, determine corresponding scores of commitment, trustability, and resilience (to be defined below), and communicate them using protected channels to the PRM. Not only do these entities enable a separation between grid-specific decision-making from market-specific decisions, but they also provide a pathway for mitigating the impact of any attacks that can occur through the addition of local resources, as will be shown in the following sections.


[8] α_2, β_2
PMO
PRM
[10] Attack flag & loss update $\bar{\xi}$
[7] PM schedules P_2^*, μ_2^{P*} & coeffs α_2, β_2
[5] RS_1
[10] $\bar{\alpha}_1, \bar{\beta}_1$ [if attack]
[14] Contract settlement/billing
SRM$_1$
SRM$_2$
SMO$_2$
SMO$_3$
SRM$_3$
[2] SMA schedules $P_{1,2}^{1\ *}, \delta P_{1,2}^{1\ *}, \mu_{1,2}^{P,1*}$
[4] $\hat{P}_{1,2}^1, RS_{1,2}^1$
[6,12] NST-PAC w/ PM bids $\Delta P_2, P_2^0$
[3] Actual injections $\hat{P}$
SMO$_1$
[1,9] SM bids $\Delta P_1^1, P_1^{0,1}$
[11] $\bar{\alpha}_1, \bar{\beta}_1, \bar{\xi}$
[2,13] SMA schedules $P_1^{1*}, \delta P_1^{1*}, \mu_1^{P,1*}$
[3] Contract settlement/billing
SMA$_1^1$
SMA$_2^1$
°C

Figure 6.5: Diagram showing a more detailed communication scheme and steps for information exchange between the various market operators, agents, and resilience managers at the secondary and primary levels.

In this monitoring stage, the SRM assigns each SMA an RS that is updated constantly based on its performance in the market and susceptibility to being compromised. The RS is a weighted combination of its commitment score (CS) and trustability score (TS). Formally, for an agent j

$$\mathrm{RS}_j = \alpha \mathrm{CS}_j + (1 - \alpha)\mathrm{TS}_j,$$

where $\alpha \in (0, 1)$ is a parameter chosen by the SRM. The CS and TS are defined below.

- *Commitment score (CS).* The CS of an agent measures its reliability in executing its cleared schedules and is updated at every SM clearing instance. The first step in updating CS_j for each agent $j \in \mathcal{N}_i$ is the computation of any relative deviation between the cleared schedule and its executed value over the past market period. A moving average is then computed to account for the past performance. Finally, a min-max normalization across all the SMAs is performed to keep $CS_j \in [0, 1]$ for all j (see Section 27.5 for further details).

- *IoT Trustability score (TS).* The TS captures the possibility of the agents (or the devices underneath them) being compromised. TSs are computed using an FL-based anomaly detector and like the CS, past values are used again to compute a weighted moving average. However, unlike the CS, which solely depends on power injections, the TS is a cyber-power metric [145] that also takes into account the associated cyber information, e.g., packet length, arrival time, and communication protocols, etc. (see Section 28 for further details).

In summary, the overall operation of the SM allows the generation of the schedules $\mathbf{y}_i^{S*} = [P_j^{i*}, Q_j^{i*}, \delta P_j^{i*}, \delta Q_j^{i*}, \mu_j^{iP*}, \mu_j^{iQ^*}]$ and RS_j^i ∀ SMAs j, all of which provide SA_j^i for the SRMs corresponding to all SMAs j at the primary node i. Similar measures of the resilience of large-scale networks to attacks can be found in [148].

27 Primary market

PM transactions happen between the PMO and the PMAs. Similar to the SM, the operation of the PM also consists of bidding, clearing, and monitoring.

27.1 PM bidding

This section addresses the link between the PM and SM. As noted previously, the PM is cleared every 5 minutes while the SM operates more frequently at 1-minute intervals. Before each PM clearing, the SMOs (or PMAs) aggregate the schedules and cleared flexibilities of all their SMAs resulting from the most recent prior SM clearing (at the lower level) to submit their flexibility bid to the upper-level PM. All market bidding and clearing for both the SM and PM are based on forecasts (assuming perfect foresight) and for the very next period. The complete bid submitted by each SMO $j \in \mathcal{N}$ into the PM $\mathcal{B}_i^P$ can be defined as:

$$\mathcal{B}_i^P = \{P_i^0, Q_i^0, \underline{P}_i, \underline{Q}_i, \overline{P}_i, \overline{Q}_i, \alpha_i^P, \alpha_i^Q, \beta_i^P, \beta_i^Q\}. \tag{6.4}$$

$$\begin{aligned} P_i^0(t_p) &= \sum_{j\in\mathcal{N}_i} P_j^{i*}(t_p),\ Q_i^0(t_p) = \sum_{j\in\mathcal{N}_i} Q_j^{i*}(t_p) \\ \underline{P}_i &= \sum_{j\in\mathcal{N}_i} P_j^i - \delta P_j^{i*}, \overline{P}_i = \sum_{j\in\mathcal{N}_i} P_j^{i*} + \delta P_j^{i*} \\ \underline{Q}_i &= \sum_{j\in\mathcal{N}_i} Q_j^{i*} - \delta Q_j^{i*}, \overline{Q}_i = \sum_{j\in\mathcal{N}_i} Q_j^{i*} + \delta Q_j^{i*} \end{aligned} \tag{6.5}$$

In the above formulas, (i) P_i^0, Q_i^0 denote the nominal baseline active and reactive power injection bids of the SMOs, (ii) $(\underline{P}_i, \underline{Q}_i)$ and $(\overline{P}_i, \overline{Q}_i)$ denote the downward and upward flexibilities (around their nominal values) in active and reactive power, respectively, (iii) α_i^P, α_i^Q are the local net generation costs, and (iv) β_i^P, β_i^Q are the flexibility disutility parameters of SMO i for P and Q, respectively. The SMO computes (iii) and (iv) as weighted averages of all their SMA retail tariffs, and SMA disutility parameters, respectively, as follows:

$$\alpha_i^P = \frac{\sum_{j\in\mathcal{N}_i\mu_j^{iP*}|P_j^{i*}|}}{\sum_{j\in\mathcal{N}_i|P_j^{i*}|}}, \beta_i^P = \frac{\sum_{j\in\mathcal{N}_i\beta_j^{iP*}|P_j^{i*}|}}{\sum_{j\in\mathcal{N}_i|P_j^{i*}|}}$$

Note that standalone PMAs such as a large industrial facility, a community solar farm, or an EV charging station, may also be present. In this case, the PMA would directly bid into the PM on its own instead of aggregating over SMAs.

27.2 PM clearing

At each PM clearing instance, an optimal power flow (OPF) problem is solved to optimize the PMO's objective while satisfying all grid physics and network power flow constraints. For simplicity, this project considered the cost functions of all the PMAs (or SMOs) to be quadratic. The objective function utilized is a weighted linear combination of (i) maximization of social welfare, (ii) minimization of total generation costs, and (iii) minimization of electrical line losses (see Section 27.4 for details of these functions). The total cost includes paying the locational marginal price (LMP) λ for importing power from the transmission grid at the PCC, as well as the payments to local generator PMAs that provide net positive injections into the PM. Dividing by suitable base values converts all quantities to per unit (between 0 and 1 p.u.). Thus, it is reasonable to combine all the terms into a single objective function using a simple weighted sum.

With the objective function thus defined, the constraints are determined by the choice of the power flow model used to describe the system. Since the original alternating current OPF (ACOPF) is inherently nonconvex and NP-hard, the problem needs to convexified to make it more tractable. In this study, two different approaches were considered for this convexification. The first is a branch flow (BF) model or nonlinear *DistFlow* [112] based on a second-order conic program (SOCP) convex relaxation, which is a simpler implementation that is valid for radial and balanced networks. The second is a linear current injection (CI) model [54] based on a McCormick envelope convex relaxation that is more generally applicable to unbalanced and meshed grids common in distribution systems (in addition to radial, balanced), although this adds some overhead due to certain pre-processing steps needed.

Both of these models were deployed for different use cases considered in this report, as shown in Table 3.1. Further details of the BF and CI approaches are provided in Section 27.3.1 and Section 27.3.2, respectively. The exact set of decision variables $\mathbf{y}_i^P$ for each PMA i differs slightly depending on the OPF model used. Both models solve for the nodal power injections and voltages. However, the BF model only considers branch currents while the CI model also considers nodal current injections. BF also models all variables as only having a single phase while the CI models these as three-phase, complex phasor quantities. For simplicity, only the single-phase formulations have been included thus far. However, these can easily be extended to the complex three-phase representation by simply modifying all variables to 3-dimensional complex vectors instead of scalars. A three-phase extension of the SM optimization is also given in Section 26.4. Thus, the decision vectors for the BF model are given by $\mathbf{y}_i^{P,BF} = [P_i^G, Q_i^G, P_i^L, Q_i^L, v_i, I_{ik}]\ \forall i \in \mathcal{N},\ (ik) \in \mathcal{E}$ and for the CI model, $\mathbf{y}_i^P = [P_i^\phi, Q_i^\phi, V_i^{\phi,R}, V_i^{\phi,I}, I_i^{\phi,R}, I_i^{\phi,I}, I_{ik}^{\phi,R}, I_{ik}^{\phi,I}]$, where phases $\phi \in \{a, b, c\}$ are the phases and $\mathcal{E}$ is the set of all network edges or branches.

27.3 Power system models

27.3.1 Branch flow model

The branch flow OPF problem is formally stated as follows in Equation (6.6), where R and X denote the network resistance and reactance matrices respectively, v and I denote the nodal voltage magnitudes and branch currents respectively, and $\mathcal{E}$ denotes the set of all edges in the network. The primal decision variables here for each PMA i are $\mathbf{y}_i^P = [P_i^G, Q_i^G, P_i^L, Q_i^L, v_i, I_{ki}]\ \forall i \in \mathbf{N},\ (ik) \in \mathcal{E}$.

$$\begin{aligned}
&\min_{\mathbf{y}^P}\ f^{S-W}(\mathbf{y}^P) && (6.6)\\
&\text{subject to:}\\
&v_i - v_k = \left(R_{ki}^2 + X_{ki}^2\right)|I_{ki}|^2 - 2\left(R_{ki}P_{ki} + X_{ki}Q_{ki}\right)\\
&P_i^G - P_i^L = -P_{ki} + R_{ki}|I_{ki}|^2 + \sum_{k:(i,k)\in\mathcal{E}} P_{ik}\\
&Q_i^G - Q_i^L = -Q_{ki} + X_{ki}|I_{ki}|^2 + \sum_{k:(ik)\in\mathcal{E}} Q_{ik}\\
&P_{ki}^2 + Q_{ki}^2 \le \overline{S}_{ki}^2,\ P_{ki}^2 + Q_{ki}^2 \le v_i|I_{ki}|^2,\ \underline{v}_i \le v_i \le \overline{v}_i\\
&\underline{P}_i^G \le P_i^G \le \overline{P}_i^G,\ \underline{P}_i^L \le P_i^L \le \overline{P}_i^L\\
&\underline{Q}_i^G \le Q_i^G \le \overline{Q}_i^G,\ \underline{Q}_i^L \le Q_i^L \le \overline{Q}_i^L
\end{aligned}$$

27.3.2 Current injection model

The primal decision variables for each SMO i obtained by solving the optimization problem $\mathbf{y}_i^P = [P_i^\phi, Q_i^\phi, V_i^{\phi,R}, V_i^{\phi,I}, I_i^{\phi,R}, I_i^{\phi,I}, I_{ik}^{\phi,R}, I_{ik}^{\phi,I}]$ consists of (i) active ($P_i^{\phi*}$) and reactive ($Q_i^{\phi*}$) power setpoints (ii) real and imaginary components of nodal voltages ($V_i^{\phi,R*}, V_i^{\phi,I*}$) and current injections ($I_i^{\phi,R*}, I_i^{\phi,I*}$). Note that these are solved for each non-zero phase $\phi \in \mathcal{P} = \{a, b, c\}$. The CI-OPF problem formulation is given by:

$$\begin{aligned}
&\min_x f^{obj}(x) && (6.7a)\\
&I^R = \mathrm{Re}(\mathrm{Y}V),\ I^I = \mathrm{Im}(\mathrm{YV}) && (6.7b)\\
&P_i^\phi = V_i^{\phi,R} I_i^{\phi,R} + V_i^{\phi,I} I_i^{\phi,I} \quad \forall i \in \mathcal{N}, \phi \in \mathcal{P} && (6.7c)\\
&Q_i^\phi = -V_i^{\phi,R} I_i^{\phi,I} + V_i^{\phi,I} I_i^{\phi,R} \quad \forall i \in \mathcal{N}, \phi \in \mathcal{P} && (6.7d)\\
&(I_{ik}^{\phi,R})^2 + (I_{ik}^{\phi,I})^2 \le \overline{I_{ik}^{\phi}}^2 \quad \forall i \in \mathcal{N}, \phi \in \mathcal{P}, (ik) \in \mathcal{E} && (6.7e)\\
&\underline{V_i^{\phi^2}} \le (V_i^{\phi,R})^2 + (V_i^{\phi,I})^2 \le \overline{V_i^\phi}^2 \quad \forall i \in \mathcal{N}, \phi \in \mathcal{P} && (6.7f)\\
&\underline{P_i^\phi} \le P_i^\phi \le \overline{P_i^\phi},\ \underline{Q_i^\phi} \le Q_i^\phi \le \overline{Q_i^\phi} && (6.7g)
\end{aligned}$$

where Y is the 3-phase bus admittance matrix for the network, and V and I are matrices of nodal voltages and currents respectively. Equation (6.7) is nonconvex due to bilinear constraints Equations (6.7c) and (6.7d), and the ring constraint Equation (6.7f) on voltage magnitudes. A convex relaxation is obtained by using McCormick envelopes (MCE), which represent the convex hull of a bilinear product $w = xy$ by using upper and lower limits on x, y. Thus, the bilinear equality is replaced with a series of linear inequalities, denoted as MCE$(w) = \{w = xy : x \in [\underline{x}, \overline{x}], y \in [\underline{y}, \overline{y}]\}$:

$$MCE(w, \underline{x}, \overline{x}, \underline{y}, \overline{y}) = \begin{cases} w \geq \underline{x}y + x\underline{y} - \underline{x}\underline{y} \\ w \geq \overline{x}y + x\overline{y} - \overline{x}\overline{y} \\ w \leq \underline{x}y + x\overline{y} - \overline{x}\underline{y} \\ w \leq \overline{x}y + x\underline{y} - \underline{x}\overline{y} \end{cases} \tag{6.8}$$

Introducing auxiliary variables for each of the four bilinear terms $\{a_i^\phi, b_i^\phi, c_i^\phi, d_i^\phi\} = \{V_i^{\phi,R} I_i^{\phi,R}, V_i^{\phi,I} I_i^{\phi,I}, V_i^{\phi,R} I_i^{\phi,I}, V_i^{\phi,I} I_i^{\phi,R}\}$ allows conversion of constraints Equations (6.7c) and (6.7d) to linear constraints with MCE constraints on each of the auxiliary variables. Additional constraints on the nodal current injections and nodal voltages are also needed in order to define the MCE constraints. These voltage and current bounds can be determined by applying a suitable preprocessing method using the nodal P and Q limits from the SMO bids [54]. The resulting bounds will also implicitly satisfy constraints Equation (6.7e) and Equation (6.7f). Thus, Equations (6.7c) to (6.7f) can be replaced with the following set of constraints in order to obtain the relaxed CI-OPF problem, which reduces to a linear program that can be solved easily. However, doing so incurs the overhead of computing the tightest possible V and I bounds to obtain a good convex relaxation, which in turn ensures that the relaxed solutions are feasible for the original problem.

$$P_i^\phi = a_i^\phi + b_i^\phi, \;\; Q_i^\phi = -c_i^\phi + d_i^\phi \quad \forall i \in \mathcal{N}, \phi \in \mathcal{P} \tag{6.9a}$$

$$\underline{I_i^{\phi,R}} \leq I_i^{\phi,R} \leq \overline{I_i^{\phi,R}}, \; \underline{I_i^{\phi,I}} \leq I_i^{\phi,I} \leq \overline{{}_i^{\phi,I}} \tag{6.9b}$$

$$\underline{V_i^{\phi,R}} \leq V_i^{\phi,R} \leq \overline{V_i^{\phi,R}}, \; \underline{V_i^{\phi,I}} \leq V_i^{\phi,I} \leq \overline{V_i^{\phi,I}} \tag{6.9c}$$

$$a_i^\phi \in MCE(V_i^{\phi,R} I_i^{\phi,R}, \underline{V_i^{\phi,R}}, \overline{V_i^{\phi,R}}, \underline{I_i^{\phi,R}}, \overline{I_i^{\phi,R}}) \tag{6.9d}$$

$$b_i^\phi \in MCE(V_i^{\phi,I} I_i^{\phi,I}, \underline{V_i^{\phi,I}}, \overline{V_i^{\phi,I}}, \underline{I_i^{\phi,I}}, \overline{I_i^{\phi,I}}) \tag{6.9e}$$

$$c_i^\phi \in MCE(V_i^{\phi,R} I_i^{\phi,I}, \underline{V_i^{\phi,R}}, \overline{V_i^{\phi,R}}, \underline{I_i^{\phi,I}}, \overline{I_i^{\phi,I}}) \tag{6.9f}$$

$$d_i^\phi \in MCE(V_i^{\phi,I} I_i^{\phi,R}, \underline{V_i^{\phi,I}}, \overline{V_i^{\phi,I}}, \underline{I_i^{\phi,R}}, \overline{I_i^{\phi,R}}) \tag{6.9g}$$

27.4 Objective functions for optimization in the Primary Market

In this Section, the following functions are defined:

$$
\begin{aligned}
f^P(\mathbf{y}^P) = \sum_{i \in \mathcal{N}} f_i^P(\mathbf{y}_i^P) = \sum_{i \in \mathcal{N}} \Big[& f_i^{\text{Load-Disutil}}(\mathbf{y}_i^P) \\
& + f_i^{\text{Gen-Cost}}(\mathbf{y}_i^P)\Big] + \xi \Big[\sum_{(ki) \in \mathcal{E}} f_{ki}^{\text{Loss}}(\mathbf{y}_i^P)\Big] \qquad (6.10)
\end{aligned}
$$

$$
f_i^{\text{Load-Disutil}}(\mathbf{y}_i^P) = \beta_i^P(P_i^L - P_i^{L0})^2 + \beta_i^Q(Q_i^L - Q_i^{L0})^2 \qquad (6.11)
$$

$$
f_i^{\text{Gen-Cost}}(\mathbf{y}_i^P) = \begin{cases} \alpha_i^P(P_i^G)^2 + \alpha_i^Q(Q_i^G)^2, \\ \lambda_i^P P_i^G + \lambda_i^Q Q_i^G, \text{if } i \qquad \text{is PCC} \end{cases} \qquad (6.12)
$$

$$
f_{ki}^{\text{Loss}}(\mathbf{y}_i^P) = R_{ki}|I_{ki}|^2 \qquad (6.13)
$$

The objective function used in Equation (6.10) used is a weighted linear combination of (i) maximizing social welfare in Equation (6.11), (ii) minimizing total generation costs in Equation (6.12) and (iii) minimizing electrical line losses in Equation (6.13). The total cost includes paying the locational marginal price (LMP) λ for importing power from the transmission grid at the point of common coupling (PCC), as well as the payments to local generator PMAs that provide net positive injections into the PM. Dividing by suitable base values converts all quantities to per unit (between 0 and 1 p.u.). Thus, it is reasonable to combine all the terms into a single objective function using a simple weighted sum. The hyperparameter ξ controls the tradeoff between penalizing line losses versus optimizing for other objectives. The coefficients α_i, β_i, are communicated by each PMA i as part of their bids, while ξ is a global hyperparameter common to all PMAs, and determined by the PMO. Here, R denotes the network resistance matrix and $\mathcal{E}$ denotes the set of all edges in the network.

27.5 Computation of commitment scores

This Section describes the details of computing the commitment reliability score, mentioned in Section 26.5. From the SM clearing, the SMAs j are directed by their SMO i to keep their net injections within the intervals $[P_j^{i*} - \delta P_j^{i*}, P_j^{i*} + \delta P_j^{i*}]$. First the deviations (if any) are computed in their actual responses $\widehat{P}_j^i$ from this range, where $[\![\cdot]\!]$ denotes the indicator function:

$$
\begin{aligned}
e_j^{iP}(t_s) = {} & [\![\widehat{P}_j^i > \overline{P}_j^{i*}]\!](\widehat{P}_j^i - \overline{P}_j^{i*}) + [\![\widehat{P}_j^i < \underline{P}_j^{i*}]\!](\underline{P}_j^{i*} - \widehat{P}_j^i) \\
& + [\![\underline{P}_j^{i*} \le \widehat{P}_j^i \le \overline{P}_j^{i*}]\!] \max(\widehat{P}_j^i - \overline{P}_j^{i*}, \underline{P}_j^{i*} - \widehat{P}_j^i) \qquad (6.14)
\end{aligned}
$$

Then, the relative deviations are obtained by comparing these with the magnitudes of their corresponding baseline setpoints:

$$
\overline{e_j^{iP}}(t_s) = \frac{e_j^{iP}(t_s)}{|P_j^{i*}(t_s)|}, \quad \overline{e_j^{iQ}}(t_s) = \frac{e_j^{iQ}(t_s)}{|Q_j^{i*}(t_s)|} \qquad (6.15)
$$

These are then normalized to unit vectors to compare the deviations among all SMAs overseen by the SMO. This allows the SMO to assess their relative performance across all its SMAs.

$$
\widetilde{\mathbf{e^{iP}}}(t_s) = \frac{\overline{\mathbf{e^{iP}}}(t_s)}{\|\overline{\mathbf{e^{iP}}}(t_s)\|}, \ \widetilde{\mathbf{e^{iQ}}}(t_s) = \frac{\overline{\mathbf{e^{iQ}}}(t_s)}{\|\overline{\mathbf{e^{iQ}}}(t_s)\|} \qquad (6.16)
$$

The scores are then updated, with the score being increased when the SMAs follow their contracts and decreased otherwise:

$$C_j^i(t_s) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } t_s = 0 \\ C_j^i(t_s - 1) - \frac{\widetilde{e_j^{iP}}(t_s) + \widetilde{e_j^{iQ}}(t_s)}{2} & \text{if } t_s > 0 \end{cases} \tag{6.17}$$

Finally, min-max normalization is performed across all the SMAs' scores to ensure that $0 \leq C_j \leq 1 \; \forall$ SMAs j.

$$\overline{C}_j^i = \frac{C_j^i - \max_j C_j^i}{\max_j C_j^i - \min_j C_j^i}$$

28 Trustability scores and resilience metrics

28.1 Computation of IoT trustability scores

The IoT trustability score (TS) is computed utilizing the federated self-learning concept [145]. Anomalies in IoT data are the key factor in the formulation of the IoT TS. Another contributing factor is the IoT device's market commitment history. More details of the features are shown in Table 6.1.

Table 6.1: Features considered for each type of data.

Data Source	**Features**
IoTs network packet	Source/Destination IP, Source/Destination port, Packet length, Protocols, Intra-packet arrival time
HVAC	Timestamp, Load, Indoor temperature, outdoor temperature, Temperature setpoint, Indoor area, Building thermal insulation
PV	Timestamp, Power generation, Rating, Solar irradiance
Battery	Timestamp, Charging/Discharging rate, SoC, KW capacity
EV	Timestamp, Charging rate, SoC

A key learning of this project is that, to detect anomalies, requires determining the IoT data's expected behavior and prediction for short time steps. To achieve this realization, predicted data is compared with measured data. For prediction, an autoencoder neural network was used for federated unsupervised learning. One autoencoder model was utilized for each IoT device to train on its physical data and one more autoencoder model to train only on IoT network packet data. For each type of data, there is a tolerance value T_{err} for the relative error (RE). Any data point (DP) that crosses T_{err}, then that is flagged as an anomalous data point (ADP). So, for any reporting time period Δt, the non-anomaly ratio (NAR) is calculated using,

$$NAR = 1 - \frac{\text{Total ADP number over } \Delta t}{\text{Total DP number over } \Delta t} \tag{6.18}$$

Next, the cumulative non-anomaly ratio ($CNAR$) is computed, where T is the fixed total time period and is always divisible by Δt.

$$CNAR_t = \sum_{j=1}^{\frac{T}{\Delta t}} \frac{T}{j\Delta t} NAR_{t-j\Delta t} \tag{6.19}$$

IoT Trustability Score (TS) for time t and building/house i is calculated by:

$$TS_{t,i} = w_t \times NAR_t + w_{t-} \times \frac{CNAR_t}{CNAR_{max}} \tag{6.20}$$

where

$$(I)\ w_t \geq w_{t-} \qquad (II)\ w_t + w_{t-} = 1 \tag{6.21}$$

Here, $CNAR_{max}$ is calculated using (6.19) with the maximum NAR being $NAR = 1$ for the whole time period T. Finally, to get the overall TS_t of any observation node with IoTs at time t, the $TS_{t,i}$ of all the clients i of that observation node is averaged to calculate TS_t:

$$TS = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{M} TS_{t,i}}{M} \tag{6.22}$$

where M is the total number of clients or buildings/houses at that observation node.

28.2 Secondary Transformer and Primary Node Resiliency Metric (STNR and PNR)

Secondary transformer node resiliency (STNR) is computed using multiple resiliency factors and TS.

$$STNR_j = \prod_{i=1}^{n_c} F_i^{W_i} \tag{6.23}$$

where n_c is the total number of factors for the category of the secondary level node, F_i is the value for each factor, and W_i is the normalized weight for each factor. These factors f influencing resiliency are determined and assigned weights to aggregate into the PNR score. Factors that can be determined directly from the secondary level configuration are described in Figure 6.6. All the device and communication vulnerabilities present at the secondary (DCVS) level of a primary node are identified using the national vulnerability database (NVD) [26]. Then DCVS factor is then calculated as,

$$DCVS = \frac{1}{\sum_{i=1}^{N_s} CVSS_i} \tag{6.24}$$

where N_s is the number of total vulnerabilities present at the secondary level. Here, the common vulnerability scoring system (CVSS) is one of several methods to measure the impact of vulnerabilities in devices known as Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE). It is an open set of standards used to assess the vulnerability of software and assign severity along a scale of 0-10. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) analyzes all identified vulnerabilities and enlists these in the NVD. In the absence of any vulnerability, DCVS will be equal to 1.

Weight assignment and aggregation are managed by fuzzy multiple-criteria decision-making (MCDM), specifically the fuzzy analytic hierarchy process (Fuzzy AHP). A weighted average of the STNR results in the primary node resiliency (PNR):

$$PNR_k = \frac{\sum_{j=1}^{n}(STNR_j \times W_j)}{\sum_{j=1}^{n} W_j} \tag{6.25}$$

where W_i is the weighted coefficient for the i^{th} secondary feeder node.

28.3 Distribution System Resiliency (DSR)

Let $F = (f_{ij}) \in R_{+}^{m\times n}$ be the factors value matrix, where f_{ij} is value of factor i of primary node j. The higher the value of f_{ij}, the more the node will contribute to the resiliency metric in regard to that factor. Following the data envelopment analysis (DEA) method, each node p can choose a set of weights $w^p = (w_1^p, ...w_m^p)$, where, $\sum_{i=1}^{m} w_i^p = 1$. Addionally, the relative contribution (RC) of the node p to the total contribution of all the nodes towards DSR, as measured by node p's weight selection can be evaluated as,

$$RC^p = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{m} w_i^p f_{ip}}{\sum_{i=1}^{m} w_i^p \sum_{j=1}^{n} (f_{ij})} \tag{6.26}$$

Given that each node wants to maximize this ratio in Equation (6.26) to have the best set of weights so that they can contribute to the maximum possible value in DSR, the resulting weight vector for each node is used in a combination of multiplicative and additive methods are used to get the DSR.

$$DSR = \sum_{j=1}^{n} \left(\prod_{i=1}^{m} (f_{ij})^{w_i^j} \right) \tag{6.27}$$


IoT Trustability Score
Secondary Transformer Node Resiliency (STNR)
Primary Node Resiliency Score (PNR)
Distribution System Resiliency (DSR)
Neural Network Autoencoder
Fuzzy Multiple-Criteria Making based weight assignment and multiplicative aggregation
Fuzzy Multiple-Criteria Making based weight assignment and multiplicative aggregation
Game-Theoretic Data Envelopment Analysis based optimized weight assignment and multiplicative & additive aggregation
Federated Learning
Factors Computed
- Available Generation
- Amount of Critical Load
- Connectivity Redundancy,
- Device & Communication Vulnerabilities
Factors Computed
- Available Generation
- Amount of Critical Load
- ∑ITS score
- ∑STNR score
- Number of Houses in each Primary Node
Factors Computed
- Available power outflow
- Primary Node Centrality
- Device & Communication Vulnerabilities
Network & Physical level Data
Primary Node
Pole top Transformer 4.16kV/120V
Secondary Transformer Node
IoT devices
substation
Federated Learning
Physical System Data from Gridlab-D Models
IoTs Network Emulation with MININET-WIFI
IoTs network Traffic
Training Session(t)
Unsupervised Neural Network Autoencoders
Monitoring Session
Local Autoencoders
ITS Algorithm
Client level IoT Device Trustability Score
Building/House as Client
Applications of the Developed Resiliency Metrics
# To compute trustability based commitment score for the market participants in distribution market
# To develop most resilient reconfiguration pathway for service restoration
# Planning upgrades or updates driven by resiliency
# Design resilient microgrids and compare the resiliency of different microgrid designs
# Perform root cause analysis of degraded operational resiliency
# Post-event resilient reconfiguration

Figure 6.6: Overview of the developed resilience score for the distribution system with IoTs

Details related to the computation of DSR are shown in Figure 6.6.

28.4 Distributed optimization for PM clearing

Since the number of nodes (and hence the number of PMAs) in a primary feeder could be arbitrarily large, rather than using traditional centralized optimization solvers, a distributed proximal atomic coordination (PAC) algorithm [139] was employed to solve the OPF using peer-to-peer communication between the agents. This also helps preserve data privacy since each PMA only needs to exchange limited information with its immediate neighbors. A distributed approach also enables the PMAs to clear the market independently of the PMO, alleviates the communication burden, and reduces latencies since PMAs do not need to send all their data to a centralized entity, thus allowing for scalability. This is achieved by a process called atomization wherein the overall global optimization problem is decomposed into several local optimization problems called atoms for each PMA. The constraints can also similarly be decoupled. However, certain network constraints also depend on other PMAs' variables. To deal with this case, additional coupling or consensus constraints are included to ensure consistency. Also used was an enhanced variant of PAC known as NST-PAC that employs Nesterov (NST) acceleration and has enhanced privacy features by further masking the variables exchanged between atoms (i.e., the PMAs) [55]. After a sufficient number of iterations, both the PAC and NST-PAC algorithms provably converge to globally optimal and feasible solutions $\mathbf{y}^{P*} = \{\mathbf{y}_i^{P*}\}$ for each of the PMAs. These cleared market schedules are communicated by the PMAs to their respective SRMs as well as to the PMO.

For a given global optimization (primal) problem with equality and inequality constraints for K number of nodes (or agents):

$$\min_x \sum_{i=1}^{K} f_i(x) \text{ s.t. } Gx = b, \quad Hx \leq d \tag{6.28}$$

This problem can be decomposed into $\mathcal{S} = \{S_1, S_2, \ldots S_K\}$ coupled optimization problems, known as atoms (representing each SMO i). The calculation involves separating the vector of all decision variables x into two sets: $\mathcal{L} = \{L_i, \forall i \in [K]\}$ and $\mathcal{O} = \{O_i, \forall i \in [K]\}$ which is a partition of decision variables into those that are owned and copied by atom i, respectively. Similarly, the constraints can be decomposed into sets owned by each atom $\mathcal{C} = \{C_i, \forall i \in [K]\}$. These variable copies across multiple atoms can then be used to satisfy coupled constraints and global objectives. Note that for a number K, $[K] = \{1, 2, \ldots K\}$.

The decomposed (or atomized) optimization problem is shown in Equation (6.29), where a_j and $f_j(a_j)$ are the primal decision variables (both owned and copies) and individual objective functions corresponding to each SMO atom, respectively. G_j and H_j are the atomic constraint submatrices of G and H, while b_j and d_j are subvectors of b and d of the right hand side constraint vectors b and d, respectively. B is the directed graph incidence matrix defining the owned and copied atomic variables. This incidence matrix allows us to full parallelization of the distributed optimization by defining coordination or consensus constraints, which enforce that all the copied variables for each atom j must equal the values of their corresponding owned values in every other atom $i \neq j$. B_j and B^j denote the incoming and outgoing edges for atom j respectively. The formula is expressed as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
&\min_{a_j} \sum_{j \in K} f_j\left(a_j\right) \qquad\qquad (6.29)\\
&\text{s.t. } G_j a_j = b_j,\ H_j a_j \leq d_j,\ B_j a = 0\ \forall j \in [K] \\
&B_{im} \triangleq \begin{cases} -1, & \text{if } i \text{ is 'owned" and } m \text{ a related "copy"} \\ 1, & \text{if } m \text{ is "owned" and } i \text{ a related "copy"} \\ 0, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}
\end{aligned}$$

The augmented Lagrangian is first atomized or decomposed for each node or SMO, introducing dual variables η and ν corresponding to primal equality and coordination constraints respectively. Note that the inequality constraints are handled directly during the primal minimization step by appropriately defining the feasible set.

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{L}(a, \eta, \nu) &= \sum_{j \in K} \left[f_j\left(a_j\right) + \eta_j^T\left(G_j a_j - b_j\right) + \nu_j^T B_j a\right] \\
&= \sum_{j \in K} \left[f_j\left(a_j\right) + \eta_j^T\left(G_j a_j - b_j\right) + \nu^T B^j a_j\right] \\
&\triangleq \sum_{j \in K} \mathcal{L}_j\left(a_j, \eta_j, \nu\right) \qquad (6.30)
\end{aligned}$$

28.4.1 PAC algorithm

At this point, the prox-linear approach of [15] can be applied to Equation (6.30) and obtain the proximal atomic coordination (PAC) algorithm [63, 139]:

$$
\begin{aligned}
a_j[\tau+1] &= \underset{a_j \in \mathbb{R}^{\left|T_j\right|}}{\operatorname{argmin}} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \mathcal{L}_j\left(a_j, \bar{\mu}_j[\tau], \bar{\nu}[\tau]\right) \\ +\frac{1}{2\rho}\left\|a_j - a_j[\tau]\right\|_2^2 \end{array} \right\} \\
\mu_j[\tau+1] &= \mu_j[\tau] + \rho\gamma_j \tilde{G}_j a_j[\tau+1] \\
\bar{\mu}_j[\tau+1] &= \mu_j[\tau+1] + \rho\widehat{\gamma}_j[\tau+1]\tilde{G}_j a_j[\tau+1]
\end{aligned}
$$

Communicate a_j for all $j \in [K]$ with neighbors

$$
\begin{aligned}
\nu_j[\tau+1] &= \nu_j[\tau] + \rho\gamma_j [B]^{O_j} a[\tau+1] \\
\bar{\nu}_j[\tau+1] &= \nu_j[\tau+1] + \rho\widehat{\gamma}_j[\tau+1][B]^{O_j} a[\tau+1]
\end{aligned}
$$

Communicate $\bar{\nu}_j$ for all $j \in [K]$ with neighbors.

The primal and dual variables are initialized as follows, $\forall j \in [K]$:

$$
\begin{aligned}
a_j[0] &\in \mathbb{R}^{||T_j|} \\
\mu_j[0] &= \rho\gamma_j \tilde{G}_j a_j[0] \\
\bar{\mu}_j[0] &= \mu_j[0] + \rho\widehat{\gamma}_j[0]\tilde{G}_j a_j[0] \\
\nu_j[0] &= \rho\gamma_j [B]^{O_j} a[0] \\
\bar{\nu}_j[0] &= \nu_j[0] + \rho\widehat{\gamma}_j[0][B]^{O_j} a[0]
\end{aligned}
$$

28.4.2 NST-PAC algorithm

This project also employed an enhanced, accelerated version called NST-PAC developed in [55]. It is a primal-dual method incorporating both $L2$ and proximal regularization terms. The convergence speed is increased by using time-varying gains and Nesterov-accelerated gradient updates for both the primal and dual variables. The iterative NST-PAC algorithm consists of the following steps at each iteration τ:

$$
\begin{aligned}
a_j[\tau+1] &= \underset{a_j}{\operatorname{argmin}} \big\{ \mathcal{L}_j\left(a_j, \widehat{\eta}_j[\tau], \widehat{\nu}[\tau]\right) \\
&\quad + \frac{\rho_j\gamma_j}{2}\left\|G_j a_j - b_j\right\|_2^2 + \frac{\rho_j\gamma_j}{2}\left\|B_j a_j\right\|_2^2 \\
&\quad + \frac{1}{2\rho_j}\left\|a_j - a_j[\tau]\right\|_2^2 \big\} \qquad (6.31) \\
\widehat{a}_j[\tau+1] &= a_j[\tau+1] + \alpha_j[\tau+1]\left(a_j[\tau+1] - a_j[\tau]\right) \\
\eta_j[\tau+1] &= \widehat{\eta}_j[\tau] + \rho_j\gamma_j\left(G_j\widehat{a}_j[\tau+1] - b_j\right) \\
\widehat{\eta}_j[\tau+1] &= \eta_j[\tau+1] + \phi_j[\tau+1]\left(\eta_j[\tau+1] - \eta_j[\tau]\right) \\
&\text{Communicate } \widehat{a}_j \text{ for all } j \in [K] \text{ with neighbors} \\
\nu_j[\tau+1] &= \widehat{\nu}_j[\tau] + \rho_j\gamma_j B_j\widehat{a}_j[\tau+1] \\
\widehat{\nu}_j[\tau+1] &= \nu_j[\tau+1] + \theta_j[\tau+1]\left(\nu_j[\tau+1] - \nu_j[\tau]\right) \\
&\text{Communicate } \widehat{\nu}_j \text{ for all } j \in [K] \text{ with neighbors}
\end{aligned}
$$

The algorithm further protects privacy by masking both the primal and dual variables. Masking is implemented by using iteration-varying and atom-specific parameters $\alpha_j[\tau]$, $\phi_j[\tau]$ and $\theta_j[\tau]$.

Masking the dual variables (or shadow prices), in particular, is desirable since these may reveal sensitive data related to costs, operating constraints, or other preferences of SMOs. Instead, masked variables $\widehat{a}$ and $\widehat{\nu}$ are exchanged between atoms. By iteratively solving the local, decomposed optimization problems across all SMOs, NST-PAC (and PAC) provably converge to the globally optimal ACOPF (relaxed) solutions for the whole primary feeder [55, 139].

28.5 PM monitoring and resilience scores

During the actual market operation, the injections $\widehat{P}_i$ and $\widehat{Q}_i$ from the DERs at PMA j are monitored by their SRM. These could be either from standalone PMAs or aggregated information from all the SMAs at a given PMA. The SRM also assembles resilience scores RS_i for each PMA i. This is done through aggregation (via a weighted average) of $\mathrm{RS}_j^i \; \forall j \in \mathcal{N}_i$. The RSs for standalone PMAs can also be directly computed at the SRM using their monitored injections. $\mathbf{y}_i^P$ and RS_i thus provide complete SA at each PMA node i. All SRMs send this information to the PRM so that the PRM has complete SA of all PMAs. This SA can then be used to redispatch the ICAs in both the PM and SM to mitigate the impact of various attacks. Further details on the mitigation strategy can be found in Section 41.

29 Reconfiguration paths

The final tool that used in the proposed EUREICA framework is the determination of reconfiguration in the wake of islanding which can occur if an attack or natural disaster causes an entire section of the grid to be disconnected from the main grid. In such cases, an algorithm that determines a self-sustaining operation of the islanded system, which is enabled by reconfiguration paths with suitable switch settings, is essential. The proposed reconfiguration algorithm (see Section 42 for details) considers power flow feasibility, available distributed generators (DGs), critical load, as well as RS information, to determine switching actions to restore specific sections of the distribution feeder. The reconfiguration paths will be determined based on the available amount of generation and the amount of critical load to be supplied, which is obtained through the SA provided by the EUREICA framework. In addition, the TSs are used at the secondary feeder level to intelligently disconnect non-critical loads, thus enabling the maximum restoration of critical loads. Once the feasible paths are determined for the optimal selection of loads, the RSs for all feasible paths are computed, and the most resilient path is implemented in the system.

Chapter 7

Validation platforms

This chapter describes the three validation platforms that were utilized in this project to validate EUREICA, which includes Hierarchical Engine for Large-scale Infrastructure Co-Simulation (HELICS) at PNNL, Advanced Research on Integrated Energy Systems (ARIES) at NREL, and Distributed Energy Resource Integration Middleware (DERIM) within Advanced Distribution Management System-Distribution Operations Training Simulator (ADMS DOTS) at LTDES. The HELICS platform was utilized to validate in software (Gridlab-D$^{\text{TM}}$, a high fidelity simulation platform for modeling power distribution system with a large number of nodes and assets) a distribution grid with more than 100,000 nodes. The AEIES platform allows real-time simulation incorporating various DER physics, and implements system models on Hardware-in-the-Loop devices so as to better capture device performance and real-time communication. The GE ADMS DOTS system was utilized so as to demonstrate use case validation in the context of control room operation with situational awareness. Rather than users waiting to experience events on the job, the use of the integrated ADMS-DOTS allows the dispatchers to familiarize themselves with advanced application functionality. The DERIM middleware helps provide the interface between the ADMS DOTS system and various technology modules developed in the EUREICA project including building the IEEE 123 Test Feeder System.

30 PNNL

EUREICA modules capture and control the energy distribution system in a cyber-physical context at all its levels. They

- predict the aggregate power consumption at the consumer level while preserving the privacy of the participating IoTs,
- use measurements from primary and secondary feeder levels to compute a feasible reconfiguration path while maximizing overall system resilience in the wake of adversary events, either physical or cyber,
- leverage a market structure with agents situated at all levels of the system, from primary nodes to end users, to create situational awareness available to each market operator.

To allow all these modules to seamlessly connect and communicate with a distribution system of a larger scale, the EUREICA validation platform relied on co-simulation as the technique that performs analysis by bringing together simulators of different domains and time scales. These simulators, also known as federates of the co-simulation platform, would exchange data that normally define their boundary conditions during the simulation, and through co-simulation, a more realistic and dynamic environment is realized. Hence, the EUREICA validation through a co-simulation platform is based on Hierarchical Engine for Large-scale Infrastructure Co-Simulation (HELICS) [3, 4, 129], an open-source cyber-physical-energy co-simulation framework for energy systems, strongly tied to the electric power system from design to testing.



Figure 7.1: EUREICA co-simulation platform.

30.1 EUREICA co-simulation platform core engine

The analysis and validation done through the EUREICA co-simulation platform are driven by HELICS, as shown in Figure 7.1. As the core engine of the platform, HELICS provides time-management and data exchanges between the simulators, also known as federates. Moreover, through standard procedures and application programming interfaces (APIs) (e.g., variable naming, types, timing, synchronization), data exchange between federates is performed either as values or messages [3, 4, 129].

Through HELICS, the EUREICA co-simulation platform offers a modular integration of the distribution system modeled in Gridlab-D$^{\text{TMTM}}$ [2, 34] and custom-built Python$^{\text{TM}}$ wrappers around the EUREICA modules to monitor and gather data from the distribution system simulator and run specific modules. Figure 7.1 illustrates the integration of the power distribution system and EUREICA modules for co-simulation.

Given the study of this research, HELICS will synchronize and facilitate data exchange between the 2 federates depicted in Figure 7.1, that is Gridlab-D$^{\text{TMTM}}$ and the Python wrapper for the resiliency-based reconfiguration module.

30.2 Gridlab-D detailed model for an IoT-populated distribution system

As EUREICA modules are designed to act at different levels of a distribution system, from primary to end-use nodes, the co-simulation platform required a detailed model for a scaled distribution system. The choice was for the topology and characteristics of a modified IEEE 123-node test system [5]. Moreover, to capture a more realistic system demand at different time granularity, the model was extended to include detailed end-user models, such as:

- residential (either single or multi-family) and commercial buildings with or without heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) system,
- edge devices (IoTs), such as:
  - typical appliances, such as HVAC, water heaters (WHs),
  - small electronics, lights, and plugs, either controllable or not,
- occupant-based load dynamics,
- behind-the-meter distributed generators (DGs), such as photovoltaic (PV) panels, battery energy storage systems (BESSs), and diesel generators.

To facilitate the validation of the EUREICA modules, the distribution model also assumed that all the loads are connected via smart meters with load-shedding capability to regulate energy demand according to a distribution system operator's command.

Gridlab-D^{TM}, the industry power distribution system simulator and analysis tool of choice, was selected to be an integral part of the EUREICA co-simulation platform as it offers, among many other features:

- agent-based and information-based modeling tools for end-use technologies (HVACs, WHs, grid-friendly appliances) and distributed generators,
- interface APIs for co-simulation connections,
- extensive data collection tools to permit a wide variety of analyses.

For EUREICA module validation, the distribution system to be modeled in Gridlab-D^{TM} is the IEEE 123-node test system [5, 6]. This system is modeled as a three-phase, unbalanced distribution system, with each of the 85 primary spot-load nodes extended to include end-use loads, such as houses with HVAC systems, water heaters, typical home energy consumers, as well as DGs (PVs and BESSs). Figure 7.2 shows an example of a possible expansion for a primary feeder node of the IEEE 123-node test system in Gridlab-D^{TM}.



Figure 7.2: IEEE 123-node test system secondary feeder generic detail implementation.

In Gridlab-D$^{\text{TM}}$ the system model incorporates schedules for all the end-user appliances and utilities and real-world weather data. Using predefined scheduling or control actions, appliances can be turned on/off based on the time of the day or certain feedback rules. Weather data can also be provided to Gridlab-D$^{\text{TM}}$ to enable variability in operation for all the weather-dependent components such as HVAC, PV, water heaters, etc., according to time, season, and location. Thus, the enhanced IEEE 123-node test system can emulate real-world distribution system behavior and generate data similar to the real distribution system.

As described in [149] and documented in [5, 6], the standard IEEE-123 node test feeder is a medium size system with 4 voltage regulators, 4 shunt capacitors, and 85 spot loads, with a peak load capacity that adds up to about 3, 985.7 kVA. Given the peak load of the original system nodes per phase, an algorithm is run on the original IEEE 123-node test feeder to populate it with secondary feeder nodes, which include houses with typical loads, and DERs according to the following rules:

- if PV is allowed, then only single-family houses can buy it, and only the single-family houses with PV will also consider storage,
- if PV is not allowed, then any single-family house may consider storage (if allowed),
- multi-family houses and mobile homes may always consider storage, but not PV.

After several iterations, the final version on a large model of the IEEE 123-node test feeder populated with edge IoTs is summarized in Table 7.1.

Table 7.1: Gridlab-D^{TM} IEEE 123-node test feeder features - IoT-enhanced model.

		Number	Capacity	Primary feeder nodes
Standard IEEE 123-node test feeder	Spot loads	85	$3,985.7$ kVA	85
EUREICA IEEE 123-node test feeder	Houses - Demand response (HVACs in all, WHs in 348)	$1,008$	variable (4 KW avg/house) (20% to 30% critical)	85
	Distributed generators (DGs)	380	$1,745.8$ kVA ($\approx$ 44% system penetration)	82
	PVs	207	880.84 kVA	68
	BESSs	173	865 kVA	63

The $1,008$ houses are distributed among the 85 spot-load buses of the IEEE 123-node system according to each node's original peak demand per phase. Most of the secondary feeders have 11 houses, with the three-phase spot loads, that is those at buses 47, 48, 49, 65, and 76, being able to accommodate more.



Figure 7.3: House distribution per bus for the EUREICA IEEE 123-node test feeder.

The overall system $\approx$ 44% DG penetration is calculated as the ratio of peak demand and available local PV and BESS capacity, and it is distributed among the 85 spot-load buses of the feeder as shown in Figure 7.4. For instance, as seen in the picture 21 buses have a DG penetration between 40% and 50%.



Figure 7.4: DG percentage penetration levels for the EUREICA IEEE 123-node test feeder.

Moreover, to accommodate for one of the tested scenarios, larger community PV farms will be added to the system at 12 of the primary nodes, summing a total capacity of 96 kVA.

30.3 EUREICA module wrapper

The detailed EUREICA IEEE 123-node feeder model presented in Section 30.2 interacts through co-simulation with EUREICA modules using a Python wrapper, which becomes the second federate of the co-simulation platform, as shown in Figure 7.1. It performs the following functions:

- Registers with the HELICS environment such that it will be time-synchronized with Gridlab-D^{TM}.
- Monitors certain measurements published by the distribution system simulator.
- Gathers and formats distribution system data as required by the EUREICA module.
- Runs the EUREICA module and communicate the results back at the distribution system level, if necessary.

31 NREL

The objective of validating the EUREICA framework at NREL is to evaluate the feasibility of implementing the framework in *real-time*. Since electrons flow in the grid in real-time, it is critical that the operations proposed should also function in real-time, and be in compliance with operational requirements. The primary objective of the validation platform is to demonstrate the feasibility of advanced system controls being developed to address challenges in the future smart grid. Towards this goal, three modules are demonstrated:

1. A Federated Learning (FL)-based machine learning model for real-time DER prediction

2. Real-time response from grid-edge devices to market signals
3. Grid response to cyber-physical hazards through reconfiguration

To demonstrate the feasibility of these advanced technologies, it is imperative to understand the requirements for the validation platform, which are enumerated on the real-time simulation and HIL requirements. The requirement for real-time simulation of the physics models is to (a) emulate physics in "wall-clock" time, (b) rigorously evaluate the timing requirements for the HIL components to deliver the services expected from them. In the same vein, the requirement for the HIL devices is to capture system dynamics that might be present in real devices which may not be captured by mathematical models. These requirements are summarized in Table 7.2.

Requirement	**Reason**	**Implementation**
Real-time physics models	(1) Emulate physics in "wall-clock" time (2) Allow for hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) testing and validation	Digital real-time simulation tools such as RTDS and Typhoon HIL
Device characterization	Captures system dynamics that might be present in real devices which may not be captured by models	Implement system models on HIL devices to better capture device performance
Real-time communication	Emulating communication at the speed of the real communication in field enables benchmarking of algorithm performance	Use of real communication medium for inter-device communication
Time synchronization	Ensure real-time components act in a coordinated fashion, without mismatches compromising experiment validity	Use precision time protocol (PTP) to ensure components are synced.

Table 7.2: Requirements for real-time validation platform

The Advanced Research on Integrated Energy Systems (ARIES) at NREL is a cutting-edge virtual emulation platform that encompasses actual DER hardware systems, such as wind turbines, photovoltaic (PV) arrays with controllers, batteries, and storage systems [89]. This facility allows for experimentation and research in a realistic environment on a 20-MW scale. The capabilities of ARIES are further enhanced by real-time digital simulators, including RTDS and Typhoon HIL, as well as house-level IoT device functions embedded in Raspberry Pi, complete with a real-time communication architecture. While ARIES represents a nation-leading capability for de-risking future technology, a portion of the capabilities are used to create a validation platform specifically for the EUREICA project. A subsection of these components, focusing only the digital real-time simulators (DRTS), the communication emulation, and their interconnections [referred to as the Hybrid Energy Real-Time Hub or HERTH] is shown in Figure 7.5. This architecture provides the necessary environment for validating the various technologies on grid-edge devices and determining system performance.



Figure 7.5: Digital real-time simulator cluster part of the NREL ARIES research platform.

The overall validation platform is shown in Figure 7.6. It constitutes 5 components - (i) IoT device virtualization (using Raspberry Pis and Typhoon HIL to characterize IoT devices), (ii) Communication emulation (using analog and network connections to emulate communication at the speed of actual communication in the field) (iii) hardware-in-the-loop interface (to provide increased fidelity for components under study) (iv) digital real-time simulation (using RTDS and Typhoon HIL to emulate the power grid in real-time), and (v) Time synchronization (to bring together the hardware components using a time server to ensure accuracy of simulation). This validation platform is used to determine the performance of the EUREICA framework for all the modules.



Figure 7.6: ARIES-DRTS Validation Platform at NREL

31.1 IoT device characterization

The IoT devices at the grid-edge considered in this work are smart thermostats, PV units, and residential energy storage. These devices are initially modeled in Typhoon HIL using standard models from the literature [46]. The room is modeled with state-space equations, and the heat controller is an ON/OFF type which is represented by a variable resistor with a simplified heater model which transforms the heat control command to an equivalent resistance. The rated power of heater is 5kW.

31.2 Real-time HIL simulation

The RTDS Simulator conducts electromagnetic transient (EMT) simulations of power systems in real-time. Equipped with fully digital parallel processing hardware, the RTDS Simulator can simulate complex networks using a typical timestep of 25-50 microseconds. Meanwhile, Typhoon HIL offers ultra-high-fidelity controller-Hardware-in-the-Loop (C-HIL) simulation for power electronics, microgrids, and distribution networks. This technology enables the modeling and performance characterization of C-HIL devices connected to the power system. In a collaborative capacity, RTDS and Typhoon HIL provide a unique capability to simulate both primary feeders of the distribution systems in RTDS and secondary feeders with house models in Typhoon HIL.

Figure 7.6 shows how the RTDS, Typhoon HIL, and IoT devices are all connected. Here, the RTDS creates a simulation of the power grid using the IEEE 123 node feeder and the


Typhoon HIL
IoT device models deployed
Input: Voltage from RTDS
Output: Current consumption from Typhoon
RTDS
RTDS_Interface
38
325 ft. | Config. 10
39
RL38_39
CTRL_38
CTRL_39
gnd
Secondary feeder + House Model
Analog IO (<1ms delay)
IEEE 123 node feeder + Miramar microgrid
RTDS – Power system primary feeder, Typhoon – Residential environment, IoT HIL – Emulate IoT device physics

Figure 7.7: Real-Time simulation model with RTDS, Typhoon HIL and IoT devices

Miramar microgrid. It does this in a special 'distribution mode' because this mode can handle many nodes in the simulation without making it too complicated. Also in this case, DERs can be modeled using average value models (AVM) where fast switching is averaged over a switching interval and approximates dynamics to a continuous function. It does not simulate the dynamics within the DERs (such as the power electronic switching in the inverters), but system dynamics are captured. Hence, transient behavior is still captured under this condition.

Typhoon HIL is being used to model a secondary feeder and a house load. It shows the voltage and current at two specific points (nodes 38 and 39) in the electrical system. The RTDS sends real-time voltage information to these points, and Typhoon HIL uses this to figure out how much current the IoT devices would use. The IoT devices are part of the simulation. Figure 7.7 shows the flow of information from the RTDS to the Typhoon HIL and then to the IoT devices. The RTDS sends voltage information to the Typhoon HIL, which uses it to simulate the electricity used by the IoT devices as if they were in a real electrical system. This whole system is fast, with less than a millisecond delay in sending and receiving signals, which is important for making sure the simulation is as close to real-time as possible.

32 LTDES

A training simulator-based platform was also used to validate the EUREICA framework. In particular, the General Electric (GE) ADMS DOTS (Advanced Distribution Management System-Distribution Operations Training Simulator), used for training operators and dispatchers, was used as the validation platform. Rather than users waiting to experience challenging events on the job, dispatchers are able to familiarize themselves with advanced application functionality and gain an understanding of how they interact with other subsystems of the ADMS. For the EUREICA project, ADMS-DOTS was integrated with DERIM, a Distributed Energy Resource Integration Middleware, an interface that allows integration of various DERs with the ability to communicate as dictated by the EUREICA framework (see Figure 7.8). This integrated system uses the same software components, programmatic and user interfaces as the real-time ADMS, and creates an effective training and testing environment to operate with the actual network model, data, and functions in a controlled and safe environment. Figure 7.9 shows an example of what the validation process looks like for Attack 1a.


MIT DOE Project Simulation Environment Scheme

LTDES - DERIM Distributed Energy Resource Integration Middleware)

Page 1

Enterprise
Layer – 5
hr-day-week

Tertiary Control
Layer – 4
sec-min-day

Secondary Control
Layer – 3
m-sec. – seconds

Automation
Layer – 2
milliseconds

Primary Control
Layer – 1
m-sec. – n-secs.

Transactive Energy Ops
Market Interface
FERC 222

MIT
Game Theoretic Aggregation
Distributed Optimization

WVU
Feeder Reconfiguration
Resiliency Matrix

GE
ADMS
&
DOTS

DERIM - T&D Grid Control Room & Enterprise Integration Platforms (TGIP & TEIP)

Meter to Bill Ops

MP Trades &
Transactions

Assets – DERs
& Devices

Metering &
Settlement
Ops Services

ML based
Load Forecast

Reference bids from ICA_p for various grid services

IoT devices status, number of compromised devices

Grid Services &
Transactive Controls

AMI
Comms.

Multi-Channel Communications

Substation – Control Room
Communication

Smart Meter -
AMI
Head End

DERIM - T&D Field Integration Platform (TFIP)

Secondary DER Model
& Ops Integration

DGAS - Digital Grid Automation
(POI – Protection & Controls)

Substation
Automation
SAS

Meter
Comms.

MIT
&
PRINCETON

Substation-Distribution
(SA-DA) Communication

Utility
DERs

IoT / EV - HVAC

Residential Customer/ DG

AMI
Comms.

LTTS Simulation App

GE Software

LTTS DERIM Apps

LTTS DERIM API

MIT & Partners

T&D
Comms.

Figure 7.8: DERIM interface with ADMS-DOTS in the LTDES validation platform.


DERIM
Attack 1 Before Data (NPZ)
Attack 1 After Data (NPZ)
Attack 1 Mitigate Data (NPZ)
Interface
SMO + SMA Aggregation
Full Network Model
Primary Secondary Customer
Interface
Load & Generation Aggregation
Primary Node Load Generation (CSV)
Load & Generation Schedule
ADMS Global File Update (CSV)
ADMS Model Update
ADMS Model Convert Verification Tool
ADMS-DOTS
Performance Analysis
at Primary and Substation Level

Figure 7.9: Attack 1a validation process workflow in the LTDES validation platform with DERIM and ADMS-DOTS.

32.1 Details of LTDES validation platform

The GE ADMS DOTS system is implemented to perform use case validation in the context of control room operation situational awareness. As a component of the ADMS portfolio, GE Digital's Distribution Operations Training Simulator (DOTS) enables training operators and dispatchers, in both routine (blue sky) and emergency (black sky) operations, in an environment that accurately represents the behavior and response of the real system. Rather than users waiting to experience challenging events on the job, dispatchers are able to familiarize themselves with advanced application functionality and gain an understanding of how they interact with other subsystems of the ADMS. This integrated system uses the same software components, programmatic interfaces, and UI as the real-time ADMS, and creates an effective training and testing environment to operate with the actual network model, data, and functions in a controlled and safe environment—without the risk of disturbing the real-world system.



Figure 7.10: ADMS DOTS Architecture.

On the left side of Figure 7.10, the Network Server DOTS mode will simulate the real distribution grid situation with the following key capabilities:

Simulator mode:

- Run in Distribution Operator Training Simulator (DOTS)
- Uses nominal load profiles and power system model to generate SCADA measurements and simulate basic protection functions.
- User has ability to manipulate system conditions: Increase/decrease loading, distributed generation, and place faults, etc.
- The EUREICA simulated data from PNNL, MIT, and WVU will be injected into DOTS mode as either telemetry measurements, scheduled generation, or forecast load.
- The EUREICA reconfiguration switching plan will be injected into DOTS mode as a switch event using DOTS's event scripts.

On the right side, the Network Server Real-Time model will provide the dispatcher with the same control room experience as the situation happens in the real world on the same distribution circuit. Figure 7.11 shows the real-time mode view of the ADMS system.

Real-time mode:

- Same HMI and alarm on the situation
- Run power flow result with SCADA measurement
- Run other advanced applications such as system reconfiguration.



Incident Detail

Afft	Division	Op Center	Station	Feeder
35741				
1181	SOUTH	STH	SPYGLASS	F6465
1887	SOUTH	CTL	JUPITER	F6865
175	NORTH	WST	WINGED FO...	F7861
4312	NORTH	WST	WINGED FO...	F7863
5446	NORTH	WST	ROYAL TRO...	F5868
3011	NORTH	WST	VENUS	F1035
1449	SOUTH	STH	OAKMONT	F8035
990	SOUTH	STH	CURLEW	F5931
1047	SOUTH	STH	CURLEW	F5938
2750	NORTH	WST	COHO	F8662
1787	SOUTH	CTL	HEAVENLY	F1935
305	NORTH	NEA	MUIRFIELD	F0531
2464	NORTH	WST	3LIONS	F5637
605	SOUTH	CTL	HEAVENLY	F1936
1157	SOUTH	STH	SATURN	F4941
1638	SOUTH	STH	MARS	F4732
1	SOUTH	STH	DURBAN	F3532
1	NORTH	WST	ROYAL TRO...	F5861

Figure 7.11: ADMS Real-Time mode HMI.

The ADMS DOTS platform was used to verify what benefits the EUREICA new technology or solution will bring to the control room Distribution System Operator, namely:

- Increase Distribution Grid Visibility
- Improve Operation Efficiency
- Better Situational Awareness
- Reduce Operation Complexity in resolving the violation
- Shorten Customer Outage Time
- Secure System from Cyber-Attack

For each of the technology pathways, the potential benefits are included in the verification matrix shown in Figure 7.12:



Figure 7.12: ADMS Verification Matrix.

32.2 Distributed Energy Resource Integration Middleware (DERIM)

In order to make new technology or solutions available to the control center operator, the integration strategy needs to be implemented to show case the integration capability of various technology outputs into the utility ADMS system. This proposed use of DERIM as such an interface is shown in Figure 7.8.

The project implements DERIM and imports/builds the IEEE 123-node Test Feeder System model to DERIM, the DERIM interface supports (as shown in Figure 7.13:

- Interfacing simulated customer load and generation value and aggregating to secondary transformer level
- Interfacing ICA at the customer/secondary level to aggregate them to the secondary transformer level
- Interface ICA at the primary level and pass that information to ADMS
- Convert aggregated load/generation information into ADMS global model file
- Load new model into ADMS DOTS system
- Execute performance analysis based on each verification case


DERIM
PNNL Forecast Data (CSV)
MIT Market Data (NPZ)
WVU Reconfig Data (CSV)
Interface
Direct IOT Aggregation
SMO + SMA Aggregation
Reconfig + IOT Aggregation
Full Network Model
Primary Secondary Customer
Interface
Load & Generation Aggregation
Primary Node Load Generation (CSV)
Load & Generation Schedule
AMDS Global File Update (CSV)
ADMS Model Update
AMDS Model Convert Verification Tool
ADMS-DOTS
Performance Analysis
at Primary and Substation Level

Figure 7.13: DERIM Interface detail.

The DERIM interface will check the input data folder from technology partner to look for simulation data update, and automatically import it into ADMS DOTS, the operation step is shown in Figure 7.14.



Figure 7.14: DERIM Interface Operation Process.

Chapter 8

Federated Learning (FL) module and validation

With the increasing penetration of distributed energy resources (DERs) in grid edge, including renewable generation, flexible loads, and storage, accurate prediction of distributed generation and consumption at the consumer level becomes important. However, DER prediction based on the transmission of customer-level data, either repeatedly or in large amounts, is not feasible due to privacy concerns. In this chapter, a distributed machine learning approach, federated learning (FL), is proposed to carry out DER forecasting using a network of Internet of Things (IoT) nodes, each of which transmits a model of the consumption and generation patterns without revealing consumer data. This FL approach was validated using each of the three platforms described above. The results are also reported in this chapter.

When it comes to DER forecasting, the challenges of privacy as well as the requirement of large training data sets, can be met using a distributed machine learning paradigm, federated learning (FL) [61, 96, 101, 170]. FL is a machine learning framework where each device participates in training a central model without sending actual data, but only exchanges gradient information in the training phase and sends prediction estimates during deployment. A general overview of the proposed DER prediction process is shown in Figure 8.1. In the figure, various IoT devices including those at a house level such as smart thermostats and smart washers, and energy-producing devices such as PV and EVs are considered. The future smart grid will include a wider range of devices that will be capable of computation and communication. The house-level devices are grouped under a home energy manager H_i to enable aggregation at a house level while energy-producing devices such as EV and PV (grouped under E_i) are assumed to directly participate in a transactive environment. Both H_i and E_i can be considered typical IoT-based DERs connected to a power grid, whose energy consumption needs to be predicted. Using a communication infrastructure, the goal is to exchange information between the DERs in the bottom local layer and the global decision makers at the top layer in a private and secure manner so as to lead to an accurate prediction of the DER consumption/generation. The DER prediction is then utilized to formulate a grid service, to mitigate the load swings and “peaks" that occur in the distribution grid due to a lack of situational awareness. The FL-based DER prediction is used to anticipate the load swings and mitigate them by proactively controlling the DERs [163].


Federated Learning
DER Prediction
IoT devices
Home energy managers H_i
Energy producing devices E_i
House level IoT devices such as smart thermostats

Figure 8.1: An overview of the DER prediction process using federated learning

A typical process of DER-forecast can occur in the following manner. Collect the input-output pair $[x_t, \widehat{P}^t(T)]$ for a federate F_i for several samples n. The features used in this work are $x_t = [P^t(T-15), P^t(T-30), P^t(T-60), P^t(T-120)]$, where $P^t(T-m)$ denotes the actual power consumption, and m denotes the minutes prior to time T. The number of samples n=2880, was obtained by collecting data every 15 minutes over a period of 30 days. The overall training schematic of the FL-based neural network is shown in Figure 8.2.


6
$w_G^{t+1} = w_G^t + \sum_{i=1}^{N} \alpha_i \delta_i^t$
$t = t + 1$
w_G^t
1
5
δ_1^t
1
w_G^t
5
δ_i^t
5
δ_{IoT}^t
1
w_G^t
F_1
F_i
F_{IoT}
2
3
4
2
$y_t = \sum_{i=1}^{N} w_{2i}^t \phi(w_{1i}^t x_t + b_i)$
3
$L^t = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} (Y_t - y_t)^2$
4
$\delta^t = -\eta \nabla L^t \big|_{w^t}$
2
3
4
From global model G to federates F_i
From federates F_i to global model G

Figure 8.2: Schematic of neural network training using federated learning is shown here. The steps (1)-(6) are repeated until $L^t \leq \epsilon$

33 PNNL: Demand forecast using FL through co-simulation

One of the goal to be achieved following the EUREICA privacy pathway is to inform different players of the power system about future power demand from all the IoTs while protecting their privacy. Predicting the aggregated consumption has been proposed to be done specifically using the federated learning (FL) algorithm, which trains a centralized model across decentralized IoTs within the system, as shown in Figure 8.3.



Figure 8.3: Federated Learning implementation for demand predictions.

The EUREICA FL module has been validated on data measured from running the enhanced IEEE 123-node test feeder in Gridlab-D^{TM} through the HELICS-based co-simulation platform, as depicted in Figure 7.1. The specific Python wrapper for the co-simulation integration of this module performs the actions detailed in the following paragraphs.

Integration and configuration of the HELICS FL federate. FL, a distributed learning paradigm, involves a Machine Learning (ML) model trained with data collected from multiple IoTs during a long period of time. Therefore, the Python wrapper represents a federate in the HELICS-based co-simulation platform that registers with HELICS as the federate monitoring the IoTs simulated in the Gridlab-D^{TM} federate.

Data collection. Before running the FL, an IoT measurement dataset needs to be created. Through its HELICS communication interface, the FL Python wrapper runs and collects data synchronously from the IoTs modeled in Gridlab-D^{TM}. The co-simulation is set to run for at least three weeks at 15-minute time resolution to collect significant data for the ML training and testing.

Data formatting. The FL algorithm is based on [62] and uses the code from its affiliated GitHub repository. Therefore, the data supplied to the model training and testing procedure needs to be structured accordingly. As per the original set-up, at each studied time moment for each IoT device, the training neural network in the FL algorithm requires 7 features, that is 7 historical time samples, which have been chosen to be the current values together with samples from 15, 30, 60, 90, 120 minutes and 24 hours before. After collecting the samples during a three-week period, data gets formatted as a large matrix for each of the monitored IoT, so that it follows the coding data structure.

Run FL module. Once the collected data is structured accordingly, the FL module runs to build the ML model for the IoTs to predict their aggregate behavior.

The workflow of validating the FL module in the co-simulation environment is shown in Figure 8.4. After an initial 2-day monitoring of IoT points from the Gridlab-D^{TM} distribution system at 15-minute resolution, the FL module gets engaged to train the machine learning model for forecasting aggregated demand patterns. Each 24 hours, new data gets saved and used for training to improve the ML model and predict the loads for the next 24 hours.



Figure 8.4: FL co-simulation integration workflow.

As a key performance indicator (KPI) of the FL module performance, the Mean Absolute Percentage Error (MAPE) proved the appropriate one to measure forecast accuracy. It is defined as the sum of the individual absolute errors divided by the demand (each period separately), as shown in Equation 8.1,

$$MAPE = \frac{1}{n}\sum_{k=1}^{n}\frac{|y_k^m - y_k^p|}{y_k^p}, \tag{8.1}$$

where y_k^m and y_k^p represent the measured and predicted quantities, respectively, at sample k of a total of n samples within the prediction horizon.

The goal is to have a MAPE of about 0.10 at the third quartile, that is about 90% accuracy for 75% of the house loads. Two scenarios have been considered:

- **Scenario 1** - All houses present a similar daily power consumption pattern, as shown in Figure 8.5a, that is only common and rather consistent power consuming home appliances are active, and no large consumers, such as HVACs and WHs turn on.
- **Scenario 2** - The HVAC systems and/or water heaters (WHs) in some houses turn on increasing the energy consumption based on outdoor temperatures and predefined water heating patterns, as shown in Figure 8.5b.



(a) Scenario 1

(b) Scenario 2

Figure 8.5: Individual and aggregate house demand.

The results in Figure 8.6a show the prediction MAPE at 75% for Scenario 1. It can be seen that when all houses have a rather similar and consistent pattern, the 0.10 goal for MAPE is generally achieved. However, there is a slightly more prediction error during the weekend days, when house consumption changes pattern from the weekdays, as exemplified by the graphs for a particular house in Figure 8.7a and Figure 8.7b, respectively.



(a) Scenario 1

(b) Scenario 2

Figure 8.6: Prediction MAPE per day at the 75% quartile.

In Scenario 2, though the aggregate load of the system does not vary pattern-wise a lot from Scenario 1 (see bottom graphs in Figure 8.5a and Figure 8.5b), some houses exhibit larger consumption due to HVAC and WH systems turning on (see top graphs in Figure 8.5a and Figure 8.5b). That leads to larger prediction errors by the ML model, as confirmed by larger values for the daily MAPE values at the 75% quartile in Figure 8.6b. Moreover, the weekday/weekend discrepancies are more evident for the time intervals when the larger house consumers are active, as seen in Figure 8.7c and Figure 8.7d.



(a) Friday, Scenario 1

(b) Saturday, Scenario 1

(c) Friday, Scenario 2

(d) Saturday, Scenario 2

Figure 8.7: Example of weekday/weekend house demand prediction.

At the aggregate level, the FL algorithm manages to capture the main trend of the load pattern fairly well, as validated by the predicted versus actual load patterns in Figure 8.8a and Figure 8.8c, respectively, and the corresponding MAPEs in Figure 8.8b and Figure 8.8d.



(a) Load prediction (Scenario 1)

(b) Prediction MAPE (Scenario 1)

(c) Load prediction (Scenario 2)

(d) Prediction MAPE (Scenario 2)

Figure 8.8: Aggregate house demand prediction and forecast MAPE.

Statistically speaking, on a sample of 1,008 houses, when only 15% of the houses (that is 152) are randomly chosen to participate in the FL module demand prediction every prediction period by sharing their consumption, the MAPE distributions are as presented by Figure 8.9.

Table 8.1: MAPE distribution for demand prediction of the 1,008 houses in the enhanced EUREICA IEEE 123-node system.

	Mean	Std	Min	Max	Q1 [25%]	Q2 [50%] (median)	Q3 [75%]	Aggregate MAPE
Scenario 1	0.12	0.09	0.07	0.65	0.08	0.09	0.11	0.09
Scenario 2	0.25	0.19	0.10	1.28	0.12	0.19	0.28	0.10



(a) Scenario 1

(b) Scenario 2

Figure 8.9: Prediction MAPE statistics.

Another set of validating co-simulations included running the EUREICA FL module using more features, that is more historical samples to train the model. Specifically, two more cases were studied, that is using the past 24 hours at 1-hour resolution (24 samples) and at 15-minute resolution (96 samples). These validating tests aimed to understand how using more data at different time resolution may influence the demand prediction. From the comparative results in Table 8.2 it can be inferred that using a higher number of historical sample to train the ML model won't necessarily lead to an improved prediction as MAPE values stay within the same range for both individual house demand, as well as for the aggregate consumption.

Table 8.2: Prediction MAPE comparison when using various number of features to predict demand 1,008 houses in the enhanced EUREICA IEEE 123-node system.

	Q1 [25%]			Q2 [50%] (median)			Q3 [75%]			Aggregate MAPE		
Samples	7	24	96	7	24	96	7	24	96	7	24	96
Scenario 1	0.08	0.10	0.09	0.09	0.13	0.12	0.11	0.25	0.20	0.09	0.13	0.11
Scenario 2	0.12	0.15	0.14	0.19	0.24	0.24	0.28	0.49	0.44	0.10	0.12	0.12

34 NREL: FL validation

Federated learning (FL) is a decentralized machine learning approach that enables model training across multiple devices or servers while keeping data localized and private. In traditional machine learning, data is centralized on a single server or data center, where the model is trained using all available data. However, in federated learning, the training process takes place on the individual devices or edge nodes (clients) that hold the data, without sharing the raw data with a central server. After local training, the clients send only the model updates (typically gradients) to the central server, where these updates are aggregated to create a global model. Federated learning is particularly advantageous in scenarios with large amounts of distributed data, data privacy concerns, limited or intermittent connectivity, and situations where transferring data to a central location is impractical or undesirable. For the EUREICA project, it was used to demonstrate FL to power systems data for several reasons,

1. Power systems data often contains sensitive information related to energy consumption, generation, and infrastructure. Federated learning allows individual substation data to stay localized and private. Data remains on the devices or servers of each participant, and only model updates are shared with a central server, ensuring that critical information is not exposed.

2. Power systems data can be massive and geographically distributed. Federated learning efficiently scales to accommodate a large number of participants without incurring significant central server computation or communications overhead.

3. In power systems, network connectivity issues or data outages are not uncommon. Federated learning's decentralized nature allows participants to continue local training even when disconnected from the central server. Once reconnected, the model updates can be synchronized with the global model.

4. Power systems exhibit regional variations, and a single centralized model may struggle to generalize well across different geographical locations. Federated learning's collaborative approach ensures that the global model benefits from diverse data sources, leading to improved generalization and better predictions across the entire power grid.

34.1 LSTM for Time-Series Forecasting

Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) is a special type of recurrent neural network (RNN) designed for analyzing sequences and time series data. The big advantage of LSTM is that it can handle the "vanishing gradient problem," which is a limitation of regular RNNs in capturing long-term patterns in sequences. The vanishing gradient occurs when the gradients in backpropagation diminish exponentially as they propagate through time, leading to limited learning capacity over long sequences. LSTM overcomes this issue through its unique architecture, incorporating specialized gates that regulate the flow of information and prevent the gradients from vanishing. This is particularly important in time series data, where patterns can span over long periods. Additionally, LSTM networks have memory cells that can hold information for a long time. This helps the network learn and remember important patterns in the time series data, even if they are far apart in time. As a result, LSTM is excellent at recognizing complex relationships, filling in gaps between data points, and making accurate predictions in time series tasks.

34.2 LSTM Model Architecture

The LSTM model architecture comprises three sequential layers, each with progressively decreasing units, initialized with 128 LSTM cells in the first layer, followed by 64 cells in the second layer, and 32 cells in the final layer. To address overfitting concerns, L2 regularization was integrated into the model training process. Additionally, the Adam optimizer is utilized to optimize the mean squared error loss function during model compilation. The time series prediction was performed using a step size of 50, effectively capturing temporal dependencies in the power systems data.

34.3 Federated Averaging Algorithm

For the EUREICA project, the federated averaging algorithm was adopted to implement federated learning. Federated averaging is an advanced federated learning approach that facilitates collaborative model training across multiple clients or devices while ensuring data privacy. In this approach, each client independently trains a local model on its respective private dataset, thereby safeguarding raw data from external exposure. Subsequently, the clients communicate with a central server, which aggregates the model weights from all participating clients by performing averaging operations. The resulting averaged weights are then utilized to update the global model, incorporating the collective knowledge derived from all clients. This iterative process allows the global model to progressively enhance its performance without the necessity of centralizing sensitive data, thereby establishing federated averaging as an efficient and privacy-preserving mechanism for distributed machine learning applications. Details of the computation are shown in Algorithm 16

Algorithm 16 Federated Averaging Algorithm

```
Require: Processed training data from each client, number of communication rounds $T$, local epochs $E$
Ensure: Global model weights $G_W$
    Initialization: Initialize global model weights $G_W$ using global_model.get_weights()
for communication round $t = 1$ to $T$ do
    Broadcast current global weights $G_W$ to all participating clients
    Initialize empty list $ClientWeights = []$
    for each client $k$ in selected clients do
        $W_k^{(t)} \leftarrow G_W$ {Initialize local model with global weights}
        for local epoch $e = 1$ to $E$ do
            Train local model on client $k$'s data to get updated weights $W_k^{(t)}$
        end for
        Add $W_k^{(t)}$ to $ClientWeights$
    end for
    {Aggregate client weights layer by layer}
    for each layer $\ell$ in model do
        $G_W[\ell] \leftarrow \frac{1}{K} \sum_{k=1}^{K} W_k^{(t)}[\ell]$ {Average weights for layer $\ell$}
    end for
    Update global model with aggregated weights $G_W$
    Evaluate global model performance (RMSE, MAPE) on validation set
end for
return Final global model weights $G_W$
```

34.4 Implementation of LSTM-Based FL in Real-Time

The use of federated learning is the key step for the other grid services discussed in this report. Two different implementations are discussed - Raspberry Pi and Typhoon. Raspberry Pi implementation is higher fidelity, as it represents an actual device in the field that can potentially be used for these services. It has the ability to model real protocols and real communication medium challenges. Typhoon HIL, on the other hand, offers tighter coupling and more computation power. Both these implementations are real-time, with their own pros and cons. The Typhoon HIL deployment can also be augmented with communication protocols in future work.

34.5 Implementation of FL using Raspberry Pis



Figure 8.10: Architecture for implementation of FL using Raspberry Pi



Figure 8.11: Latency in communication between physical system simulation in Typhoon HIL and FL deployed in Raspberry Pi

The basic architecture of using FL using Raspberry Pis with real communication protocols, over the actual communication medium at the speed of the real communication is shown in Figure 8.10. Before the actual implementation, the Raspberry Pis have to be formatted to a x64 architecture, and connected to an NTP server to enable time synchronization with the real-time components. This deployment represents an engineering effort with a combination of several libraries for implementing FL. These include -

1. PySyft, which offers the capability of deploying FL on multiple hardware platforms

2. PyTorch, which offers the actual machine-learning algorithm, LSTM

3. Mosquitto, a lightweight MQTT protocol wrapper

Although this setup enables deployment of FL on real devices, it presents several challenges. The primary challenge is the lack of computational power on the Raspberry Pi model chosen, which adds significant latency due to the heavyweight ML algorithms and the implementation of the communication protocol. Over a 30 second period, IoT device performance is consistent, but presents a few aberrations. Sinusoidal voltage signal is sent from Typhoon, received by the IoT device, which sends back the gradient updates with an execution time of 100µs, with a sampling time of 1000µs.

The latency in this case is shown in Figure 8.11, and the latency using UDP (in ms, y-axis) is around 30ms. However, as can be seen in the plot, the latency is not consistent and experiences a few dips, which could compromise physical system simulation. In the real-field, appropriate filtering devices can be used where the global model is deployed to accommodate the latency and enable self-recovery. Alternatively, a more powerful computation device can be used. For the EUREICA project, this challenge is compensated by using the more powerful Typhoon HIL platform to enable tighter coupling.

34.6 Implementation of FL in Typhoon HIL

Typhoon HIL offers a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) Hardware-in-the-Loop (HIL) environment that facilitates interaction with the underlying power system model through a Python-based HIL API. Within this environment, it becomes feasible to incorporate widely used machine learning library packages and engage with real-time power system data through various interactive widgets. As depicted in Figure 8.12, the "Federated Learning" widget is employed, executing LSTM-based neural networks on both clients while leveraging power system data. Additionally, the "Data Forecasting" widget employs data generated from Federated Learning to predict future data points. This integration showcases the capability of Typhoon HIL in supporting real-time interactions with power system data for predictive modeling and analysis.



Figure 8.12: Typhoon HIL SCADA Screenshot: Real-time Execution of Federated Learning Using Python-based HIL API

In this study, a simulated power system model was used within the Typhoon Hardware-in-the-Loop (HIL) platform. The model encompasses secondary feeders interlinked with multiple sets of houses, each equipped with Distribution Energy Resources (DERs) and Internet of Things (IoT) devices. These secondary feeder sets are further integrated with the primary feeder, forming connections with the main grid. Typhoon HIL provides the capability of simulating Distribution Networks in Real-Time with High Fidelity with a simulation step of 0.5 μs. Typhoon HIL also offers a comprehensive range of HIL Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) that enable seamless interaction with the power system model in real-time. Moreover, it facilitates the execution of Python libraries for Machine Learning directly within the Typhoon HIL environment. This integration enables researchers and engineers to utilize the potential of Machine Learning techniques while utilizing the capabilities of Typhoon HIL's real-time power system simulation environment.

For this project, Federated Learning was applied using real-time data from the Typhoon HIL platform using the HIL API. Specifically, the power load data was captured from primary feeders 38 and 39 during the simulation. To implement FL, Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) models were used independently on each client, enabling them to train using their respective data.

The FL process involved employing a federated average algorithm on both clients to collaboratively update the model weights. For load prediction, the LSTM models were used on each client, and trained with the data obtained from Typhoon HIL. To assess the performance of the FL algorithm, the global weight obtained from the federated average was utilized, and evaluated its effectiveness with test data and via predicting future power load scenarios.

34.7 NREL FL Results

This section begins by examining the results and measurements used to validate the FL model. Then, how well the global model performs is compared on different local data, looking at individual client models. This facilitates understand how effective and widely applicable the model is for all clients. Finally, this information is used to predict future data for load forecasting in real-time simulations.

34.7.1 Accuracy and Convergence of Federated Learning

RMSE (Root Mean Square Error) and MAPE (Mean Absolute Percentage Error) are used to understand how well the FL model (developed during this project) predicts the next data point in a time series. RMSE measures the average size of errors between predicted and actual values. A smaller RMSE indicates closer predictions. MAPE calculates the average percentage difference between predictions and actual values, which is handy for varying data scales. Combining RMSE and MAPE gives a fuller view of the model's accuracy where RMSE reveals overall fit and larger errors, while MAPE shows how close the predictions are in relation to the real data. This dual approach helps to better assess the model's performance in time series predictions. Figure 8.13 shows the prediction on both training and testing data after the FL is trained for 50 epochs. As depicted by the graph, the prediction trends are quite similar with the values of RMSE and MAPE as follows,

- RMSE: 21.89
- MAPE: 4.86

Figure 8.14 illustrates how RMSE and MAPE values change during 50 epochs. This number of epochs was chosen because MAPE drops by less than 5% within this timeframe. Since the model is being used in real-time, the aim is to achieve faster execution while maintaining a useful error value for load forecasting.



Figure 8.13: Predictions on Client 1's Training and Test Data Using Global Weights



Figure 8.14: RMSE and MAPE values for increasing number of Epochs

34.7.2 Comparing Global Weights and Local Weights in Corresponding Models

OOne purpose of federated learning is to enable the global model to generalize across multiple local models and, in some cases, yield better results. In this implementation, the global weights acquired at four different epochs was compared with the separate training of individual clients in the same four epochs. Since the model architecture is the same for both the clients and the global model, this approach can provide a data-driven understanding of how global weights compare to the corresponding local weights on the same model architecture for the same number of epochs. The results are shown in Table 8.3. Observations reveal that, in the case of client 1, the global weights consistently exhibit better performance in terms of both RMSE and MAPE. Conversely, for client 2, during epochs 10 and 20, the global weights demonstrate a capacity to generalize the client 2 model, albeit with marginally higher RMSE and MAPE values. However, as the epochs were extended in the federated learning experimentation, global weights progressively exhibited enhanced performance (evident during epochs 50 and 100) surpassing the error values of the client 2 model used with local weights.

Table 8.3: Global Weight vs Local Weight Comparison
(E = Epochs, MAPE in %)

E	CLIENT 1				CLIENT 2			
	Global Weight		Local Weight		Global Weight		Local Weight	
	RMSE	MAPE	RMSE	MAPE	RMSE	MAPE	RMSE	MAPE
10	32.17	7.77	33.69	8.46	30.03	9.63	29.46	9.06
20	27.05	6.38	27.64	6.51	25.91	8.23	25.80	8.01
50	21.89	4.86	25.69	6.47	21.23	6.78	21.26	7.05
100	21.27	4.69	21.29	4.81	20.83	5.87	21.05	6.02

35 LTDES: FL validation

For the privacy pathway, it was assumed that the ADMS will use its internal load model to replace customer load measurement as ADMS DOTS setpoints. This allows a gradual increase in the percentage of the customer load measurements available to measure the load forecast difference of the ADMS model. The privacy pathway performance analysis process is shown in Figure 8.15, and includes the following parameters::


Home H_i
IoT Devices Type-A
Home Energy Manager
Data
ML model (House controller model)
Power prediction at time t from H_i
$w_{l_i}^t \rightarrow \delta_{l_i}^t$
Global server model
$w_{G_i}^t$
Power prediction from all other H_j
IoT Devices Type-B
Data
FL Client (Type B device model)
Power prediction from B_i
Global server model
$w_{G_i}^t$
$\mathbf{w}_G^{t+1} = \mathbf{w}_G^t + \sum_{j=1}^{k} \alpha_j \delta_j^{t+1}$
Power prediction from all other B_j
Aggregator at Node J
Power prediction from Node K
Power prediction at time t from Node J
$w_{G_J}^t$
To Primary Feeder
End-user layer
Secondary Feeder
ICA_s
DERIM
Interface
Fed Learning
Full Network Model
Primary Secondary Customer
Direct Customer Aggregation
Interface
ADMS-DOTS
Performance Analysis
Privacy Based Aggregation Technology at Primary and Substation Level

Figure 8.15: Privacy Pathway Performance Analysis.

Direct Customer Aggregation Workflow:

- Only inject xx% of PNNL simulation data to ADMS
- Calculate the Standard Deviation of the power flow result (compared with baseline)

Federated Learning Aggregation Flow:

- Only inject xx% of PNNL simulation data to ADMS
- Inject rest of simulation data using Federated Learning data
- Calculate the Standard Deviation of PF result (Compared with baseline)

The performance analysis result is shown in Figure 8.16, which also depicts simulation of the use case where the percentage of customers who are willing to provide data to Utility (ADMS) has a significant impact on the ADMS load forecast result:



Figure 8.16: Privacy Pathway Result

- Data Availability = 100% Load Forecast Error = 0%
- Data Availability = 0.00% Load Forecast Error = 65%

The Federated Learning model resolved this issue:

- Data Availability = 100% Load Forecast Error = 0%
- Data Availability = 0.00% Load Forecast Error = 3%

In conclusion, the Federated Learning model forecast (developed for the EUREICA project) will provide the utility with much-needed customer load forecast information without sacrificing customer privacy. Its performance is much better than the traditional load forecast model available to utilities today.

Chapter 9

Blue sky scenario: Voltage control

In this chapter, we apply the EUREICA framework for the important use case of voltage regulation. Maintaining voltages within a tight range is a crucial concern for distribution grids in order to maintain stability, improve power quality, and enhance efficiency. This is the main application considered during nominal (or 'blue-sky') grid operation. We first show the results of both the secondary and primary markets when operated in lock-step with the real-time wholesale market. We then show the results for the voltage regulation scenario, which confirm that the EUREICA approach can successfully optimize system voltages while also setting accurate spatially and temporally varying prices. In addition, to numerical market simulation results, we also report the hardware and software-based validation results.

36 Baseline market simulation results

36.1 The Use-case

The hierarchical LEM proposed for this project was evaluated using a modified IEEE 123-node test feeder. A Gridlab-D$^{\text{TM}}$ model[1] was utilized to simulate this test feeder over the course of a 24 hour period. Rooftop PV (with smart inverters) was assumed to be present at nodes 5, 20, 50, 63, and 94, with a total PV generation capacity of 510.3 kW. This corresponded to a DER (PV) penetration of about 14%, assuming that the peak load is at about 3.6 MW [84, 135]. An SMO was assumed to be present at 79 of the primary feeder nodes (i.e. $|\mathcal{N}_I| = 79$), and that flexible loads were present at all of these nodes with each DCA capable of *up to* ±50% deviations around their baseline injections. This maximum flexibility was based on past studies forecasting demand response potentials in the US [126]. The Gridlab-D$^{\text{TM}}$ model included triplex meters to record P and Q injections every minute, at each of these 79 nodes. Weather data for Boston, MA was used to forecast PV generation, and real-time 5-minute LMPs from ISO-NE for August 28, 2021 were used as input data to the SM and PM optimization problems [75]. Since no reactive power market currently exists, the Q-LMP was assumed to be 10% of the P-LMP [53]. The price ceilings in Equation (6.2) were set to be $\overline{\mu}^{iP}, \overline{\mu}^{iQ} = 0.2$ \$/kWh, which is almost twice the current average retail rate of 0.129 \$/kWh charged by Eversource,

[1] `https://www.gridlabd.org/`

a utility in Massachusetts[2]. The overall test feeder was converted to a balanced 3-phase distribution network by (i) assuming switches to be at their normal positions, (ii) converting single phase spot loads to be 3-phase, (iii) assuming cables to be 3-phase transposed, (iv) converting configurations 1 thru 12 to symmetric matrices and (v) modeling shunt capacitors as 3-phase reactive power generators [64]. A PMO was assumed to be at the slack bus, at 13.2kV, with the SMOs at 4.16kV, and each DCA at 120-240V.

Each SMO was assumed to have anywhere between $|\mathcal{N}_{J,i}| \in [3,5]$ DCAs with the actual number chosen uniformly at random. The number of DCAs at each SMO i is chosen independently. The baseline injections P_j^{i0}, Q_j^{i0} were set to be equal to the results from the Gridlab-D$^{\text{TM}}$ simulations. Since the injection data was only available up to the primary feeder node level, the injections were artificially disaggregated at each SMO amongst its DCAs, with each DCA being either a net load or net generator. The flexibility bids for the SM $\Delta P_j^i, \Delta Q_j^i$ were also randomly generated, allowing each DCA to offer flexibilities of *up to* ±50% away from their baseline. Thus, the upper and lower limits for the bid flexibilities were set as $\underline{P}_j^i = P_j^{i0}(1-\underline{\Delta}_i^j), \overline{P}_j^i = P_j^{i0}(1+\overline{\Delta}_i^j)$, where $\underline{\Delta}_i^j, \overline{\Delta}_i^j \sim \mathcal{U}[0,0.5]$. The remainder of this Section focuses on the results for active power only; similar trends were observed for reactive power.

36.2 SM scheduling

The first step in this use-case study is the SM structure, and its market clearing using the optimization problem outlined in Equations (6.3a)-(6.2g). The bids $\vec{B}_j^i$ corresponding to these parameters are shown in Figure 9.1a for a randomly selected SMO $i = 7$ having 3 DCAs $j = 1, 2, 3$. The interval of interest was chosen to be of a 60-min duration, with the actual hour chosen at random. The power injections $P_j^{7^*}$ obtained from solving (6.3a)-(6.2g) as well as the corresponding flexibilities, for each DCA j, are indicated in Figure 9.1b. These two figures clearly illustrate the optimal flexibility range for each of the DCAs, reflecting the ability of the SM to incorporate the constraints of the DCAs, and multiple objectives such as utility, monetary costs, and commitment reliability. The corresponding local electricity tariffs, $\mu_j^{7P^*}$ are shown in Figure 9.1c for $j = 1, 2, 3$. Figs. 9.1b and 9.1c also illustrate the correlation between injections and prices. For instance, the tariffs for DCA 3 are consistently higher than those for 1 and 2, as DCA 3 is more heavily loaded than the other DCAs. Similarly, tariffs for DCA 1 are lower as its net generation is higher; the price fluctuations are more or less in sync with generation and demand patterns.

[2] `https://www.eversource.com/content/ema-c/residential/my-account/billing-payments/about-your-bill/rates-tariffs/summary-of-electric-rates`



(a) Bids with flexibilities $P_j^{7,0}, \Delta P_j^7$.

(b) DCA schedules and responses.

(c) Market cleared local retail tariffs.

Figure 9.1: SM bidding and clearing for primary feeder node 7, with 3 DCAs $j \in \{1, 2, 3\}$. The solid lines in Figure 9.1a and Figure 9.1b represent the baseline injection bids and market cleared setpoints, respectively, while the shaded regions around them are the flexibility ranges. Local retail tariffs from the SM $\mu_j^{7P^*}$ are shown in Figure 9.1c. The SMO aggregates these PM schedules to bid into the PMO as shown in Figure 9.2a. The dashed lines in Figure 9.1b indicate the actual responses of the DCAs in response to their market cleared schedules.

36.3 PM scheduling

The optimal injections with associated flexibilities from the SM clearing in Figure 9.1b are aggregated across all three DCAs to form this SMO's bid $P_7^0, \Delta P_7$ into the primary level market, as described in Equation (6.5). The resulting SMO bids are shown in Figure 9.2a, where the solid red line indicates P_7^0 and the shaded area indicates the flexibility range $[P_7^0 - \Delta P_7, P_7^0 + \Delta P_7]$. These bids are in turn used to solve the PM OPF problem in Equation (6.6) using the distributed PAC algorithm, where the SMO's flexible bids $\Delta P_7 = [\underline{P}_7, \overline{P}_7]$ set the feasible operational limits for the power flow constraints in (6.6). Solving this optimization problem corresponds to clearing the PM, and determines the PM schedules for the SMO. The results of the PM clearing for SMO $i = 7$ are shown in Figure 9.2c.



(a) Inputs from node 7 for PM clearing.

(b) d-LMPs across all SMO nodes over 1 day.

(c) PM solutions for SMO 7. The solid and dashed black lines are the load injections, while the red and blue lines are the d-LMPs with and without the SMO, respectively.

Figure 9.2: Selected solutions from the PM clearing.

The proposed two-tier market structure generates two sets of schedules and prices, every 1 minute and every 5 minutes for the SM and PM, respectively, as shown in Figure 9.1 and Figure 9.2. Further, note that both the local electricity tariffs and the d-LMPs, as determined by the SM and PM, display a high degree of spatio-temporal variations, as shown in Figure 9.2b. This illustrates the need for local primary and secondary markets to capture such changes with sufficient resolution.

In order to evaluate the impact of the hierarchical structure that has been included in the LEM (for this project), the performance of the PM is compared to the case when there is no SM at the lower level. The 'without SMO' scenario consists of only a PM, with the PMO directly assuming flexibility ranges for each primary feeder node that best represents an aggregation of local generation and curtailable loads. In the following paragraphs, the performance of the proposed hierarchical LEM, i.e., the 'with SMO' scenario, is compared with the 'without SMO' scenario. First, we compare the inputs into the PM at node 7.

Figure 9.2a shows that the PMO has a larger flexibility range that may not be accurate or realizable. The red curve in Figure 9.2a shows that the flexibility range with SMO is narrower, and reflects the true preferences of the DCAs. Furthermore, the amount of flexibility that the SMO provides to the PMO is also impacted by other factors like the SM retail costs and the commitment scores of each of its DCAs, both of which vary with time. As a result, the 'with SMO' case is more performant as the baseline injection is optimized in comparison to the relatively ad-hoc choice in the without SMO case (the blue curve in Figure 9.2a).

The performance of proposed hierarchical market is now compared across the entire primary feeder consisting of all 79 SMO nodes, over the course of the whole simulation period of 24 hours. In Figure 9.3a, the inputs to the PMO are shown (the red curve), with all SMO solutions aggregated across all 79 primary feeder nodes $i \in \mathcal{N}_I$ and for the entire day. Note that without the additional visibility and granularity offered by the SM structure, the PM would assume much larger ranges for the injection limits in the 'without SMO' case (the blue curve) when compared to the 'with SMO' case. These are less accurate and may also be overoptimistic in terms of how much flexibility can be realistically expected from the DCAs, which in turn can cause issues in case of reneged commitments. It should be pointed out that the amounts of local generation seen in Figure 9.2 and Figure 9.4b are above the installed PV capacity of 510.3 kW. This is because while generating the synthetic flexibility bids for the DCAs, the computation allowed for the possibility of additional DERs like batteries, EVs and curtailable or shiftable loads, present at each of these secondary feeders, which weren't explicitly modeled in the Gridlab-D$^{\text{TM}}$ simulation.

Figure 9.4a shows the d-LMPs both with and without the SMO are generally higher than the LMP, which is expected since the d-LMPs account for additional costs associated with congestion, line losses and other delivery charges incurred by the PMO and DSO in the distribution network, downstream of the substation. The d-LMP with the SMO does fall slightly below the LMP between 100-500 minutes (02:00:0700). This can be explained by the total electricity demand being low during this period which in turn occurs as the SMOs are able to curtail flexible loads to a larger extent by coordinating their DCAs more intelligently and compensate them accordingly at the local retail tariff rate. In fact, this demonstrates that the SMOs are able to achieve higher levels of load curtailment throughout the course of the day when compared to the case without SMOs. Once again, this is likely because the SMO can access additional information on DCA's preferences and effectively utilize any additional flexibility that they're willing to provide. The SM allows the SMO to more efficiently allocate resources amongst the secondary feeders at each primary feeder node, and take advantage of differences in load and generation profiles across DCAs over time since they could potentially complement each other.

The second observation from Figure 9.4a and Figure 9.4b is that the 'with SMO' case schedules lower levels of local generation mid-day compared to the 'without SMO' case. This may be due to a combination of multiple objectives utilized in the SM that include both net costs and flexibility. The optimal behavior as a result, as predicted by the LEM, is one where more power is purchased from the main transmission grid rather than from local generation mid-day. This is also supported by Figure 9.4a which shows that such a behavior leads to lower d-LMPs and reduced distribution network costs with the hierarchical LEM than without the SMO. This is desirable since the SMOs can then reduce the retail tariff charged to their DCAs, improving affordability for customers, as seen in Table 9.1. It also ensures that DSOs aren't over-compensating prosumers with DERs. This can help avoid excessive cross-subsidies from consumers to prosumers which is a major challenge associated with net energy metering (NEM) programs today [133], and can thus produce more equitable allocations.



(a) Inputs to PM aggregated across all primary feeder nodes except the slack bus.

(b) PM solutions for net injections at the slack bus.

Figure 9.3: Comparison of PM bids (or inputs) and slack bus injections, with and without SM. The slack bus (node 149) is connected to the substation and distribution transformer. Positive injections here indicate that the feeder as a whole is importing power from the main grid.

Figures 9.3b, 9.4a, and 9.4b correspond to the main conclusions of the proposed LEM. In all three figures, the red curves correspond to the behavior with the LEM while the blue curves correspond to the 'without SMO' case. The red curve in Figure 9.3b shows that the LEM schedules generation from the bulk grid more in the middle of the day and less otherwise; while those in Figure 9.4b show that it's advantageous to increase local generation in the latter part of the day and to curtail load in the earlier part of the day. The LEM determines that the IEEE 123-node feeder needs to import around 700 kW between minute 400 to minute 850, and less than 300 kW from minute 1000 onward. This behavior is significantly different from the market structure without SMOs, as the primary market alone does not have the granular customer level information to accurately estimate the power injections and their associated flexibilities. Finally, Figure 9.4a shows the optimal d-LMP from the LEM that enables the overall generation mix as shown in Figure 9.3b and Figure 9.4b, and that it is lower than what the 'without SMO' case predicts.

Table 9.1: Summary financial metrics for simulations under different types of market structures.

	SM + PM	**PM only**	**No LEM**
Avg. P d-LMP [$/kWh]	0.064	0.116	N/A
Avg retail tariff [$/kWh]	0.082	0.116	0.129



(a) d-LMPs averaged across all primary nodes, compared to the LMP.

(b) PM total load and generation injections, summed over all primary feeder nodes except the slack bus.

Figure 9.4: Comparison of PM solutions obtained with and without SM.

37 Voltage regulation use case setup

For this use case, the LEM (developed during this project) was applied to specifically provide voltage control as a grid service. This formed the core of the blue sky scenario.

37.1 Objective functions for voltage control

After converting all quantities to per-unit (p.u.), this exercise considered a weighted linear combination of several convex objective functions for the PM clearing using CI-OPF - where the weight ξ controls the relative tradeoff between the first two 'socio-economic' objectives versus the last two 'electrical' objectives:

$$\begin{aligned} f^{obj}(x) = & \sum_{\phi\in\mathcal{P}} \sum_{i\in\mathcal{N}_I} \left[f_i^{\text{Load-Disutil},\phi}(x) + f_i^{\text{Gen-Cost},\phi(x)} \right] \\ & + \xi \sum_{\phi\in\mathcal{P}} \left[\sum_{(i,k)\in\mathcal{T}} f_{ik}^{\text{Loss},\phi}(x) + \sum_{i\in\mathcal{N}_I} f_i^{\text{Volt},\phi}(x) \right] \end{aligned} \tag{9.1}$$

The first term minimizes disutility due to load flexibility:

$$f_i^{\text{Load-Disutil},\phi}(x) = \beta_i^P (P_i^{L,\phi} - P_i^{L0,\phi})^2 + \beta_i^Q (Q_i^{L,\phi} - Q_i^{L0,\phi})^2$$

The second term minimizes generation costs. These are set by the LMP $\Lambda_i^P,\ \Lambda_i^Q$ for the primary feeder node at the PCC at the substation. For SMOs at all other primary feeder nodes, these depend on some fixed coefficients $\alpha_i^P,\ \alpha_i^Q$ that represent costs to the SMO for running its SM:

$$f_i^{\text{Gen-Cost},\phi}(y) = \begin{cases} \Lambda_i^P P_i^{G,\phi} + \Lambda_i^Q Q_i^{G,\phi}, \text{if } i & \text{is PCC} \\ \alpha_i^P P_i^{G,\phi} + \alpha_i^Q Q_i^{G,\phi} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

The third term minimizes line losses in the network for more efficient operation. These are determined by the following function:

$$f_{ij}^{\text{Loss},\phi}(x) = R_{ij}|I_{ij}^{\phi}|^2 = R_{ij}\left(I_{ij}^{\phi,R^2} + I_{ij}^{\phi,I^2}\right)$$

where $\mathcal{T}$ is the set of network branches, R_{ij} are branch resistances and I_{ij}^{ϕ} are branch current flows. These can be readily obtained from the nodal currents I_i since $I = A^{\intercal} I_{branch}$, where A is the three-phase graph incidence matrix.

The fourth term is the voltage regulation term that is specified to perform voltage control. This penalizes voltage deviations from some desired nominal values, in order to achieve a desired profile:

$$f_i^{\text{Volt},\phi}(x) = \left(V_j^{\phi,R} - \tilde{V}_j^{\phi,R}\right)^2 + \left(V_j^{\phi,I} - \tilde{V}_j^{\phi,I}\right)^2$$

In this study, the voltage was regulated about setpoints $\tilde{V}_j^{\phi,R} = 1,\ \tilde{V}_j^{\phi,I} = 0$, to track a nominal magnitude $|\tilde{V}_j^{\phi}| = 1$ p.u.

37.2 Pricing

Both the SM and PM result in localized, real-time prices for each DCA and SMO, respectively, which allows capture of the high degree of spatial and temporal variation in prices. The focus of this study was on the pricing results for SMOs in the PM - please refer to [118] for detailed results on localized retail tariffs for DCAs in the SM. PM prices can be derived by inspecting dual variables (λ) corresponding to different sets of linear equality constraints in the PM CI-OPF problem expressed by Equation (6.7). The Lagrangian for the primal problem Equation (6.7) is:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathcal{L} &= f^{obj}(x) + \lambda_P^{\intercal} P_{balance} + \lambda_Q^{\intercal} Q_{balance} \\ &\quad + \lambda_I^{\intercal}(I - YV) + \lambda_{ineq}^{\intercal}(RHS_{ineq} - LHS_{ineq})\end{aligned} \tag{9.2}$$

where $P_{balance}$ and $Q_{balance}$ refer to the active and reactive power balance equations Equations (6.7c) and (6.7d) respectively, and $I = YV$ enforces the linear Ohm's law constraint from Equation (6.7b). The last term in the Lagrangian corresponds to all the remaining inequality constraints from Equation (6.9b)-6.9g. However, the focus in this case is only on the duals of equality constraints Equations (6.7b) to (6.7d) for pricing purposes. Note that the dual variable λ_I is in terms of current, which can be converted to an equivalent value in terms of voltage as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}&\lambda_I^{\intercal}(I - YV) \equiv \lambda_V^{\intercal}(ZI - V) = \lambda_V^{\intercal}(Y^{-1}I - Y^{-1}YV) \\ &= \lambda_V^{\intercal} Y^{-1}(I - YV) \implies \lambda_I^{\intercal} = \lambda_V^{\intercal} Y^{-1} \implies \lambda_V = Y^{\intercal}\lambda_I\end{aligned} \tag{9.3}$$

where $Z = Y^{-1}$ is the 3-phase network impedance matrix. These dual variables can be interpreted as prices for different services in the distribution grid. Thus, the vector of dual variables above $\boldsymbol{\lambda} = [\lambda_P, \lambda_Q, \overline{\lambda_V}]$ is proposed as the d-LMP where $\overline{\lambda_V} = \text{Re}(\lambda_V)$ is the real part of the complex dual variable. In particular, λ_P and λ_Q represent the P and Q d-LMP components for active and reactive power. The P-dLMP or energy price λ_P is similar to the notion of LMP in the transmission system and WEM. Such a structure of P and Q components in a d-LMP has also been proposed in [19], but the voltage support price $\overline{\lambda_V}$ is introduced in this paper for the first time. These d-LMPs represent the overall grid services from DERs by providing real power, reactive power, and voltage support. Note that $\overline{\lambda_V}$ can be interpreted as a price for voltage control or regulation, because it reflects the effects of perturbations in the Ohm's law constraint, on the proposed objective function, as shown below:

$$\begin{aligned}&\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial V} = \frac{\partial f^{obj}(x)}{\partial V} - \lambda_I^{\intercal} Y = \frac{\partial f^{obj}(x)}{\partial V} - \lambda_V \\ &\text{At optimality } \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial V^*} = \frac{\partial f^{obj}}{\partial V^*} - \lambda_V = 0 \implies \frac{\partial f^{obj}}{\partial V^*} = \lambda_V^*\end{aligned}$$

Thus, $\overline{\lambda_V}$ intuitively represents the costs of satisfying voltage constraints on the distribution grid (in terms of degrading the objective) and can be interpreted as the value of this voltage control grid service. Similarly, λ_P and λ_Q are costs associated with meeting power balance.

38 Voltage control results

38.1 Numerical simulations

A co-simulation was conducted of both the SM and PM on a modified IEEE-123 node feeder with high DER penetration comprising of rooftop solar PV systems, batteries, and flexible loads. The specifications of the modified network are shown in Section 38.1. The network was simulated using Gridlab-D$^{\text{TM}}$ in order to obtain realistic profiles for baseline power injections of SMOs and DCAs, as well as primary-level nodal voltages. Synthetic flexibility bids were then generated by randomly assigning flexibilities between 10-30% for each of the DCAs. Simulations were conducted for a 24-hour period, using weather data from San Francisco, CA on August 2, 2022, along with 5-minute LMP data from the CAISO. The SM was cleared every 1 minute, while the PM was cleared every 5 minutes, in lockstep with the WEM.

Type	Number	Capacity
DERs	380	1,745.8 kVA (≈44%)
PVs	207	880.84 kVA
Batteries	173	865 kVA
Spot loads	85	3,985.7 kVA
Houses	1008	4-10 kW (variable)
Flexible loads	1-2 per house	10-50% flexibility (variable)

Table 9.2: Specifications of modified IEEE 123-node feeder.

The workflow for the co-simulation is shown in Figure 9.5. In particular, the aggregated solutions are fed in from the SM clearing to form the SMOs bids into the PM. These bids, which are in terms of active and reactive power flexibility ranges, are then preprocessed to give the corresponding V and I bounds needed for the MCE relaxation. The relaxed CI-OPF problem is then solved to clear the PM. The Gurobi solver was used for both the SM and PM optimization problems. In order to accelerate the simulations, the SM clearing was parallelized using MIT's Supercloud high-performance computing cluster [137] and Python's Message Passing Interface (MPI). At every secondary timestep t_s (1 min), the optimization problems were solved for all 85 SMOs in parallel across multiple processors - making the problem much more computationally tractable and providing ≈ 80X speedup in solution runtimes. The d-LMPs and nodal voltage solutions are 3-phase variables, but in the following sections, the calculation of their mean values was averaged over all the non-zero phases that are present at each node.


CAISO
PM solutions and d-LMPs
5-min LMPs
PNNL GridLAB-D data
SM optimization
Updated P/Q limits for primary feeder nodes (SMO bids)
PM optimization
Baseline injections for secondary feeders
Climate & load data for San Francisco
Demand response availability profiles for CA (time-varying, up to 50%)
Pseudo-randomly generate DCA flexibility bids
Data preprocessing
Tight V & I bounds for MCE convex relaxation

Figure 9.5: Workflow for SM and PM co-simulation.

38.2 Effects of the LEM on voltages



(a) Without the LEM.

(b) With the LEM.

Figure 9.6: Primary level nodal voltage magnitudes with and without the LEM, at nodes with SMOs and over time.

Among the observations emanating from the simulations conducted during this project is that the LEM does indeed significantly improve the overall voltage profile by making it more uniform and bringing the voltage magnitudes closer to the desired 1 p.u. setpoint, as seen in Figure 9.6. Note that Figure 9.6a also depicts overvoltage (i.e. $|V| > 1$ p.u.) issues throughout most of the 24-hour simulation period, but these are generally more pronounced during daylight periods of the day with higher PV output. Overvoltage problems are also more frequent and severe for specific primary nodes that correspond to SMOs and DCAs with greater local generation capacity from solar PV and/or batteries. Undervoltages (i.e. $|V| < 1$ p.u.) are less common and occur during the afternoons, likely due to higher demand spikes from HVAC loads. The LEM is able to effectively coordinate DERs in order to mitigate both undervoltage and overvoltage issues throughout the day and across all nodes in the primary feeder, as seen in Figure 9.6b. This is achieved through smarter scheduling and dispatch of resources - these actions may include (but are not limited to) controlled battery charging or discharging, power factor control using smart inverters as well as shifting or curtailment of flexible loads and appliances. This results in more uniform spatial and temporal voltage distributions.



(a) Nodal averages over time.

(b) Daily average across nodes.

Figure 9.7: Primary level nodal voltage magnitude averages with and without the LEM, at nodes with SMOs and over time.

The voltage profile improvements are also evident from Figure 9.7, where both the spatial (in Figure 9.7a) and temporal (in Figure 9.7b) mean voltage magnitudes are almost exactly equal to the desired 1 p.u. with the LEM in place, as opposed to the consistently higher mean voltages observed without the LEM. The voltages are also well within the ANSI safe operating voltage limits of $[0.95, 1.05]$ $p.u.$.

38.3 dLMP results

Figure 9.8 summarizes the PM pricing results and decomposition of the d-LMPs into the three components of P, Q, and V support prices. In Figure 9.8a, temporal variations of the d-LMP components are shown over the whole day, when averaged over all the SMO nodes. At all times, the mean d-LMP over the primary feeder is higher than the LMP at the substation or PCC. This makes intuitive sense since the d-LMP accounts for additional costs and losses in the distribution grid downstream of the transmission grid, that are not included in the LMP. This also allows the DSO and PMOs to recoup their own costs for running the retail markets while participating in the WEM. Another interesting result is that throughout the day, the P and V-dLMP components contribute to the bulk of the d-LMP, while the Q-dLMP only makes up a small portion of the price. This makes sense since nodal Q injections are much smaller in magnitude compared to P injections across the distribution feeder, and is also in line with other works that have suggested for instance, that Q-dLMPs should roughly be $\approx$ 10% of the corresponding P-dLMPs [53]. Another reason for the small Q price contribution could be that reactive compensation plays a key role in maintaining grid voltages, so some of its effects may already be taken into account by the V-dLMP.



(a) d-LMP components over time, averaged over all primary level nodes along with the LMP.

(b) d-LMP components over primary level nodes, averaged over the entire 24 h simulation period.

Figure 9.8: Variations in d-LMPs for over nodes and time.



(a) P-dLMP

(b) Q-dLMP

(c) V-dLMP

Figure 9.9: Distributions of d-LMP components over all SMO nodes during the 24-hour simulation period.

In Figure 9.8b, the spatial node-to-node variations of the time-averaged dLMPs are shown, along with the average LMP for the day. Note that, once again, the combined average P, Q, and V-dLMPs are higher than the average LMP at most nodes, except for a few of them (< 10). The relative breakdowns of P versus Q-dLMPs are roughly similar across the network, but the contributions of the V-dLMP differ quite significantly for different nodes. For example, the V-dLMP is relatively much larger for node 71 in Figure 9.8b, indicating that it may be more challenging to meet grid physics constraints and support voltages at these specific nodes, while solving the PM clearing and CI-OPF problem. Further analysis is necessary to fully interpret and explain this trend. Such an analysis is beyond the scope of the EUREICA project, but will be explored more as part of future work. Both plots in Figure 9.8 also show that the costs associated with voltage support are significant and must also be adequately accounted for in retail markets, rather than focusing solely on P and Q energy prices. In both Figures 9.7a and 9.7b, the combined P and Q-dLMPs without including the V-dLMP are consistently lower than the LMP. This is in agreement with other related works such as [19, 66] - this indicates that distribution level costs involve not just those associated with satisfying power balance, but also other constraints like Ohm's law (Equation (6.7b)).

The locational-temporal variations of the normalized P, Q, and V-dLMPs are shown in Figure 9.9, for all 85 primary feeder nodes with SMOs and over the 24-hour period. Note that there's a great deal of variability in these prices, which further motivates the crucial need for new retail market structures (such as the proposed LEM) in order to capture these variations. This would allow more accurate compensation of different resources depending both on the time of day as well as their geographic locations within the distribution system. Another important observation is that the combined d-LMP is significantly lower than the current retail rate charged by utilities and other load-serving entities (LSE), throughout the day and across all primary nodes. Since current retail rates only include active power, an equivalent rate λ_{eq} in \$/kWh is calculated for the LEM as a weighted average of all 3 dLMP components:

$$\begin{aligned} \lambda_{eq} &= (\lambda_P^* P^* + \lambda_Q^* Q^* + \overline{\lambda_V}^* \Delta V^*)/P^* \\ \Delta V^* &= |V^{R^*} - 1| + |V^{I^*}| \end{aligned} \tag{9.4}$$

where ΔV^* are the deviations of voltages from the nominal values. The average bundled tariff for Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) customers in August 2022 was 33.72 $¢/kWh$, compared to the mean equivalent rate $\overline{\lambda_{eq}} = 5.38$ $¢/kWh$ in the proposed LEM, averaged over the day and the whole network. This represents a ≈ 84% reduction, indicating the LEM is able to coordinate and schedule DERs more effectively to reduce network-wide costs. These tariffs are likely to increase further as higher DER penetration places more stress on distribution grids, but the proposed LEM can help mitigate these challenges [10].

However, it should also be noted that in this paper, we have only included costs for operating the primary market while meeting power flow constraints imposed by grid physics. In reality, the DSO incurs additional costs such as maintenance costs, infrastructure expenses, and delivery charges as well as profit margins imposed by LSEs. In addition, the DSO has to recoup its costs for importing power from the WEM and transmission grid. For similar reasons, the retail rates charged by the SMOs to its DCAs may be higher than the breakeven tariffs. These additional costs may reduce the reported margin of improvement from 64% to a certain extent. The final dLMPs and retail rates also represent the value provided by the PMOs and SMOs (as well as the DSO that oversees both) in terms of serving demand as well as by facilitating market participation for DERs. They allow DERs to actively bid into retail and wholesale markets and get appropriately compensated for services they provide to the grid. This also motivates recent regulations like FERC order 2222 which opened up WEM participation to DERs [1], as well as the push towards performance-based rate regulation - which evaluates actual utility performance when establishing rates as an alternative to calculating rate plans based on utility capital investments [8].

39 Blue sky scenario validation

39.1 PNNL: Situational awareness and system reconfiguration through co-simulation

To validate the market structure role in raising situational awareness at the distribution system operator levels, the EUREICA market module is integrated with the enhanced IEEE 123-node test system at the secondary nodes through the co-simulation platform, as visually shown in Figure 9.10. Specifically, the connection is made at the level of the secondary market agent (SMA), which acts at each secondary node of the distribution system. The market module provides situational awareness by analyzing the current state of the system against what it is known as expected behavior, that is the feeder's net total power injection at the substation monitored by the primary market operator (PMO). It then mitigates the effects of any disturbing event by alerting the trustable primary market agents (PMAs), also known as secondary market operators (SMOs) to redispatch their DERs. The flexible loads are thus required to curtail their consumption, which is achieved by the SMA that will provide them with new set points. In the co-simulation environment, this is achieved by distributing the flexible load change, that is the $\pm\Delta P$ in Figure 9.10, as calculated by the mitigation strategy.



Figure 9.10: Market module integration with the EUREICA IEEE 123-node test system.

Integration of the local electricity markets and system reconfiguration modules for situational awareness and providing grid services with the distribution system model has been achieved through co-simulation in different scenarios. The Utilities Technology Council (UTC) defines two main electrical power system operation scenarios:

- Blue Sky operating scenario, when a normal, routine operating day is expected;
- Black Sky operating scenario, when an event compromising the electric reliability is considered.

The scope of co-simulating a blue sky scenario is to demonstrate the effectiveness of the EUREICA modules in raising situational awareness, and handling under/over voltage situations.

The black sky scenario studies will show EUREICA's adversarial situational awareness that allows system operators to project use of additional power from IoTs to increase the percentage of critical load served.

39.2 PNNL voltage control validation

The Blue Sky scenario is meant to test the design and development of the EUREICA market module integration with the distribution system model through the HELICS co-simulation, as well as to validate its control strategy to reduce the secondary feeder demand during peak hours, which could mitigate possible undervoltages. Due to the fact that the house and IoT models in Gridlab-D$^{\text{TM}}$ are not equipped with EUREICA market responding controllers, the aggregate house demand in the second graphs of Figure 9.11a and Figure 9.11b are very similar. However, as shown in Figure 9.10, the EUREICA market module alters the secondary feeder node demand by requesting a certain change in generation and/or demand $\pm\Delta P$. This results in a change in the overall secondary feeder demand as shown in the top graphs of Figure 9.11a (base case without EUREICA market module engagement) and Figure 9.11b (case when EUREICA market module is engaged). Moreover, by controlling the demand of IoTs through responses to the EUREICA market, the local batteries could take advantage and charge using the energy produced by the proximity solar panels.



(a) System load and distributed generation without the EUREICA market.

(b) System load and distributed generation with the EUREICA market.

Figure 9.11: Blue Sky operating scenario load and generation.



(a) System spot load bus voltages without the EUREICA market.

(b) System spot load bus voltages with the EUREICA market.

Figure 9.12: Blue Sky operating scenario voltages.

Also, though not drastically different, the voltages in Figure 9.12b show a lesser drop during peak hours compared to the base case in Figure 9.12a.

39.3 LTDES voltage control validation

For the blue sky validation, market pathway data is used to compare with PNNL baseline data to see the effectiveness of the market function on substation feeder head performance analysis process, as shown below:



Figure 9.13: Blue Sky Validation Process

SMO + SMA Direct Aggregation Flow:

- Market Forecast is aggregated to primary node and used as setpoint in ADMS
- Calculate Standard Deviation of PF result

SMO + SMA Direct Aggregation Flow:

- PNNL baseline is aggregated to primary node and used as setpoint in ADMS
- Calculate Standard Deviation of PF result

The performance analysis result is shown below:



Figure 9.14: Blue Sky Validation Result

PNNL baseline data is used as SCADA input to the ADMS model. Figure 9.14 shows the primary node load at 1:00PM.

- Baseline load without Market (red)
- Baseline load with Market participation (red)

Results of the co-simulation clearly show that some of the large load is curtailed by the market pathway (Node 76 17 kW curtail) and total demand on the feeder head (substation) is also reduced by 120 kW. In conclusion, the market function acts like a dynamic load management agent at the primary node level. It has the net effect of curtailing high load node when needed. It reduces the feeder head total demand without operator involvement.

39.4 NREL voltage control validation

The secondary market services demonstrated during the EUREICA project is based on the market module described above. While markets presently implemented in the operation of the grid are only at the transmission level, this project demonstrates the concept of retail markets, which are implemented at the distribution level on the primary feeder, secondary feeder, and consumer level. The market operators at the secondary feeder level are called secondary market operators (SMO), and they receive bids from IoT Coordinated Assets (ICAs), which are groups of IoT devices operating together to provide grid services. Consumer Market Operators (CMOs) operate between the houses in a particular secondary feeder, and they provide customer flexibility information to the ICAs. Further details about the market structure is provided in [118]. The market structure is implemented using the same validation platform, with the primary feeders modeled on the RTDS, secondary feeders and below on Typhoon HIL and Raspberry Pis. Figure 9.15 shows the overall architecture of this implementation by which the consumer market operator (CMO) receives DER predictions from federated learning. SMO solves for secondary market setpoints at each primary feeder node, and then they are distributed to the CMOs, and ultimately to the IoT devices. The market operates in the blue-sky scenario, and with an objective of voltage regulation and minimization of power import from the main grid.



Figure 9.15: Implementation of secondary market services in real-time

Chapter 10

Black sky scenarios

In this chapter, we apply the EUREICA framework to enhance the resilience of the distribution grid to cyber-physical attacks under the 'black sky' scenario. This is the primary goal of this project. We use our coordination mechanism to validate the mitigation of attacks of different levels of severity, with attack magnitudes that range from 5 to 40% of the total peak load. Both grid-connected and islanded cases are studied. In all cases, we show that grid resilience can be obtained through a combination of locally available flexible assets and reconfiguration of the grid topology. In addition to numerical simulations, we report results from the validation partners as well.

40 Attack scenarios

This section presents use cases that illustrate how SA can be leveraged to ensure grid resilience in a distribution grid with a high penetration of DERs. Four different attack scenarios are considered, all of which are motivated by the two large-scale attacks in [153, 167] on power grids. Disruptive attacks are assumed to occur in the form of (a) a sudden loss of generation, and/or (b) a sudden increase in load, at multiple vulnerable locations. All use cases are simulated using an IEEE 123-node test feeder; extensions to more realistic and larger networks [110] can be implemented similarly.

40.1 Attack 1

In this attack, it assumed that a small percentage of generation or load resources at either the primary or secondary feeder level are compromised. In particular, it is assumed that these units are offline due to either an outage, natural calamity, or malicious cyber-attacker using elevated privileges to disconnect the units. In addition to the generation shortfall, it is assumed that the communication link between the market operators (PMO/SMO) and the resilience managers (PRM/SRM) is also affected by a denial of service (DoS) attack, which compromises the availability of a resource (see [9] for an attack which occurred on an sPower installation in Utah). Attack 1 draws inspiration from [167], where a malicious attacker used (i) elevated and unauthorized access to disconnect several resources, and (ii) severed communication links, to hamper operator visibility and response. While these attacks occurred at the transmission level, it is feasible that a similar impact can be achieved by targeting distribution grid entities, especially with the larger attack surface provided by grid-edge devices. Independently, it is possible that IoT load devices such as heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) devices, WHs, EV chargers, or refrigerators may be attacked as well as noted in [152]. Elements of both of these types of attacks are explored here in two different cases, 1a and 1b.

40.1.1 Case 1a

In this case, the grid is assumed to be subjected to a sudden increase in load at the primary feeder level level (SMO or PMA) due to malicious agents. TThere are several large loads (such as commercial buildings or industries) connected to the primary feeder, and a malicious agent can manipulate the loads in these entities to affect the grid. Typically, the grid would rely on the margin provided by grid inertia to mitigate the effect of a sudden load increase. However, in a case where the grid's resources are stretched, such as a cold snap or similar natural hazards, it is imperative that the grid-edge IoT resources be tapped to mitigate this condition. Examples of this scenario are already seen in operations, such as requests from grid operators in Alaska, Texas, and others in response to cold snaps. The operators requested customers to reduce their power consumption to support large critical loads such as chillers in hospitals. Furthermore, increased DER penetration will also lead to a loss of inertia, currently provided largely by large coal and gas plants. Case 1(b) details the performance of the proposed framework from this generation shortfall, even when the PRM does not have complete observability in the system.

40.1.2 Case 1b

Case 1b details the performance of the proposed EUREICA framework from the type of generation shortfall discussed in the previous case, even when the PRM does not have complete observability in the system. For this situation, several generating resources are assumed to be unavailable at the primary feeder level (i.e. SMO or PMA). There are several scenarios that motivate this case – for example, in the case of several cloudy days in a row (affecting wind/solar power production), or unforeseen maintenance on generating units, the grid operates at a lower margin than under normal conditions. There is also the case of a malicious actor disconnecting generation resources. In this scenario, the grid experiences a generation shortfall, and in combination with the DoS attack, the system operator (PRM) loses observability.

40.1.3 Case 1c

In this case, the grid is subjected to a sudden increase in load and/or corruption of distributed generation sources from the IoT devices, in a coordinated fashion directly at the secondary feeder. DER IoT devices will soon be operated via cloud-based service mechanisms that allow them to be controlled remotely. Thus, a sufficiently motivated malicious actor could gain control of a large number of these resources to suddenly reduce generation or increase load in a coordinated fashion. As such, Case 1c simulated a scenario in which a large number of DERs (such as solar PV smart inverters) are attacked at the SMA level.

40.2 Attack 2

For this case, larger-scale attack is assumed to occur at the distribution grid level in the form of several DERs being corrupted, causing them to go offline. The scale of this attack is assumed to be such that the impact is felt even in the transmission grid. This attack will explore how SA by the PRM and SRM helps mitigate this impact. Similar to Attack 1, this use case combines elements of both [152] and [167]. The similarity to the latter is that the corruption is inserted in the form of outages of large DERs, while that to the former is that it introduces oscillations at the transmission level. For this purpose, the well-known Kundur 2-area test system will be used to understand the transient and dynamic transmission-level impacts [88]. In particular, this case assumes that there is an outage in one of the two areas (Area 2) that is load-rich, which introduces additional stress on the tie-line connecting the 2 areas (see Figure 10.26 for a diagram of the 2-area system).

40.3 Attack 3

The substation transformer is located at node 150, which is connected to the main transmission grid under normal operating conditions. However, under this attack, the distribution grid is islanded from the main grid at node 150. This could be due to a multitude of factors – such as wildlife tripping the transmission line from the substation to the distribution system, or a cyber-attack (i.e., integrity or disruption attack) that trips the circuit breaker from the main grid. With the increased SA introduced through our framework, we will demonstrate that the distribution system loads can be picked up in a coordinated fashion.

41 Mitigation using market operators and resilience managers

The EUREICA market framework, consisting of the SM and PM, provides situational awareness (SA) in the form of available power injections at various nodes at the primary and secondary levels. Once the market is cleared, during execution, the actual injections from the SMA and PMA are monitored by the SRM and PRM, respectively (see Figure 6.4). These injections are then utilized by these managers to compute commitment scores, trustability scores, and resilience scores (RS), as shown in Section 27.5 and Section 28.1. The following discussion will show how the SA from the market operators and the RS from the resilience managers can be utilized to mitigate all the attacks.

As a result of continuous monitoring, any unexpected deviation from the agents' nominal performance in the form of change in the net injection at the PCC, raises a flag. Any such flag makes the operators shift from the nominal operating mode to the resilience mode. Minimal visibility regarding actual injections from all PMAs is assumed to be available. Therefore, a reasonable assumption is that each SRM only locally observes the actual injection from the corresponding SMA, and each SRM communicates that information to the PRM. More importantly, the attack scenarios considered in this case also assume that this important communication to the PRM from all SRMs is completely sabotaged (as was the case in the Ukraine 2015-16 attacks). Despite this loss of communication, the PRM is able to step in and mitigate the attack as the flag raised is independent of this communication loss and is due to a physical impact of the agents' deviation from nominal performance. Subsequently, the PMO redispatches trustworthy PMAs so as to bring the power import from the bulk grid down to pre-attack levels. The new setpoints for the PMAs/SMOs are in turn suitably disaggregated to compute new setpoints for the SMAs through a re-dispatch by the SM. Before proceeding to the results, a specific mitigation strategy is proposed that leverages the SA provided by this approach.


Δt_p
Δt_s
t_{s_0}
t_{p_0}
t_{s_1}
t_{s_2}
t_{s_5}
t_{p_1}
6. SM redispatch with new PM solution: SMOs disaggregate new setpoints amongst their SMAs within their flex bids for $[t_{s_1}, t_{s_2}]$
3. SMAs submit bids for $[t_{s_1}, t_{s_2}]$
4. SMO attacked
5. Mitigation: PMO redispatches all SMOs for $[t_{s_1}, t_{p_1}]$ within their flexibility limits
1. SMOs submit flexibility bids for $[t_{p_0}, t_{p_1}]$
2. PMO clears all SMOs for $[t_{p_0}, t_{p_1}]$

Figure 10.1: Timeline of attack detection and mitigation.

41.1 Algorithm (A) for redispatch by the PMO in a balanced network

Development of this algorithm involved using the BF model to consider a balanced, equivalent single-phase network. The starting point for the overall mitigation sequence is the awareness that an attack has occurred. This is realized by the PRM in the form of a change in the net load from P_{PCC} to $\overline{P}_{PCC}$, which denotes the net load from the entire primary feeder at the substation before and after the attack, respectively. This can be detected by the PRM at the substation or PCC since this is the power imported from the main transmission grid. As a result, the corresponding SMOs can carry out the proposed redispatch algorithm based on the ratio between these two values. Subsequently, it follows that a description of this proposed algorithm begins with the cost function in Equation (6.10) for the PM ACOPF problem. For ease of exposition, this can be rewritten in a simplified manner as:

$$\sum_{i=1}^{n}\left(\frac{1}{2}\,\alpha_i P_i^{G^2} + \beta_i\left(P_i^L - P_i^{L0}\right)^2\right) + \xi \cdot losses \tag{10.1}$$

$$\overline{\alpha}_i = \Delta_\alpha \alpha_i,\ \overline{\beta}_i = \Delta_\beta \beta_i,\ \overline{\xi} = \Delta_\xi \xi;\ \alpha, \beta, \xi, \Delta > 0 \tag{10.2}$$

$$\Delta_\alpha = \Delta_\beta = \frac{|P_{PCC}|}{|\overline{P}_{PCC}|},\ \Delta_\xi = \frac{|\overline{P}_{PCC}|}{|P_{PCC}|} \tag{10.3}$$

Note that a change in the power import from the main grid causes $\Delta_\alpha, \Delta_\beta, \Delta_\xi$ to deviate from unity. So, if several distributed local generator SMOs are attacked, as in Attack 1a, the net feeder load would increase, i.e. $|\overline{P}_{PCC}| > |P_{PCC}|$ (note that both $P_{PCC}, \overline{P}_{PCC} < 0$ since net loads are negative injections), thus causing $\Delta_\alpha < 1$. Applying this cost coefficient update would lower the cost coefficients from α_i to α_i'. This results in dispatching more local generation from remaining online SMOs instead of importing power from the bulk grid. As the SMOs also have information about the flexibility in their corresponding SMAs in the form of $\delta P^*, \delta Q^*$ (see Section 26.2), the overall hierarchical PM-SM market structure automatically provides the solutions of the new dispatch. Similarly, a value of $\Delta_\beta < 1$ reduces the disutility coefficients to encourage more demand response via load shifting and/or curtailment, by utilizing the downward flexibility provided by the SMOs bidding into the PM, and subsequently also by the SMAs bidding into the SM. In contrast to these two values, when the net import from the main grid increases, then $\Delta_\xi > 1$ penalizes electrical line losses more heavily in the objective function. As a result, the redispatch discourages imports from the transmission grid in favor of dispatching more local DERs. This is because distribution grids are more lossy (have higher resistance to reactance ratios), and hence prioritizing the loss minimization makes it more efficient to utilize local generation closer to the loads being served.

After deriving the multiplicative coefficient update factors $\Delta_\alpha, \Delta_\beta, \Delta_\xi$, the PRM can broadcast these common values to all the SRMs simultaneously, who in turn send them to their corresponding SMOs. The SMOs update each of their objective function coefficients using these factors and then perform distributed optimization to redispatch the PM, resulting in new P and Q setpoints for SMOs, along with new nodal distribution LMPs (d-LMPs). This is followed by each SMO also re-dispatching their SM, in order to disaggregate the new setpoints among their SMAs. A timeline of the key events is shown in Figure 10.1.

41.2 Algorithm (B) for redispatch in an unbalanced, 3-phase network

For the unbalanced 3-phase case, a modified algorithm is used for the coefficient update. The update rule in this case is more sophisticated since the variables are now 3-phase vectors rather than scalars.

$$\Delta = \mathbf{P}_{PCC} - \overline{\mathbf{P}}_{PCC} \tag{10.4}$$

$$Z_i\left(\delta_i\right) = 1 + \frac{RS_i \Delta^\top \delta_i}{\mu \sum_i RS_i} \Longrightarrow \gamma_{i\delta} = \frac{1}{Z_i\left(\delta_i\right)} \tag{10.5}$$

$$\overline{\boldsymbol{\alpha}}_i = \gamma_{i\alpha}\boldsymbol{\alpha}_i, \quad \overline{\boldsymbol{\beta}}_i = \gamma_{i\beta}\boldsymbol{\beta}_i, \quad \overline{\boldsymbol{\xi}} = \left(\frac{\sum_i \gamma_{i\alpha} + \gamma_{i\beta}}{2n}\right)^{-1} \boldsymbol{\xi} \tag{10.6}$$

Note here that $\mathbf{P}_{PCC}, \overline{\mathbf{P}}_{PCC}$ are the 3-phase power imports from the tie line before and after the attack. Additionally, $\boldsymbol{\alpha}_i, \boldsymbol{\beta}_i$ are 3×1 vectors representing cost and disutility coefficient for each phase at SMO node i, and $\boldsymbol{\xi}$ is a 3-phase hyperparameter that penalizes line losses in the objective function. A DG attack that increases net load would result in $\gamma_{i\alpha}, \gamma_{i\beta} < 1$ and $\overline{\boldsymbol{\xi}} < \boldsymbol{\xi}$. Thus, these coefficient updates work using a similar intuition to Algorithm (A) in that it favors local DER generation and load flexibility over transmission imports. A key difference here is that the PRM also takes into account the RS of each SMO during the redispatch so that it relies more heavily on resilient SMOs for attack mitigation. The PRM updates the coefficients α_i, β_i and ξ to α_i', β_i' and ξ', and sends the new coefficient values to all SRMs. The SRMs send these new objective functions to the corresponding SMOs, and the rest of the mitigation procedure follows in the same manner as in the previous section.

42 Resilience-drive reconfiguration algorithm for attack mitigation

All possible shortest paths are computed between each generation source and critical load pairs present within the system using the graph network. If existing generation is not enough to supply the total critical load, then the algorithm searches for the next available generation. This search will continue until the critical load demand is met. As the generation sources are assigned to critical loads, if any source's capacity is more than the assigned load, the source's partial remaining capacity will be utilized for other loads. Once all the feasible paths for reconfiguration are identified, the resiliency metric will be computed for each path (see Section 28.2 for how to compute the resiliency metrics and PNR), which will support the operator in finding the most resilient path to restore the feeder. The reconfiguration paths will be determined based on the stress levels of the grid and the corresponding degree of the failed SMA node, the tolerance bands and flexibility of the ICA, and the security levels and privacy needs of the SMA. This process is outlined in Figure 10.2.

Algorithm 1 Compute reconfiguration pathway

```
Given total generation $G$, generation units $\mathcal{G}_i = \{G_1, G_2, \ldots, G_i\}$, total load $L$, load nodes $\mathcal{L}_i = \{L_1, L_2, \ldots, L_i\}$, graph network, switch settings, $\mathcal{S}_i = \{S_1, \ldots, S_n\}$
while $G < L$, do
    for Load $L_i$ in $\mathcal{L}_i$ do
        Find shortest path $path_i$ to generation units $\mathcal{G}_i$
        Sort paths based on electrical distance in the ascending order
    end for
    Find leaf nodes $\mathcal{L}_i^n$ in $\mathcal{L}_i$
    for all $\mathcal{L}_i^n$ do
        Find next node in $path_i$ $j$ to $\mathcal{G}_i$
        $TotalLoss = TotalLoss + PowerLossInPath$
        Update $\mathcal{L}_i^n$ to $j$
        if Leaf nodes $\mathcal{L}_i^n$ is empty then
            break
        end if
    end for
end while
for all $paths$ do
    If there is a $\mathcal{S}_i$ in path, then assign $\mathcal{S}_i == 1$
    if $path$ is a tree then
        Break
    else
        Adjust $\mathcal{S}_i$ for $path$ to return to tree structure
    end if
end for
Update $\mathcal{G}_{i+1} = \{G_1, G_2, \ldots, G_{i+1}\}$
Update $\mathcal{S}_i = \{S_1^0, \ldots, S_n^0\}$
Compute resiliency metric at the primary level $PNR$ for the switch setting $\mathcal{S}_N$.
Implement the $path$ with the highest $PNR$.
```

Figure 10.2: Resilience-based reconfiguration algorithm.

43 Results

43.1 Numerical simulation setup for markets

All use cases considered are based on an IEEE 123-node test feeder (see Figure 2.2), which is radial, unbalanced, and multi-phase. The feeder was modeled in the Gridlab-D$^{\text{TM}}$ environment (see Section 30 for more details) and augmented to have a high penetration of DERs. For all attacks (except Attack 3), we assumed that the switch settings were assumed to be in their nominal positions such that there is one primary feeder having 85 active nodes with SMOs/PMAs (out of the 123 in total). A PMO was assumed to be at the slack bus (substation), at either 115 or 69kV, with the SMOs at 4.16kV, and each SMA at 120-240V. The flexibility bids for the SMAs and the SMOs were randomly generated, allowing each to offer flexibilities of up to ±30% around their baseline power injections [127]. 5-minute real-time market LMPs from the California ISO were used, and assumed the Q-LMP to be 10% of the P-LMP. Note that for all attack scenarios (except Attack 3), the CI model was used to represent the feeder as is.

For Attack 2, however, a modified version of the feeder was considered, and deployed the BF model instead. In this scenario, the original IEEE 123-node feeder was modified to consider having a few large distributed generators (PV, batteries, diesel generators) concentrated at just five primary feeder (SMO) nodes numbered 25, 40, 67, 81, and 94. This is in contrast to the other attacks where there were instead a larger number of smaller DERs distributed throughout the network. Another distinguishing factor of this scenario is that the originally unbalanced feeder was converted to an equivalent balanced 3-phase model by (i) assuming all switches to be at their normal positions, (ii) converting single-phase spot loads to 3-phase, (iii) assuming cables to be 3-phase transposed, (iv) converting configurations 1 thru 12 to symmetric matrices and (v) modeling shunt capacitors as 3-phase reactive power generators [63]. Each SMO was assumed to have between 3-5 SMAs with the number chosen uniformly at random. Since the injection data in the original IEEE 123-node model was only available up to the primary feeder node level, the injections at each SMO were artificially randomly disaggregated amongst its SMAs, which could be net loads or generators.

A co-simulation was then performed of both the PM and SM for all attack scenarios. Refer to [115, 118] for the behavior of this market structure for a nominal scenario when there is no attack. The discussions that follow only consider the three attack scenarios described above. Also note that the proposed flexibility bids were synthetically created. So, the resulting flexible ranges in the subsequent simulations may be quite large at times and not realistic in some cases. However, the proposed framework can be generally applied to cases where there is less DER flexibility as well.

With the numerical simulation setup described in Section 43.1, the following sections provide details of how each of these attacks is mitigated using the proposed EUREICA framework. Note that for all attacks (except Attack 2), the mitigation strategy described in Section 41.2is used. For Attacks 2a and 2b, the algorithm in Section 41.1 is used instead. In addition to market simulations, results were validated using high-fidelity software at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), LTDES, and the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL). Technical details for each validation platform can be found in Chapter 7.

43.2 Mitigation of Attack 1a

Note that in Attack 1a, loads are compromised leading to an increase in the power import from the bulk grid. It is also assumed that the communication from all SRMs to the PRM is disrupted, while the communication from the PRM to the SRMs remains intact. That is, the PRM loses observability but is still able to communicate the redispatch of the new coefficients to the SRMs. Note that this report does not consider the case when observability is not lost since such a discussion is beyond the scope of this project. With the redispatch, the PM-SM framework identifies all of the new trustable PMAs (through the SA computations described in Section 41), which will provide the injections needed to fully mitigate the attack, and the overall power balance is thus met at all points in the distribution grid.

The steps in mitigation are as follows: 10 SMO nodes are attacked, resulting in a total increase in load (generation shortfall) of 36 kW for the entire feeder as seen in Figure 10.3a. A large number of flexible load nodes across the entire feeder help with mitigation by curtailment and shifting as in Figure 10.4. Flexible load curtailment at individual SMO nodes ranges from a minimum of 0.55 kW to a maximum of 7.8 kW reduction per primary feeder node - using a combination of resources like HVAC, WHs, batteries, and EVs to reduce the net load. There is a 123 kW decrease in power import after mitigation as seen in Figure 10.3b. The new SMO setpoints from the PM redispatch are then disaggregated amongst their SMAs during the following SM redispatch, with an example for SMO 77 shown in Figure 10.5.



(a) Net load at attacked nodes.

(b) Feeder power import from main grid.

Figure 10.3: Effect of Attack 1a and mitigation.



Figure 10.4: Curtailment of flexible loads for Attack 1a mitigation.



Figure 10.5: Dis-aggregation of setpoint changes (from the PM) for SMO at node 77 across its 3 SMAs (in the SM) on phase B, after Attack 1a mitigation.

43.2.1 Attack 1a validation by LTDES

The outputs from the PM-SM market framework were sent to the DERIM interface using which the effect on the total net load at the substation feeder head could be determined with the DERIM-ADMS-DOTS software platform (see Figure 7.9 for an overview of the validation process). It is clear from Figure 10.6, that without the intervention of EUREICA, the impact of the attack is a 37 kW jump in the feeder demand; in contrast with EUREICA, the feeder demand is cut by 94 kW. Moving further ahead from the attack timestep, the feeder net load eventually approaches the same value as if there hadn't been an attack.



Figure 10.6: LTDES validation of Attack 1a in the DERIM-ADMS platform, showing total power import at the substation around the attack time at 13:00.

While Figure 10.6 zooms in on the period around the attack timestep, Figure 10.7 shows the total feeder head load over the entire 24-hour simulation horizon. We can clearly see the blip at 13:00 PST indicating the impact of the attack. Figure 10.8 shows the effects of attack and mitigation on the net load at all the SMO primary nodes. This shows that the DERIM-ADMS-DOTS validation produces results similar to the market simulation in Figure 10.3a and Figure 10.4. The attack increases the load at the following nodes: 12, 17, 21, 36, 65, 75, 95, 105, 112, and 113. The majority of load curtailment for mitigation is contributed by the larger loads at nodes 1, 16, 48, 76, and 88.



Figure 10.7: Effects of Attack 1a on total load at feeder head over 24 hours.



Figure 10.8: Load change at primary nodes during Attack 1a. The values (i) without attack, (ii) with attack, and (iii) with attack mitigation are shown in the blue, red, and green bars, respectively. The SMO nodes providing the most flexibility are circled.

43.2.2 Validation of Attack 1a by PNNL using HELICS

This attack artificially increases the load at several devices throughout the network. Figure 10.9 shows the effects of Attack 1a and mitigation on the total feeder load over the course of the 48-hour simulation, which was performed using the HELICS platform and a Gridlab-D$^{\text{TM}}$ model (see Section 30 for details). At first glance, the results indicate that the application of the LEM during day 2 generally results in curtailment of net load by leveraging DER flexibility, relative to day 1 (when the market is not used). Secondly, upon zooming in on the attack period (around 13:00 PST) reveals that the LA attack increases the total system load. However, attack mitigation is quickly able to reduce the system load using flexibility and help the system recover.



Figure 10.9: Validation of Attack 1a mitigation effects of the EUREICA framework using HELICS, showing system load over 48 hours.

43.2.3 Validation of Attack 1a by NREL using ARIES

The market structure is implemented using the same validation platform, with the primary feeders modeled on the RTDS, and secondary feeders, and below on Typhoon HIL and Raspberry Pis. In the implementation, the SMAs receive DER predictions from federated learning. The PMO and SMOs solve for primary and secondary market setpoints at each primary feeder node and secondary feeder, respectively, and then they are distributed to the SMAs, and ultimately to the IoT devices. Under nominal conditions (without an attack), the market operates with the objective of voltage regulation and minimization of power import from the main grid.



Figure 10.10: Implementation of market services to mitigate load increase in Attack 1a.

In the case of Attack 1a, the secondary feeder load increases by 63 kW, which may be driven by various factors, such as weather-related load swings, or a coordinated cyber attack across IoT devices, such as the MadIoT attack. In this case, the mitigation is provided by using 30 flexible load nodes. Curtailment at the IoT device level ranges from a minimum of 0.2 kW reduction and a maximum of 0.5 kW reduction per primary feeder node. In total, approximately 130 kW of power import from the main grid decreases after mitigation. Market clearing happens every minute, and the drop in the load is shown in Figure 10.10. The IoT device response, which is the thermostat in this case, has an instantaneous response, with an immediate drop in net load.

43.3 Attack 1b mitigation based on resilience

In Attack 1b, there is a loss in net generation, and therefore the power imported from the bulk grid increases. It is also assumed that the communication from all SRMs to the PRM is disrupted, while the communication from PRM to the SRMs remains intact. That is, the PRM loses observability but is still able to communicate the redispatch of the new coefficients to the SRMs. Note that this report does not consider the case when observability is not lost since such a discussion is beyond the scope of this project. With the redispatch, the PM-SM framework identifies all of the new trustable PMAs through the SA computations described in Chapter 6 with the overall power balance met at all points in the distribution grid.

The steps in mitigating this attack are as follows. Due to the attack, 45 kW of net-generation is compromised as shown in Figure 10.11a. The PMO alerts other trustable PMAs/SMOs to redispatch their generation assets in the PM. Trustable PMAs/SMOs will curtail flexible loads to respond and mitigate the attack as in Figure 10.13. The redispatch is also influenced by the resilience scores of different SMOs over time as shown in Figure 10.14. SMOs redispatch the SM which then provides correct setpoints to all their SMAs. An an example, Figure 10.12 shows how the SMO at node 35 disaggregates its new setpoint amongst its 3 SMAs. As a result of mitigation, the total import from the main grid stays at the same level as shown in Figure 10.11b.



(a) Generation with and without Attack 1b.

(b) Feeder power import.

Figure 10.11: Effects of Attack 1b on SMO net generation and power import.



Figure 10.12: Dis-aggregation of changes in the setpoints for SMO (from the PM) at node 35 across its 3 SMAs (in the SM), resulting from Attack 1b mitigation, along with each SMA's RS. All 3 SMAs are on phase A.



Figure 10.13: Curtailment of flexible loads for Attack 1b mitigation.



Figure 10.14: Locational-temporal trends of RS across all flexible SMO nodes and over the whole simulation period of 24 hours.

The next step is to highlight the effects of resilience scores on the mitigation of Attack 1b, where a number of DGs are attacked. The simulation also considers how the RSs of SMOs and SMAs influence which resources are utilized to mitigate the attack. The RSs of the flexible SMOs are plotted against their absolute and relative levels of net load curtailment in Figure 10.15a and Figure 10.15b, respectively. This shows that, in relative terms, the curtailment is generally distributed evenly to ensure that no single SMO is disproportionately affected. However, if the PMO does need to utilize more flexibility from certain SMOs, it generally calls upon more reliable ones with higher RSs. The absolute amounts of curtailment vary for each SMO based on their baseline load. This also holds while dis-aggregating SMO setpoints at the SM level, where the SMO allocates greater flexibility to SMAs with higher RSs, as seen in Figure 10.5.



(a) Absolute curtailment and RS.

(b) Relative curtailment and RS.

Figure 10.15: Distribution of absolute and relative amounts of load curtailment across the flexible net load SMOs, along with their corresponding resilience scores.

43.3.1 Validation of Attack 1b by PNNL using HELICS

The HELICS-based co-simulation platform was utilized to simulate this use case in which several of the distributed generation resources are being disconnected leading to about a 44 kW loss in generation. This loss is accomplished in the model simulation by taking the PVs at the buses offline as indicated in Figure 10.11a. However, with the SA enabled through the market module, the SM agents are informed about how much they need to adjust their flexible assets, which results in an approximate 36 kW load and local generation alteration after attack mitigation to counterbalance the distributed generation loss, as seen in Figure 10.13. The effect of the market integration on the total system load during the second 24-hour period of a 48-hour simulation is depicted in Figure 10.16. In particular, the window details the attack that happens around 13:00 on the second day and how the total flexible load is manipulated to mitigate the need for increased generation demand from the main grid. Note that the attack mitigation reduces the impact of the attack by lowering the total feeder load and bringing it back down closer to the values as if there wasn't an attack. However, note that even after mitigation, the load is still slightly higher than the 'without attack' case for some periods but much lower than the 'with attack' case.



Figure 10.16: Validation of Attack 1b mitigation effects of the EUREICA framework using HELICS, showing system load over 48 hours.

43.3.2 Validation of Attack 1b by LTDES using DERIM and ADMS-DOTS

Figure 10.17 shows the effects of the Attack 1b on the total system load over the full 24-hor simulation while Figure 10.18 zooms in on the time period of the attack. The graphs show that without the market-based mitigation, the feeder demand would have jumped by 68 kW due to the attack. However, with mitigation, the attack impact is minimal since there's only a 4 kW increase in feeder demand. Figure 10.19 shows the changes in net injections at all primary nodes during Attack 1b. This essentially shows that flexibility from several primary nodes is leveraged across the feeder, producing results similar to those discussed in Section 43.3. The attack causes the following DER nodes to lose power and go offline: 9, 28, 45, 55, 56, 58, 62, 73, 82, and 94. The following flexible load nodes contribute a majority of the curtailment needed to mitigate: 1, 48, 76, and 88.



Figure 10.17: Effects of Attack 1b on the total load at the feeder head over 24 h.



Figure 10.18: LTDES validation of Attack 1b in the DERIM-ADMS platform, showing total power import at the substation around the attack time at 13:00.



Figure 10.19: Load change at primary nodes during Attack 1b. The values (i) without attack, (ii) with attack, and (iii) with attack mitigation are shown in the blue, red, and green bars, respectively. The SMO nodes providing the most flexibility are circled.

Figure 10.20 compares the load setpoints at the SMO level (updated every 5 minutes) for node 76 versus the aggregated setpoints over all the SMAs at this node (cleared every minute). Although these are largely similar, there are some slight differences between the two values. Thus, it may make more sense to utilize the more precise SMA setpoints directly for the ADMS simulation.



Figure 10.20: Forecasted values of SMO and SMA setpoints at primary node 76 during Attack 1b mitigation.

Some further analysis was also performed on the role of the SM and PM in attack mitigation. Figure 10.21 compares the contributions of the setpoints of the SMOs (5 minutes) and the SMAs (1 minute). The blue bar shows the 5-minute setpoint changes expected from the SMOs, while the orange bar shows the 1-minute setpoint changes at the SMA level. We see that the SM clearing every minute and the associated SMA setpoint changes contribute more toward the overall primary load adjustment when compared to the SMO-level changes alone.



Figure 10.21: Comparison of forecasted changes in SMO and SMA setpoints due to Attack 1b mitigation.

43.4 Attack 1c mitigation

Attack 1c is a more distributed attack where individual SMAs representing secondary feeders are attacked directly. This scenario considered a case where a large number of DERs, including solar PV and batteries, are attacked. A total of 53 SMA nodes with DGs were compromised and taken offline, resulting in a total loss in generation capacity of 157 kW. This leads to a decrease in the net injections across all the SMOs as seen in Figure 10.22a - there are no longer any SMOs with net generation after the attack and the loss of local generation also increases the net load at the SMOs. This leads to an increase in power import from the main transmission grid as in Figure 10.22b.



(a) SMO injections.

(b) 3-phase power imports from the main grid.

Figure 10.22: Effects of Attack 1c on SMO injections and power import.

In the case of all other attacks, the mitigation strategy involves the PM redispatch occurring first, followed by the SM redispatch. There, only the PM is directly involved in attack mitigation while the SM is only used to disaggregate the new SMO setpoints amongst their SMAs. However, in the case of Attack 1c, the SM redispatch occurs first at the secondary feeder level and is then followed by the PM redispatch at the primary feeder level. Thus, both the SM and PM are actively involved in attack mitigation in this case. Figure 10.22b shows that the attack can be partially mitigated by leveraging the flexibility of SMAs in the SM. However, SM mitigation alone is not sufficient. The inter-SMO flexibility in the PM must also be utilized to fully mitigate and restore the feeder import back down to the pre-attack level. A summary of the attack metrics is shown in Table 10.1.

Table 10.1: Attack 1c summary.

	Power import [kW]	**Total net load [kW]**
Pre-attack	1412	1457
Post-attack	1722	1716
SM mitigation only	1553	1547
SM + PM mitigation	1422	1417

This exercise also compared the flexibility bids of the SMOs before and after the attack in Figure 10.23. As expected, the net load of the bids generally increases across all SMOs due to the loss of local DERs at their respective SMAs. However, by leveraging their SMA flexibilities, the SMOs are still able to offer some flexibility to the PM to help mitigate the attack.



Figure 10.23: Comparison of SMO flexibility bids into the PM before and after the attack. The dashed and dotted lines indicate the baseline values while the shaded regions are the flexibility bids around the baseline.

43.4.1 Contributions of SM and PM to Attack 1c mitigation

As stated previously, Attack 1c is a more distributed attack where individual SMAs are attacked directly. This case shows how both the SM and PM flexibility are needed to fully mitigate the attack. Figure 10.24 shows the contributions of the SM and PM toward attack mitigation. Results show that, for most of the SMO nodes, both the SM and PM flexibility play a significant role in reducing the net load compared to the post-attack case. At the SM level, the available upward flexibility of any SMAs with remaining online DERs is utilized along with the downward flexibility of all net load SMAs. At the PM level, the downward load flexibility of the SMOs (which are all net loads after the attack) is utilized.



Figure 10.24: Contributions of SM and PM flexibility for Attack 1c mitigation.

43.5 Mitigation of Attack 2

This section describes the mitigation of two attacks at the primary feeder level that are relatively broader in scope, one is a medium-scale and the second is a large-scale attack. Both are disruption attacks where the attacker shuts down one or more of the large DERs in the network. This case considers a single primary market time step to study the effects of an instantaneous attack. Mitigation can use P dispatch from batteries, P and Q curtailment from flexible loads, limited P dispatch from PV, Q support from smart inverters (connected to PV and batteries), as well as conventional dispatchable fossil fuel sources like diesel generators.

43.5.1 Mitigation of Attack 2a

This corresponds to a case where there are five large distributed generators in the modified IEEE 123-node system, one of which (at SMO node 94) is taken offline. For this instance, the remaining four SMO nodes (25, 40, 67, 81) have more than enough remaining generation capacity to meet the shortfall caused by the attack. Without mitigation, the attack would have resulted in an additional import of about 261 kW from the main grid. However, by utilizing the upward flexibility of remaining SMOs, the attack can be fully resolved, which reduces the total power imported back to pre-attack levels. The left side of Figure 10.25 shows the results of the PM dispatch before the attack and after attack mitigation for the five key SMO nodes of interest. The plot also shows the SMO's bids into the PM, with the dashed blue line being the baseline injection bid and the blue-shaded region representing the upward/downward flexibility around it. The right side of the figure shows the results of the SM re-dispatch after the attack mitigation and PM re-dispatch for SMO 67 (as an example). The new setpoints are disaggregated among its three SMAs, with SMA 1 being a net load while SMAs 2 and 3 are net generators.



Figure 10.25: Mitigation of small-scale Attack 2a.

43.5.2 Large-scale Attack 2b

For this scenario, a top-down approach was adopted in emulating an attack and starting with a Kundur 2-area transmission model, with the attack occurring in Area 2. Figure 10.26 is a diagram of the Kundur 2-area transmission system commonly used as a test case to study dynamic stability, power interchange, oscillation damping, etc. The system contains 11 buses, four generators, and two areas. The two areas are connected with weak tie lines [88].



Figure 10.26: Schematic of Kundur 2-area power system

Noting that Area 2 (which consists of a load of 1767 M) can be broken down into 552 IEEE 123-node feeders, each with approximately 3.2 MW, an assumption is made that an attack compromising

about 650 kW of generation, occurs in each of these 552 feeders. This in turn corresponds to an overall shortfall of 359 MW at the transmission level. For the simulation, this 650 kW shortfall was introduced in the form of a generation loss at four nodes: 25, 40, 81, and 94, in each of the 552 primary feeders. The only remaining SMO with significant generation capability is at node 67. With the same procedure as outlined in the previous scenarios, the use of the proposed EUREICA framework leads to the results depicted in Figure 10.27. In order to mitigate the attack, the upward generation flexibility of the remaining SMO at node 67 needs to be leveraged to increase its output injection after attack mitigation. Meanwhile, the net injections for all the other four attacked SMOs drop to zero (as seen in the left plot), and the right plot shows the new SMA schedules resulting from the revised SM clearing.



Figure 10.27: Mitigation of large-scale Attack 2b.

However, due to the larger scale of the attack, re-dispatching the generator SMOs is no longer sufficient to fully meet the shortfall. Furthermore, as seen in Figure 10.27, the upward flexibility of the remaining online SMO at node 67 cannot be fully utilized since its dispatch is limited by power flow constraints, on nodal voltages and line currents in particular. Thus, some shifting and curtailment of high-wattage flexible loads needs to be performed. These shifts could include EVs and thermostatically controlled loads like HVAC and WHs. In addition, some discharging of battery storage systems could also be utilized to reduce the net load. The distribution of net load reductions across the remaining SMOs is shown in Figure 10.28, with a total decrease of around 14%. These load reductions are evident in Table 10.2, which also indicates that the attack would have potentially increased the power import from the transmission grid by over 37%. But, the combination of increased local generation and load curtailment helps keep the imported amount almost the same as before the attack started.



Figure 10.28: Flexible load curtailment for large attack mitigation.

43.5.3 Effects at the transmission level

The overall impact of the generation shortfall and mitigation using EUREICA is simulated in the RTDS using a proxy where the individual feeders are not modeled, but the aggregated effect is studied at the transmission level. A combined shortfall of 359 MW, corresponding to a simultaneous compromise and outage of 650 kW in all 552 primary feeders in Area 2 triggers a frequency event (see Figure 10.29). Left unchecked, this can potentially lead to drastic load shedding or parts of the system being blacked out. To mitigate this situation, the power flow from Area 1 to Area 2 needs to be increased, which was observed in the RTDS, through the action of the governor system, which responds in the timescale of seconds, by increasing output from the other generators present in the system proportionately based on a droop value. This increases the power flow from the generation-rich Area 1 to Area 2. However, changing the tie-line power flow creates a frequency imbalance, resulting in the system frequency oscillating, and settling at a lower/higher frequency, as shown in Figure 10.29. With the EUREICA framework, the frequency mismatch is mitigated by suitably leveraging the flexibility of the remaining generation as well as demand response (DR) mechanisms from flexible loads at both the SMO and SMA levels (see Figure 10.30). Once the governor response is completed and the system settles at a sub-optimal frequency, a combination of intelligent DR and generation redispatch in Area 2 facilitated by the EUREICA framework allows the system frequency to be restored to normal, ensuring grid resilience, avoiding system stress and increased operational costs.



Figure 10.29: Response without EUREICA; system settles at sub-optimal frequency



Figure 10.30: Frequency response with EUREICA; system settles at 60 Hz following demand response and load shedding enabled by the EUREICA framework

43.5.4 Key system metrics, economic, and distributional impacts

Simulations performed during the EUREICA project revealed that attack mitigation comes at the expense of increased operational costs for the PMO since it needs to dispatch more expensive local resources to a greater extent, rather than importing cheaper power from the main grid (at the LMP rate). The PMOs and SMOs also need to adequately compensate agents for the critical flexibility they provide. As shown in Table 10.2 for Attack 2b, the attack increases the system operating costs by around 7%, and the mitigation steps raise the cost by over 31%, both relative to the pre-attack case. However, the PMO could recoup this through other revenue streams and cost savings. For example, the transmission system operators may compensate PMOs for locally containing attacks. Being able to leverage local DER flexibility through markets could also reduce the amount of auxiliary backup generation that the PMO needs to maintain, and lower the reserves it may have to otherwise procure from capacity or ancillary service markets. The PMO in turn could also redistribute some of these benefits among the SMOs and SMAs.

Table 10.2: Summary of metrics for large-scale Attack 2b scenario.

	Pre-attack	**Post-attack**	**Attack mitigation**
Power import from main grid [kW]	1,325	1,821 (+37.4%)	1,328
Total cost [$]	10,752	11,500 (+7%)	14,156 (+31.7%)
Total load [kW]	2,064	2,023 (-0.02%)	1,775 (-14%)

Electricity prices in the PM can also be obtained from the dual variables associated with the power balance constraints in Equation (6.6)), previously referred to as distribution-LMPs (d-LMPs) at each node (with an SMO) in the primary feeder. To explore this aspect, the normalized d-LMPs for active power were compared before and after the attack, as well as post-attack mitigation, with results shown in Figure 10.31. As intuitively expected, the results indicate that nodal prices increase throughout the grid after the attack and rise even further after implementing the attack mitigation steps, signifying that the loss of some local generation makes it more expensive to satisfy network constraints and results in sub-optimal solutions. The pre-attack and post-attack prices have nearly the same spatial profile across all the SMO nodes, with the post-attack values essentially being higher by an offset. This makes sense because the d-LMP variations between nodes are influenced by congestion on lines. In the attack case without mitigation, the shortfall caused by the attack would've been compensated for entirely by importing extra power from the grid, and thus the relative congestion variation over the rest of the network remains largely unchanged. The price trends after attack mitigation look more different since the changes in power flow and congestion (resulting from the PM re-dispatch) are not uniform throughout the network. Notably, the prices are significantly more volatile, especially around the nodes affected by the attack. The price also peaks at node 67 - this makes sense since it has the highest increase in injection after attack mitigation, which in turn worsens congestion in the lines connected to it.



Figure 10.31: Effects of large-scale attack and mitigation on nodal d-LMPs at SMO nodes.

Another important consideration is the impact of the proposed mitigation approach on the different market participants, i.e., the SMOs and SMAs themselves. The objective function update rules from Sections 41.1 and 41.2 generally imply that these local resources will be compensated less per unit (kW or kVAR) of grid support they provide, either in terms of load flexibility or generation dispatch. It may also lead to significant load shifting and curtailment in order to meet grid objectives, which can reduce the overall utility of end-users. However, a more careful study of the distributional impacts of such methods is needed since they may end up disproportionately negatively impacting certain groups of customers or prosumers, which could in turn have important implications for energy affordability, equity, and fairness.

43.6 Mitigation of Attack 3



Figure 10.32: EUREICA IEEE 123-node feeder for reconfiguration module validation.

This section considers the attack scenario where the distribution grid is isolated from the transmission system. In such a case, the distribution grid is fed through an alternate circuit such as from node 350 (see Figure 10.32). A typical response in such a case is that the distribution grid breaks into several "zones" - creating smaller islands where only a portion of the load is fed through any DERs that may be present. The remainder of this section explores the premise that, with the increased awareness provided by the EUREICA framework, a much higher percentage of consumers remain unaffected, by suitably leveraging the DERs at node 48, the microgrid system connected at node 65 (marked by the red circles in Figure 10.32, and DR methodologies. In order to ensure feasibility and supply-demand balance with islanding, two large diesel generators (located at nodes 48 and 65) are introduced which may only be called upon when the feeder is islanded. Three cases are presented.

43.6.1 Critical loads distributed across the feeder

In this case, through the proposed resilience-based IoT load restoration with DR optimization strategy (see Section 42, a feasible reconfiguration path is computed to open or close tie switches and completely or partially shed non-critical grid edge loads using reconfiguration to allow the available generation resources to cover approximately 30% of total load in the system. As seen in Figure 10.33, with almost 70% of the load shed (second graph from the top) between 13:00

and 14:00 hours, and batteries only allowed to discharge, if possible, to supply extra energy (third graph from the top), the burden on the diesel generators is significantly alleviated as they only need to ramp up to about 230 KW. These results were validated using the HELICS co-simulation platform at PNNL (see Section 30 for details). Additional validation results using HELICS and LTDES are included in Section 43.6.4 and Section 43.6.5.1, respectively.



Figure 10.33: Demand and DER injections with resilience-based reconfiguration during Attack 3.

43.6.2 Critical loads aggregated in a single zone

In this case, the SA from EUREICA helps the reconfiguration algorithm to disconnect or open the switches 18-135 and 151-300 to island zone 3 and pick up only the critical loads in this zone using the DER at node 48, which is a total of 430 kW. The results from this case are shown in Figure 10.34. These results were validated using the DERIM and ADMS-DOTS software at LTDES (see Section 32 for details). Additional results are included in Section 43.6.5.



Figure 10.34: Primary node load change between 12:59 (before) and 13:00 (after attack).

43.6.3 Mitigation with a military microgrid

This case assumes that there is a military microgrid at node 66 in the primary circuit, which serves as a backup directly in the distribution system. Under existing regulations, defense critical systems have to be disconnected and isolated in the event of contingencies. Since EUREICA has the ability to identify trusted resources, a logical thesis is that there is confidence in the security of this resource as well as in meeting the power flow requirements, making it feasible to use this additional resource for Attack 3 mitigation. First, the fault is isolated using reconfiguration based on the algorithm described in Figure 10.2. The reconfiguration algorithm returns the most resilient path for implementation. In this case, since only one feasible path is available, it is chosen for this exercise. This islands the feeder by opening the switch between nodes 150 and 149 and connecting the switches to the DER and microgrid at nodes 48 and 66, respectively. Then, a combination of 1.7 MW from the microgrid at node 66, 560 kW from the DER at node 48, and customer-side DR is utilized to pick up approximately 80% of the total load of the feeder. Some results from this case are shown in Figure 10.35, validated using the ARIES platform at NREL (see Section 31 for details). The complete set of results can be found in Section 43.6.6.



(a) Microgrid response after reconfiguration.

(b) DG response after reconfiguration.

Figure 10.35: System response after reconfiguration with microgrid.

43.6.4 Validation of Attack 3 by PNNL using HELICS

The enhanced EUREICA IEEE 123-node feeder is covered partially by the local distributed energy resources, that is the PVSs and BESSs, and mainly from the main grid through a connection at node 150, as shown in Figure 10.32. MMoreover, the system has 2 large diesel generators available at buses 48 (150 kVA rated capacity) and 66 (1 MVA rated capacity), respectively, that could be called upon to serve loads in case of adversarial events. Also, a set of switches between certain nodes of the feeder configures it into 7 areas that could be isolated in certain scenarios to be able to serve critical loads, as in Figure 10.32. The initial configuration of the switches is given in Table 10.3.

Table 10.3: Original switch configuration in the EUREICA IEEE 123-node test feeder.

Node A	Node B	Switch status
13	152	CLOSED
18	135	CLOSED
60	160	CLOSED
61	610	CLOSED
97	197	CLOSED
150	149	CLOSED
250	251	OPEN
450	451	OPEN
300	350	OPEN
95	195	OPEN
54	94	OPEN
151	300	OPEN
13	18	CLOSED
86	76	CLOSED
48	48_dg	OPEN
65	65_dg	OPEN

The validation scenario assumes that due to an adversary event, either a cyber attack or a physical phenomenon, the distribution system gets islanded from the main grid, which is simulated by opening the switch between nodes 150 and 149 at 13:00. The feeder's reconnection to the main grid is assumed to happen at 14:00. As expected, at 13:00 the system collapses, which is demonstrated by the sudden drop to 0 for all the spot-load bus voltages, as seen in Figure 10.36.



Figure 10.36: Black-out as a result of distribution system islanding in Attack 3.

The proposed reconfiguration and load shed approach addresses the situation created at 13:00 hours, creates situational awareness, and decides the switch statuses and loads that might need to be shed. Once the feeder is disconnected from the grid, if the available diesel generators could have been brought online by reconfiguring the status of the corresponding switches, the blackout depicted in Figure 10.37 would have been prevented.



Figure 10.37: Voltage recovery after engaging diesel generators during Attack 3.

However, as seen in Figure 10.38, to supply the entire house population load (the total measurements from the house management units in the second graph from the top), even with the support of the PVs and batteries, the diesel generators would still need a total capacity of over 2 MW (as seen in bottom-most graph of Figure 10.38), which is more than the maximum capacity of the diesel generators modeled for this case.



Figure 10.38: Demand and DERs without resilience-based reconfiguration during Attack 3.

Through the proposed resilience-based IoT load restoration with demand response optimization strategy, a feasible reconfiguration path is computed to open and/or close tie switches and shed either completely/partially grid edge loads to allow the available generation resources to cover the approximately 30% critical load in the system, as identified in Table 7.1. As seen in Figure 10.33, with the almost 70% load shed (second graph from the top) between 13:00 and 14:00 hours, and batteries only allowed to discharge, if possible, to supply extra energy (third graph from the top), the burden on the diesel generators is significantly alleviated as they only need to ramp up to about 230 KW.

For the islanded attack, the power flow redirection through switch reconfiguration (algorithm described in Figure 10.2) and load shed also helps with keeping the spot-load buses voltages within the admissible limits during the attack (Figure 10.39). Moreover, by bringing the loads back online sequentially after system recovery, under-voltage problems due to load rebound are also avoided.



Figure 10.39: Voltage recovery after resilience-based reconfiguration during Attack 3.

43.6.5 Validation of Attack 3 by LTDES using DERIM and ADMS-DOTS

43.6.5.1 Case 1: Critical loads distributed across the feeder Figure 10.40 shows the new switch settings and updated topology after applying the resilience-based reconfiguration during Attack 3. This case assumes that there are critical loads distributed throughout the feeder. The system is islanded from the main grid at 13:00 PST and islanding ends at 14:00 hours.



SWITCH	STATE
150-149	OPEN
61-610	OPEN

JUMP	STATE
150-48	CONNECTED

DG	STATE
DG48/65	CONNECTED

1. Islanding happens at 13:00 and ends at 14:00
2. DG 48 can output up to 270 kW
3. DG 65 can output constant 15 kW
4. Using Node 150 as swing node

Figure 10.40: Switch status changes and network reconfiguration in the case when there are critical loads throughout the feeder.

The DERs at node 48 can output up to 270 kW while DERs at node 65 provide a constant 15 kW. In addition, node 150 is considered as the swing node (or slack bus) for the simulation. Figure 10.41 shows the impact of the attack on the total feeder load and Figure 10.42 shows the changes in the net load at all primary nodes without the attack and with the attack (and associated reconfiguration). Results of this simulation indicate that the DERs at nodes 48 and 65 together pick up about 300 kW of the critical load, which represents about 20% of the total baseline load. The remaining 80% of the feeder load (which is non-critical) is shed (goes to zero after the attack in Figure 10.42) to maintain feasibility.



Figure 10.41: Total feeder head load over 24 hour simulation, when there are critical loads throughout the feeder.



Figure 10.42: Primary node load change during Attack 3 between 12:59 and 13:00 PST, when there are critical loads throughout the feeder.

43.6.5.2 Case 2: Critical loads aggregated in a single zone Figure 10.43 shows the new switch settings and updated topology after applying the resilience-based reconfiguration during Attack 3. In this case, all the critical loads are assumed to be concentrated only in zone 3. The feeder is islanded from the main grid at 13:00 PST and islanding ends at 14:00 hours. During reconfiguration, switch 18-135 is opened so that cluster 3 becomes a microgrid. The DERs at node 48 provide sufficient capacity to meet all the load in zone 3 alone. Again, node 150 is used as the slack node for the simulation.



SWITCH	STATE
150-149	OPEN
18-135	OPEN

JUMP	STATE
150-48	CLOSED

DG	STATE
DG48	CONNECTED

1. Islanding happens at 13:00 and end at 14:00
2. Switch 18-135 open to create an microgrid
3. DG 48 has enough generation capacity to maintain region 3 load

Figure 10.43: Attack 3 case where critical loads are only located in zone 3 as a microgrid.

Figure 10.44 shows the changes in the net load at all primary nodes without the attack and with the attack (and associated reconfiguration), as observed from the simulation results, which reveal that the DERs at node 48 pick up all the expected load in zone 3 with 430 kW of generation output.

Thus the main conclusions from the Attack 3 validation using DERIM-ADMS-DOTS are as follows. Under case 1, the reconfiguration algorithm is able to restore all the critical loads throughout the islanded distribution circuit without relying on any power from the main transmission grid. In case 2, all the load in zone 3 (as a microgrid) was completely restored without any loss of load. In both cases, without the SA provided by the EUREICA framework, the control center operator at the substation would not have the necessary means to achieve restoration.



Figure 10.44: Primary node load change during Attack 3 between 12:59 and 13:00 PST, when critical loads are only located in zone 3 as a microgrid.

43.6.6 Validation of Attack 3 by NREL using ARIES

The mitigation of Attack 3 is validated using the RTDS at NREL-ARIES. The implementation of the reconfiguration algorithm in the RunTime environment of RTDS is shown in Figure 10.45.



C:\Users\vvenkata\Documents\RSCAD\RTDS_USER\fileman\EUREICA_I...\Reconfig...
Scripting interface
Node 48 and 66 → Connected to DER)
Switch controls for circuit breakers

Figure 10.45: Implementation of reconfiguration algorithm in RTDS.

In the case where the EUREICA framework is not used, the frequency of the system becomes unstable, and the distribution feeder is broken into islands and only the loads in zone 3 are picked by the DERs in node 48. This plot is shown in Figure 10.46.



Figure 10.46: Distribution feeder broken into islands, with only zone 3 load restored by DERs at node 48.

The case with the EUREICA framework, with the contributions from various DGs and the military microgrid connected at Node 66 has already been demonstrated in Section 43.6.3.

Chapter 11

Conclusion

This project proposed to develop a framework, EUREICA, for achieving grid resilience through the coordination of IoT-Coordinated Assets that are trustable. A local electricity market, that has been previously shown to lead to grid reliability and provide services such as voltage support and overall power balance, is leveraged in this framework to ensure grid resilience. The local market accomplishes this through SA to co-located operators. This SA consists of information about DERs and their power injections, as well as their levels of trustability, commitment, and resilience. With this SA, this project has shown that a range of cyberattacks can be mitigated using local trustable resources without stressing the bulk grid. The demonstrations described in this report were carried out using a variety of platforms with high fidelity, hardware-in-the-loop, and utility-friendly validation software.

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